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Abstract 
 
Stabilization and reconstruction operations are necessary to secure and maintain 
the peace in the aftermath of conflict.  The complexities of nation-building involve many 
different but interrelated systems and institutions.  The basic structure of a country may 
or may not remain; its political, economic, and judicial systems, cultural, educational, 
medical, and military institutions, and critical infrastructure all vitally contribute to the 
overall progression of stability and prosperity.  Understanding the significance of the 
dynamic relationships between the forces in play during stability and reconstruction 
operations is paramount to the successful conclusion of such missions.  The system 
dynamics model proposed in this research functions as a support tool allowing decision-
makers and analysts to investigate different sets of decision approaches at a sub-national, 
regional level.  Concentration on the regional level allows for specific identification and 
investigation of potentially troublesome regions, providing the model-user with more 
detailed information concerning the internal dynamics prevalent within the area of 
operations.  Construction of two different measures via logistic regression, a probability 
of stabilization success and a probability of stabilization failure, provide indication as to 
the successful execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations.  The proposed 
model is a general construct, widely adaptable to a variety of post-conflict nation-
building scenarios.  The model is notionally demonstrated using Operation Iraqi Freedom 
as a test case. 
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INVESTIGATING THE COMPLEXITIES OF  
NATIONBUILDING: A SUB-NATIONAL 
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Background 
 
 As declared by the President of the United States in the September 2002 National 
Security Strategy, the most formidable challenge to freedom and peace in the upcoming 
century will no longer involve large scale conflicts between rival nation-states; rather it is 
the ambitions and destructiveness of global terrorist organizations.  As affirmed by the 
president, the United States will actively seek out and destroy these terrorist 
organizations regardless of their location (Bush, 2002: 5). 
The primary tenet of the United States national security strategy elucidates 
American determination to act preemptively, if necessary, in exercising the right of self-
defense against purveyors of global terrorism (Bush, 2002: 6).  Therefore, denying 
support and sanctuary to terrorists across the globe where enabling conditions for 
terrorism prevail is a primary driver for future military conflicts.  The potential threat to 
the national security of the United States posed by these failing states which are 
inadvertently or actively providing safe harbor to global terrorist organizations provides a 
galvanizing motivation to explore the complexities involved in “convincing or 
compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities” (Bush, 2002: 6).  
 A question remains, however; with what frequency will the US find itself 
involved in sub-national and transnational conflicts within these failed states and why?  
Dr Thomas Barnett, in his book The Pentagon’s New Map; War and Peace in the 
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Twenty-First Century (2004) and other outlets offers one rationale providing context for 
the currently prevailing geopolitical situation.  In particular, in an article written for the 
National Intelligence Council’s 2020 project titled Does the US Face a Future of Never-
ending Subnational and Transnational Violence? Barnett (2004) directly addresses the 
concerns surrounding failed states. 
 Barnett (2004:2) suggests a capitalist economic worldview drives global 
interdependency forward, subtly forcing states to continually integrate economically, 
politically, culturally, and on other levels into a core global whole.  A connectivity is thus 
developed between functioning parts of the global community as globalization extends 
throughout the world.  Those areas that do not connect into this global economy (for 
various reasons) are often found to be the areas where security problems arise (failed 
states).  Barnett (2004:2) emphasizes what the President’s National Security Strategy 
contended, that the world has moved rapidly from a Cold War/global nuclear war era 
through a transitional phase, where rogue states were deemed the most problematic to 
global stability, to the now prevailing geopolitical situation whereby transnational non-
state actors are the drivers of worldwide disruptions to peace.  For a variety of reasons 
these non-state actors (terrorist networks) will continually be found in failed states, with 
those states typically being unattached to the global community. 
 Barnett (2004:3) defines state failure as: 
a state is ‘failing’ if it either cannot attract or build itself the connectivity 
associated with globalization’s progressive advance or if it essentially seeks to 
retard or deny the development of such connectivity out of desire to maintain 
strict political control over its population. 
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 As mentioned, terrorist networks seek out the failed states for a variety of reasons.  
Regimes in failed states often do not have full control over its own territory (e.g., 
Somalia, Afghanistan) allowing groups to arrange agreements with local leaders and set 
up operations without fear of a national government response.  Failed states often 
experience political turmoil which is then exploited by the terrorists to create a supportive 
and friendly environment (e.g. Sudan and potentially other sub-Saharan African states in 
the near future).  Failed states are often ruled by authoritarian regimes offering limited 
support to terrorist networks (e.g. Iran’s support of Hezbollah, Liberia’s offer of 
sanctuary in return for cash).  Barnett suggests an underlying rejectionist ideology 
amongst the terrorist leadership fighting against the “reality of globalization’s progressive 
advance into traditional Islamic societies” as driving rationale behind the current 
geopolitical situation (Barnett, 2004:4).  The terrorists are individuals motivated to fight 
this “assault” on traditional values.  They view the failed states as bases from which to 
strike back against the powers of globalization, the chief of which is the United States. 
 Barnett also discusses the future integration of disconnected regions into the 
global economy, arguing that the disconnected regions lack technological, social, 
economic, and political connectivity to the global economy.  Since the Cold War it is in 
these regions that most of the internal and terrorist violence occurs.  The four 
disconnected regions are:  Southwest Asia/Greater Middle East, Asia Pacific, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and the Caribbean Rim/Central America/Northern Andes region 
(2004:6).  When examining these regions from a historical context it is not difficult to see 
the current problems stem from, in part, national boundaries drawn with imperialistic 
intentions as the primary consideration.  In particular for the Middle East, the Sykes-Picot 
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Treaty implemented at the conclusion of World War I could be argued as a root cause of 
many of the present day problems due to the ethnic fractionalization resulting from the 
politically motivated determination of national borders.  The historical backdrop of the 
disconnected regions complements the rationale put forth by Barnett.  As for nation-
building as US national policy, Barnett directly states the continuing and pressing need 
for nation-building as the US seeks to rehabilitate and reintegrate the failed states into the 
global economy.  In fact, in his book Barnett expounds a controversial vision of a US 
military force-shaping evolution necessary to successfully conduct the potentially 
numerous upcoming nation-building operations. 
 The stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations addressed in this study 
focus primarily on the aftermath of military operations executed to forcibly compel a 
state to alter its policy on terrorism.  Whether the state was actively hostile or simply 
incapable of policing itself is irrelevant; direct military action is assumed to have 
occurred.  A myriad of different political paths could lead to such a stabilization and 
reconstruction effort and, sadly, as discussed above, there appears to be definitive 
potential for future nation-building operations. 
 By design, the model developed is general in nature; it fits the middle-state of a 
particular S&R situation and does not directly factor in the geopolitical events leading up 
to that particular situation.  More specifically, the model does not consider phase I, II, or 
III (partially) operations directly.  The conditions resulting from actions taken in these 
phases are captured by the initial states and growth rates of the variables within the 
model, though the model could be viewed as spanning the overlap of phase III and phase 
IV operations to the end of phase IV. 
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 Phasing operations is a basic tenet of campaign planning (DoD, 2001: III-18).  
Although a commander has leeway to establish actual phases as necessary, the typical 
four phases used to organize the full spectrum of combat and non-combat operations are: 
deter/engage (I), seize initiative (II), decisive operations (III), and transition (IV) (DoD, 
2001: III-19).  Planning and conducting a campaign in phases allows commanders and 
staffs to visualize and think through the entire campaign in terms of forces, resources, 
time, space, and purpose (DoD, 2001: III-18), thus providing a progressive advantage to 
the forces using phased operations.  It is also acknowledged that “phases may be 
conducted sequentially or concurrently and may overlap” (DoD, 2001: III-18). 
 The major assumption of this study presupposes a successful military operation 
that removes a hostile or ineffective (and terrorist enabling) leadership from power.  With 
such a condition existing, the victor finds itself transitioning between phase III and phase 
IV.  Remnants of the hostile regime must be confronted while simultaneously a multitude 
of civil affairs tasks must be completed.  It should be noted that depending on the 
historical time period of the post-conflict operation, S&R operations have been labeled as 
occupation, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement and can be found referenced as such in 
the literature. 
 Stabilization and reconstruction operations are necessary to secure and maintain 
the peace in the aftermath of conflict.  Many factors shape the outcome of S&R 
operations including: the amount of damage inflicted on the state’s infrastructure, non-
combatants killed or injured (along with the associated perception management 
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problems), and the effects of a long term military campaign on neighboring states’ 
stability (Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2003: 21).  
The important overarching goals driving the success of stabilization and 
reconstruction operations are: 
1. Establishment of security – defined as the suppression or destruction of the  
  indigenous elements resisting the emergence of a new society (politically  
  driven  insurgents) or promoting instability for economic reasons   
  (criminally driven insurgents) 
2. Establishment of law and order (justice and reconciliation) 
3. Maintenance of critical infrastructure (social and economic well-being) 
4. Establishment of an effective interim government constituted from the   
  indigenous population 
All four driving goals must be pursued concurrently because of their heavy 
interdependence (Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2003: 
29).  These four main goals are mentioned repeatedly by experts within the peacekeeping 
and reconstruction communities as paramount to success (World Bank: 2004, United 
Nations/World Bank: 2003, Rand: 2003, Feil: 2002, US DoD: 2004, CSIS/AUSA: 2002).  
Arguably, the key factor is that of establishing security as it is an enabler for the other 
factors. Degradation of security increases pressure on stabilization and reconstruction 
operations as pressure for a coalition withdrawal increases.  Insurgent elements violently 
opposing intervention directly inhibit mission success across the spectrum of coalition 
activities; “terrorist or insurgent elements are always engaged in obtaining popular 
support on their home ground and abroad by attacking military targets in areas where 
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Americans are intensely unpopular” (Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations, 2003: 29).  Finding and defeating these insurgent elements is critical to 
overall mission success.   
The systems dynamics model developed in this study functions as a support tool 
allowing decision-makers and analysts to investigate different sets of decision approaches 
at a sub-national regional level.  Of specific import is resource allocation management.  
The proposed model is a general construct, widely adaptable to a variety of post-conflict 
nation-building scenarios.   
Study Focus 
 A wide array of security, economic, infrastructural, geographical, sociological, 
cultural, and historical complexities reflect the ongoing status of S&R operations within 
the area of operations (AOR).  This study expands the current system dynamics model 
proposed by Richardson (2004) to capture the various aspects of the S&R effort as it 
progresses. 
 Richardson demonstrated the viability of applying system dynamics modeling 
techniques (which will be subsequently discussed) to an S&R effort, allowing the 
statistical analysis of various potential macro level policy choices.  This study develops a 
deeper, broadened model, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Model 
(SROM).  The SROM allows for a more detailed analysis of the S&R effort than the 
earlier work done by Richardson.  
 The SROM is a sub-national region based construct as opposed to the nation 
based model put forth by Richardson. This allows the end-users of the model to identify 
potential problem regions within the state, test a wide variety of policy options on a 
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national or regional basis, determine suitable courses of action given a specified set of 
initial conditions, and determine resource allocation methods that best improve overall 
country or regional stability. The different policy options are simulated at the sub-
national regional level, providing higher fidelity solutions to the end-user. Analysis of 
S&R operations via the SROM provides decision makers insight into policy driven 
scenarios, affording them the opportunity of having different policy options modeled, 
simulated, and the outcomes analyzed. 
 The SROM can be used to analyze the importance of the controllable factors 
affecting ongoing S&R operations. By changing different factor levels such as troop 
numbers, the region of troop deployments, troop deployment schedules, indigenous 
security forces training schedules, levels of indigenous popular support, initial number of 
insurgents, civil-military operations in terms of aid money disbursed, and other such level 
values included within the model, the factors’ relative significance and impact to the 
success or failure of the particular instance of nation-building may be investigated. 
Decision-makers and analysts are thus provided a tool able to assist in determining 
appropriate courses of action in stabilization and reconstruction at a regional level within 
a nation. 
 While this model extends the scope of the Richardson model, limitations remain 
in regard to the proper determination of the relationships among the state variables. 
Investigating potentially successful courses of action in terms of policy decisions can 
only be accomplished at the regional level. An excellent goal would be to narrow the 
focus to the city level, but acquiring the necessary level of data remains in doubt with this 
being true even at the regional level. 
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Summary 
 
 Justification for the relevance of this thesis effort in the context of the global war 
on terror (denial of failed states as safe havens for enemy activity) has been presented to 
the reader.  Creation of a sub-national regional level system dynamics model has been 
identified as the approach used to gain insight into the complexities of nation-building.  
Chapter II reviews the relevant literature as it applies to nation-building.  Chapter III 
discusses the development and construction of the general stabilization and 
reconstruction operations model (SROM).  Demonstration of the model using Operation 
Iraqi Freedom as a test case is presented in Chapter IV.  Significant insights, 
recommendations, and suggestions for future work are then offered in Chapter V. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 This chapter examines specific literature for direct application within the 
stabilization and reconstruction model (SROM).  Each area focuses on determining the 
relationships and rates of change between necessary level values incorporated into the 
model.  Typically, each area covers an entire sub-model within the SROM architecture.  
This literature review serves to provide a background context for the reader and to justify 
the reasoning behind values and relations that are used to define the aforementioned level 
values and associated rates of change.  The exact specifications for each will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter III.  This chapter concludes with a discussion on the analytical 
methodology used to evaluate the importance of various level values and the associated 
meaning regarding policy implications. 
System Dynamics 
 Nation-building is an ambitious and difficult foreign policy undertaking.  Few 
national undertakings are as complex, costly, and time-consuming as reconstructing the 
governing institutions of foreign societies (Pei and Kasper, 2003: 1).  Any model 
constructed to simulate the nation-building process must be able to accurately represent 
the inherent dynamics of the situation.  The basic structure of a country may, or may not, 
remain; its political, economic, and judicial systems, cultural, educational, medical, and 
military institutions, and critical infrastructure all vitally contribute to the overall 
progression toward stability and prosperity.  The country’s many interdependent systems 
lend themselves to study via a system dynamics model and indeed, as mentioned in 
Chapter I, Richardson demonstrated the viability of the concept. 
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 System dynamics, with its underlying principles of interdependent systems has its 
roots in systems of difference equations and differential equations (Forrester, 1980: Sec 
3.3).  Common principles such as feedback loops, time delays, levels, and rates are used 
to describe each of the individual systems, which when taken together, describes a larger, 
target system of interest.  By investigating the levels and rates associated with the 
individual systems a better understanding of the whole system can be achieved. 
 The Richardson model used national level systems to model the nation as a 
whole.  The SROM consists of sub-national regional systems together modeling regions 
within the country.  A region’s systems are then integrated with other regions’ systems as 
appropriate.  In addition to this narrowing of focus, the individual systems within each 
region are further refined.  In some cases, such as critical infrastructure and population 
characteristics, the systems are expanded dramatically over those in Richardson’s original 
model.  In other cases, such as criminal, insurgent, and coalition military activity, the 
systems are entirely revamped.  These changes allow a higher fidelity investigation into 
the relative significance of different sets of decision approaches at a sub-national regional 
level.   
Criminal Activities 
 The attendant socioeconomic problems within a state recovering from a major 
violent political transition such as a militarily enforced regime change necessarily involve 
a transient period of lawlessness and rampant criminal activity.  In seeking to more 
accurately capture the characteristics of this period within the nation-building paradigm, a 
more thorough review of criminal activity and the associated criminal statistics was 
conducted. 
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 When constructing a system dynamics model, identifying the important level 
values and their rates of change is of particular importance.  In the context of law 
enforcement the SROM is concerned with police, police training rates, performance 
levels of police (arrest rates), criminals, crime rates, and the associated demographic and 
cultural conditions affecting each of these areas.  Together these elements represent a 
region’s criminal culture and the capacity of the society to mitigate the negative effects of 
that culture. 
 Some basic questions need to be addressed.  How many police are typically 
appropriate for a given number of citizens?  How many police are required to maintain 
law and order given a certain amount of criminal activity?  What is the typical murder 
rate for a given crime rate? What effect does unemployment have on the crime rate? Does 
economic growth have a significant impact? What about the urbanization level?  A study 
conducted by Niskanen for the Cato Institute presents a statistical analysis of the relation 
between crime rates and public safety resources and provides tentative solutions to many 
of the questions raised above (1994: 1). 
 Niskanen attempts to answer many of the questions posed above.  He first 
discusses a “supply of crimes” (1994:6), the key variable in part of his study.  To provide 
the “supply of crimes” a model of criminal activity is put forth.  It should be noted that 
there are psycho-social models of criminal activity as well as economic models.  Both 
types of model attempt to model criminal behavior in order to better understand it.    
Niskanen focuses on the economics of crime and acknowledges many contributors to the 
economics of crime literature to include: foremost Becker (1968), then Erlich (1973), 
Craig (1987), Trumbull (1989), and Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger (1993).  Niskanen 
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states the central hypothesis of the extended Becker rational choice economic model of 
crime: 
 
the crime rate is expected to be a negative function of the probability and 
expected severity of criminal sanctions, a positive function of returns to criminal 
activity, a negative function of returns to legal activity, and a positive function of 
the share of the population that may have a relative tolerance of or preference for 
criminal activity. (Niskanen, 1994: 6) 
 
The coefficients of the significant predictor variables in Niskanen’s regression provide 
solutions to the aforementioned questions.  The data used in Niskanen’s study will first 
be discussed, followed by his results. 
 The data used in Niskanen’s study set the demographic and cultural conditions.  
The data comes from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1993) and reflects the 
crime and related conditions by state, in the US, for the calendar year of 1991.  It is from 
this data set that certain assumptions for the SROM are derived.  Niskanen lists the 
minimum, average, and maximum violent and property crimes committed per 100,000 
citizens.  The minimum, average, and maximum number of police per 10,000 citizens are 
also listed (1994: 6).  From these numbers certain generalities can be assumed for use 
within SROM.  These relationships are detailed in Chapter III under the law enforcement 
sub-model description. 
 The criminal relationships used in the SROM drawn from Niskanen’s study are 
based on data from a peaceful, stable United States.  It would be reasonable to question 
the use of relationships derived from such data.  However, Fajnzylber, Lederman, and 
Loayza note the difficulty in carrying out cross-country studies; the most notable 
problems being that of mismeasurement and underreporting (2000: 3-4).  They further 
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note that “underreporting is widespread in countries with low quality police and judicial 
systems and with poorly educated populations” (Fajnzylber et al, 2000:3-4).  
Examination of their cross-country summary statistics reveals that the homicide rate of 
the United States is over twice as much as the homicide rate for the Middle East region 
(Israel, Jordan, Egypt).  Thus, the US data indicates a much higher homicide rate than 
that of the Middle East, but the Middle East probably underreports.  In view of these 
facts, it was deemed reasonable to assume the relationships derived from the United 
States data are plausible for use in a post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction 
scenario, especially considering that when applicable, the data used will be from 
maximums or doubled averages. 
 The Niskanen study allows the determination of certain rates of change between 
level values.  Niskanen finds that, “as expected, an increase in legal economic 
opportunities reduces the crime rate” (1994: 9); a one percent increase in unemployment 
increases violent crime by nine percent.  A second useful determination is that of the 
urban effect.  A one point increase in a state’s urbanization level increases both the 
violent and property crime rate by 0.9 percent (Niskanen, 1994: 10).  Niskanen’s 
rationale suggests a higher productivity rate for criminals relative to police within highly 
urbanized metropolitan areas.  Another very important find is that economic growth 
reduces many problems; an increase in per capita income reduces violent and property 
crime by a proportional amount.  It is suggested that an economic growth strategy may be 
more effective in reducing crime than a public safety strategy, especially if 
unemployment is decreased among the male youth (Niskanen, 1994: 13).  A similar 
strategy is worthy of consideration in the nation-building context. 
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 Niskanen’s study goes on to identify many more significant conditions affecting 
the crime rate in a state.  These include the percentage of single mothers (crime up), the 
percentage of minorities (crime up), and the percentage of church goers (crime down).  
While interesting, these finding are beyond the scope of this model and indeed their 
direct application to a failed state paradigm maybe limited considering the inherent 
cultural and economic differences between populations. 
 While Niskanen addressed many of the questions concerning crime, others 
remain.  Fajnzylber et al (2000) analyze the determinants of national crime rates across 
countries and over time using an economic model of crime.  So while Niskanen examined 
statewide crime rates within the US, Fajnzylber et al examine crime across different 
nations where the shared cultural and economic characteristics of the indigenous people 
may bias the proclivity for criminal activity within a nation.  The stated objective of 
Fajnzylber et al in their paper, “What Causes Violent Crime?,” is to gain insight into the 
social and economic causes of worldwide violent crime (2000: 1). 
 Fajnzylber et al follow the Becker rational choice cost-benefit theory of crime and 
choose the explanatory variables for their study accordingly.  The basic Fajnzylber et al 
model considers the lagged crime rate, the economic growth rate, income per capita, 
income inequality, and average education.  Additionally, they include four extensions: 
deterrence factors (number of police and presence of death penalty), presence of illegal 
drug industry, demographics, and cultural issues (geographic region and religion).  
Fajnzylber et al acknowledge that measurement error makes it difficult to compare crime 
rates across countries (due to underreporting, varying confidence in police, social stigma, 
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and so forth) but contend that the associated bias is reduced by their selection of the types 
of crime modeled and the econometric methodology employed (2000: 3). 
 The Fajnzylber et al results provide additional evidence that economic variables 
successfully capture criminal behavior and account for criminal inertia as well.  
Specifically, the identified variables were: economic growth, inequality, and past crime 
rates (2000: 23).  As for economic growth rate, Fajnzylber et al report that a one point 
increase in the GDP growth rate decreases the murder rate by 2.4 percent (2000: 18).  
Fajnzylber et al also contend that there is clear evidence that violent crime is self 
perpetuating (criminal inertia); the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (crime 
rate) is positive and significant across all model variations. 
 Fajnzylber et al offer two rationales by which past crime breeds future crime; 
criminal behavior and law enforcement performance.  First, the cost of performing 
criminal activity declines with the passing of time as criminals become more efficient in 
their trade (learning curve), the moral loss of breaking the law is reduced by committing 
the crime and by interacting with other criminals (criminal culture).  Second, law 
enforcement failures (arrest and/or conviction rates) reduce the criminals’ perception of 
apprehension, a factor in the choice to commit crime (2000: 18).  The implication here is 
that besides the increased incapacitation of criminals due to additional police, more 
police will deter criminals due to the increased perception of apprehension (conversely, 
in the presence of a breakdown in society and withdrawal of police, more crime will 
occur).  In addition, once there are fewer criminals, criminal inertia will have less of an 
impact; a culture of law and order must be established to further assist in mitigating the 
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effects of crime.  Not surprisingly, the establishment of law and order is one of the 
primary goals for stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
 Some basic questions still remain unanswered (typical arrest rates, murder rates, 
and deterrence rates).  Levitt (1995), attempts to determine the difference between 
incapacitation effects and deterrence effects on crime rates.  Levitt acknowledges Becker 
as the initial purveyor of the economic model of crime and explains why deterrence is the 
most important factor within that model (1995: 3).  If the cost of committing the crime is 
too high, according to the model, then the criminal will not commit the crime; the 
criminal is deterred.   
 In implementing his study Levitt uses a panel of US city-level arrest data from 
1970 to 1992 for the seven index crimes.  The crime rates per 100,000 people for each of 
the index crimes are given, as are the associated arrest rates for the crimes (Levitt 1995: 
Table 1).  The proportion of crimes (how many murders on average, relative to robbery 
or burglary, and so forth) is of particular import.  From these summary statistics certain 
useful rates can be determined, including typical arrest rates and murder rates. 
 Levitt found a negative correlation between arrest rates and crime rates which is 
noted to be consistent with the economic model of crime and the predicted effects of 
incapacitation and deterrence.  Levitt was able to break the coefficients for each of the 
index crimes into incapacitation and deterrence effects (1995: Table 7).  This dichotomy 
is particularly useful for the SROM because it indicates the number of criminals deterred 
per arrest; the calculations are shown in Chapter III under the law enforcement sub-model 
description. 
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 Levitt provided a rough estimate of the number of crimes committed per criminal 
per year.  This value, fifteen, is taken from prisoner self reports (1995: 28).  From his 
work Levitt estimates that the “reduction in index crimes associated with an additional 
person-year of incapacitation ranges from 5.1 to 8.2,” depending on the type of crime 
committed (1995: 27).  The values calculated for the incapacitation effect are of the same 
order of magnitude as the criminal self-reports, giving Levitt further positive feedback 
supporting his work.  The small discrepancy is explained as resulting from multiple 
perpetrators involved in a single crime and replacement effects as one criminal 
immediately replaces the newly incarcerated criminal.  The number of crimes committed 
per criminal per year is useful in calculating a rough estimate of the crime rate within a 
region given the number of criminals.  Of course, if more nation specific data is available, 
it should be utilized. 
 A key issue is the effect of crime on society.  Bourguignon (1999: 3), Tullio and 
Quarella (1998), and Bejarano (2003: 49-50) each discuss the negative costs to a 
country’s GDP due to criminal activity.  Bejarano suggests a natural crime rate inherent 
to any economy as a function of income per capita and the capacity of the judicial system 
to keep criminal activity constrained (2003: 44).  Failure of the judicial system to 
adequately protect a society from criminal action will allow increased criminal activity 
resulting in economic erosion.  This economic erosion is typically measured by 
economists as a 1% to 2% loss of GDP annually (Tullio and Quarella: 15, Bejarano, 49); 
if the crime rates are high enough the effect might reach as high as 7% (Bourguignon, 
50). 
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 Bejarano’s paper is of particular interest for this thesis because of its focus on 
Colombia.  Colombia’s murder rate (as of 1995) was 72 per 100,000 people.  A myriad of 
factors explain why it is so high, approximately 2.5 times higher than the Latin America 
average of approximately 28 per 100,000 people.  These factors include numerous anti-
government insurgent groups, an entrenched drug trafficking industry, and an ineffective 
judicial system.  Tullio and Quarella parallel these findings in their study of southern 
Italy, where ineffective government, poor judicial practices, and extensive organized 
crime all contribute to poor growth in GDP.  Bejarano, utilizing the work of Londono 
(1996: 7), suggests that Colombia’s extremely high murder rate points to an annual GDP 
loss of 5% compared to the 2% loss suffered by other countries in the Latin American 
region (Bejarano, 2003: 49-50). 
 The theoretical justification of why crime affects economic growth so negatively 
should be discussed.  Tullio and Quarella suggest that crime affects an economy much as 
taxation does except that there is no return on capital in terms of services provided (1998: 
10).  A society must redirect resources from productive uses to fight crime.  Whether the 
public sector protects society by raising taxes to increase public safety activities or the 
private sector spends capital to protect its investments, resources are spent to combat the 
negative criminal effects.  Organized crime, criminal gangs, insurgent groups, and simple 
criminals effectively accomplish a redistribution of resources due to their criminal 
activity (Tullio and Quarella, 10).  Besides the wasted funds combating criminal 
elements, direct criminal activity harms the economy as well; murder, robbery, 
kidnappings, extortion, protection fees, and ransom demands are perpetrated against 
corporations and citizens, breeding a culture of lawlessness, fear, and insecurity 
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(Bejarano, 2003: 49-50).  This culture threatens property rights, discourages 
accumulation of capital, and generally hurts the capitalistic entrepreneurial spirit.  Law 
abiding entities will seek out different locales because there is no incentive to invest in 
the unstable area in question (Tullio and Quarella).  As previously mentioned, a criminal 
inertia exists, and so once the law enforcement establishment has been weakened the 
effort required to return the area to a reasonable level of security will be markedly 
increased.  As far as direct application in the SROM, Bejarano’s implication that a natural 
baseline murder rate of 28 per 100,000 citizens results in a 2% decrease in GDP was used 
to assess the criminal effect on the economy in a stabilization and reconstruction 
operational context.  Any civilian death rate higher than the baseline will result in a 
further reduction of the GDP growth rate (Bejarano, 2003: 49-50).  
 Overall, Niskanen, Fajnzylber et al, Levitt, and Bejarano provide detailed 
quantitative criminal characteristics justified by statistical analysis of regressions based 
on real world data sets and modeled using the extended Becker economic model of crime.  
The results obtained from the review of the criminal activity literature are used in 
defining rate relationships among the law enforcement level values of the SROM and are 
detailed, as appropriate, in the next chapter.  While not all of these figures are from failed 
nations, they do provide approximations based on the open literature.  As better data 
becomes available, the relations can be improved. 
Insurgent Activities 
 An unfortunate reality facing US and coalition allies attempting to rebuild a 
country is the likely existence of the preconditions for insurgency.  Not surprisingly, the 
conditions necessary for insurrections are often found in failed states.  This is especially 
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true after military action is taken to remove the previous regime.  Steven Metz (2003: 28) 
identifies the “raw material” for insurgency: “anger, resentment, alienation, frustration, a 
unifying ideology”.  Additionally important is access to resources, particularly arms and 
money.  Again, a failed state will likely be rife with these necessary conditions. 
 In his article “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” Metz discusses the 
situation in Iraq.  In recognizing the importance of achieving success in Iraq, he notes 
that Iraq is a test case in helping the Arab world become more open, economically and 
politically.  Metz specifically states: 
the conflict there will help determine whether the world continues its difficult and 
uneven movement toward a global system based on open governments and 
economies or fractures into a new bipolarity. (Metz, 2003: 26) 
 
Metz further identifies the Middle East region as the most resistant to the US global 
vision.  Interestingly, Metz’s thoughts parallel the points made by Barnett, outlined in 
Chapter I. 
 Generally an insurgency begins with the failure of the state to address the needs of 
the people.  Some problems that Metz lists are: “social or regional polarization, 
sectarianism, endemic corruption, crime, radicalism, or rising expectations” (2003: 26).  
A population is even more unforgiving when it is a foreign power failing in support of the 
people; even the mere presence of foreign troops often exacerbates sensitive situations 
(Metz, 2003: 26).  Thus, it is a narrow window in which a nation-building operation must 
operate.  The issues identified as problematic when executing stability and reconstruction 
operations need to be recognized and incorporated into any model attempting to 
realistically simulate a nation-building incidence.  Some crucial concerns are further 
outlined by Metz and are germane to the discussion here.  
22 
 One concern is the existence of a security vacuum in the time immediately 
following the overthrow of the previous regime.  The allowance of lawlessness breeds a 
culture of chaos and disorder within the nation and makes the eventual establishment of 
order more difficult (Metz, 2003: 27).  Reconstruction projects and economic assistance, 
both instrumental in the rebuilding of the country, are harmed by the lawlessness.  
Additionally, this period can witness severe looting and destruction of critical 
infrastructure within the country which will again slow rehabilitation efforts.  Metz feels 
the importance of infrastructure cannot be overstated (Metz, 2003: 27).  It will be 
addressed more fully later in this chapter.   
 Not surprisingly, insurgents hinder the nation-building effort on many fronts.  
Insurgents directly attack coalition troops, guarantors of security.  They hurt economic 
recovery by driving away efforts to disburse aid funds.  Reconstruction projects are 
attacked, harming the rebuilding of infrastructure.  Once the indigenous people take part 
in their own future and begin to fill in the ranks of security forces (police, civil defense, 
and army) within the country, the insurgents attack them as well.  As has occurred in past 
insurgencies, the insurgents may even attack civilian populace bases seen as collaborating 
with the “enemy” (the US and its coalition partners). 
 An examination of the relevant information contained in the Brookings Institution 
“Iraq Index” (2005), which provides summary information on a range of activities inside 
Iraq since the declared end of major combat operations (1 May 2003), bares out the above 
stipulations concerning insurgent actions.  The data presented by the Brookings 
Institution is the primary source in determining the number of daily insurgent attacks in 
this study.  This calculation results from the development of a regression model using the 
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Brookings Institution data.  The number of daily insurgent attacks is a function of the 
number of insurgents, a quadratic effect resulting from the one month lagged number of 
insurgents, and a moving average of the coalition troops casualty rate.  
 Besides successfully modeling the actions of insurgents, a significant issue 
concerns the recruitment of insurgents.  If the insurgents are able to replace their combat 
losses quicker than coalition forces can capture or eliminate them, than the insurgency 
will grow.  It is of primary importance that the dynamics involving recruitment of 
additional insurgents be correctly modeled.  Unfortunately, the extent of specific open 
source literature addressing this topic is minimal.  However, various literature on violent 
conflict leads to a number of insights. 
 “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” authored by Collier and Hoeffler (2001) 
discusses the causes of civil war.  Rebellion is typically explained by the grievances of 
the rebels such as income inequality, poor political rights, and ethnic and religious 
divisions amid society.  In addition, rebellion may be explained by opportunities for 
rebellion.  Collier and Hoeffler test which set of conditions provides more explanatory 
power, grievance or economic viability (greed).  They develop a set of explanatory 
variables that proxy greed and grievance to then determine which set of variables most 
accurately explain the onset of rebellion.  A data set of 78 large civil conflicts dating 
from 1960 to 1999 was used to facilitate their study. 
 In discussing the opportunity for rebellion, a host of categories can be described.  
The first of which is the extent of rebel finance.  This rebel income can be derived from a 
primary commodity export (such as oil, diamonds, and so forth), foreign diasporas, or 
neighboring hostile governments.  The SROM assumes that conditions are such that 
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sufficient financing exists for the insurgency.  Further support from outside the AOR is 
modeled by the infiltration of foreign insurgents. 
 Collier and Hoeffler go on to discuss the cost of recruiting.  The cost of recruiting 
new insurgents may be related to the income foregone by enlisting in the insurgency 
(2001: 4).  This reasoning complements the extended Becker economic theory of crime 
whereby legal economic opportunities raise the cost of crime and thereby forces a 
decline.  Collier and Hoeffler suggest three proxies for foregone income: income per 
capita, male secondary schooling, and the growth rate of the economy.  All three of these 
variables are found to have a significant and substantial effect on the reduction of conflict 
(2001: 16).  Within the SROM, the growth rate of the economy has an impact on the 
recruitment of insurgents, directly and also indirectly by reducing the pool of potential 
insurgents through the reduction of the number of unemployed. 
 As far as grievance is concerned, Collier and Hoeffler use four measures: ethnic 
or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality.  For 
the SROM, the concern here is with ethnic and religious hatred (though the other 
measures should certainly be addressed in future studies), as they are widely thought of 
as a primary cause of civil conflict (2001: 6).  Used widely in conflict analysis literature, 
an ethnic-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index score can be generated from the 
population distribution inside a nation or region.  This index score indicates the extent to 
which the population is fractionalized into many different groups.  Specifically, the index 
score is the chance that two people within the region do not belong to the same ethnic (or 
religious) group and is thus a simple measure of diversity within a culture.  A value of 
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zero indicates the society is completely homogenous whereas a value of one indicates a 
completely heterogeneous society (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001: 32). 
 Besides the fractionalization of a society as a proxy for ethnic tension, Collier and 
Hoeffler discuss another proxy adapted from Esteban and Ray (1994), polarization.  The 
argument here is that polarization is a better measure of inter-group tension than simple 
diversity.  The ultimate goal of these grievance measures is to accurately capture the 
inter-group hatreds that ultimately lead to civil strife and conflict. 
 In their work “On the Duration of Civil War”, Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 
(2001) revisit the civil war topic but this time in the context of determining the conditions 
necessary for the end of the conflict; or put another way, to determine the conflict drivers.  
In this paper the authors find that ethnic fractionalization is a significant determinant in 
the length of the conflict.  In fact, both ethnic fractionalization and its square are highly 
significant and Collier et al note that the duration of conflict reaches its maximum when 
the index score is approximately half (2001: 10).  This implies that conflict is most likely 
when there are just a few large ethnic or religious groups rather than many small groups 
or a single dominant group. 
When discussing insurgent recruiting, an important factor remains.  The influence 
of the media is typically regarded as quite substantial.  Indeed it is important, to the 
coalition effort and that of the insurgents as well.  As previously mentioned, insurgent 
elements are always engaged in obtaining the popular support of the indigenous people to 
further their political and military goals (Transforming for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Operations, 2003: 29).  Thus, developing “a uniform, consistent message 
that supports a political strategy with attainable political-military objectives is vital” to 
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undermining an insurgency (Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations, 2003: 25).  A consistent, compelling message is important.  Besides the 
synergistic effect on coalition operations across all stabilization and reconstruction 
elements, human relations are crucial to winning the peace.  “To be successful the United 
States must gain trust and create a state in which the citizens of an ‘occupied’ nation feel 
that their condition is improved and that they have hope for the future” (Transforming for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2003: 101-102).  Communications between 
coalition forces and the indigenous population are necessary to “bridge cultural 
differences, establish trust, deliver our message, and counter disinformation about our 
intent” (Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2003: 102). 
 A major insurgent methodology is the spreading of misinformation to damage the 
credibility of stabilization and reconstruction forces.  A biased mass media only 
exacerbates the problem.  In Changing Minds Winning Peace the research panel came to 
an insidious conclusion: “we were also told that if America does not define itself, the 
extremists will do it for us” (2003: 8).  It is self-evident that the US must embrace public 
diplomacy as a tool to positively influence the perceptions of certain target audiences and 
in terms of the battle for indigenous popular support, mass media can act as the main 
communication vehicle for the insurgent and terrorist elements.  Which side makes the 
most impact on the target audience (potential insurgent recruits) and how does the impact 
make its presence felt in terms of the recruitment rates?  Examination of relevant 
marketing literature, in particular consumer behavior, provides some interesting 
information and allows the development of a proxy measure for use in the SROM. 
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 Especially constructive for the SROM media influence effect is the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA).  The main premise of Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) Theory of 
Reasoned Action is that a person's intention is the main predictor and influencer of 
attitude.  If a person intends to do something then they will more than likely do it.  If they 
do not intend to take action (engage in a certain behavior) then they will more then likely 
not do it (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980).  This implies the existence of a seemingly 
behavioral inertia.  The Theory of Reasoned Action suggests two main influencers of 
intention; the attitude towards the behavior and subjective norms relating to the behavior. 
 The attitude towards the behavior derives from the person's previous attitude 
toward the behavior.  The Theory of Reasoned Action contends that people consider the 
implications of their actions before they decide to engage or not engage in a given 
behavior.  An attitude forms about the overall decision and the behavior central to the 
decision (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). 
 The second suggested main influencer of a person’s intentions is “subjective 
norms.”  The subjective norms come from a person's belief of how certain specific, 
important individuals or groups regard the contemplated action or inaction concerning the 
behavior, to include the perceived motivation driving the person’s action or inaction 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980).  What outside influencers will think of the decision and how 
important these outside influencers are to the decision maker play a vital role in the 
subjective norms.  For many it is rare to make an important life decision quickly without 
consulting close and valued sources.  People want to feel that they have made the most 
educated and best decision for themselves.  The SROM must model these media effects. 
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 Based on the current population support level values within the SROM a 
predisposed portion of sub-groupings of a population (e.g. within Iraq - Sunnis not 
supporting coalition reconstruction and stabilization activities, Shiites not supporting 
coalition reconstruction and stabilization activities, and so forth) are more likely to join 
the insurgency based on a personal attitude towards the insurgency (TRA) and friends, 
family, clergy, tribal, and/or others attitudes toward the insurgency (TRA- subjective 
norms).  If those individuals that are predisposed to favoring the insurgency have not yet 
committed to active membership because of their own concerns or because of the 
thoughts and influences of those around them, then it is contended here that media, 
especially a biased media (e.g. Al-Jazeera) will reinforce the insurgency-friendly view 
and push some of those individuals on the edge from inactive support of the insurgency 
to an active, violent role in the insurgency.  A baseline rate is established and modified by 
the market penetration of insurgency friendly media and the prevalence of that particular 
medium within the AOR. 
 Lastly, it should be noted that media influence extends beyond the bounds of the 
SROM.  Media affects the perceptions of the coalition population base which can 
influence the political situation at home and thereby alter the situation in the nation-
building AOR.  Additionally, media influence could potentially affect the morale of 
coalition troops as well as dynamically impact indigenous security forces recruiting 
efforts within the AOR.  Currently, these effects are beyond the scope of the model, but 
the far reaching effects of the media are acknowledged. 
 The aggregation of these various sources, to include certain aspects of the 
criminal activity research, provides a foundation for a theoretical measure in which the 
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insurgent recruitment rate within a region is determined by the many different economic, 
demographic, military, and geopolitical factors.  The insurgent recruit rate is a function of 
the perceived military success of the insurgency, the population diversity within the 
region and the country, the polarization of the population sub-groups (nationally and 
regionally), the presence of foreign troops as an aggravating factor, the growth of the 
economy in terms of GDP per capita and unemployment changes, an urbanization effect, 
the percentage of unemployed males, media influence, and the support of the population 
sub-groups for the coalition stabilization and reconstruction effort.  Each of these factors 
modifies a baseline recruitment rate, affecting each of the population subgroups in a 
different manner according to their support of the coalition effort.  The detailed equation 
is explained fully in Chapter III under the insurgent and coalition military sub-model, 
insurgent recruit rate subsystem. 
Social and Economic Developmental Framework 
 One of the four major focus areas identified by experts within the peacekeeping 
and reconstruction communities, the social and economic well-being of a society is an 
important determinant of stabilization and reconstruction operational success.  Rand 
corporation notes that reconstructing a nation’s economy is not sufficient for success by 
itself; nation-building is about political transformation not economic viability (2003: xix).  
While an excellent point, and a consideration that must be kept in mind, the implicit 
suggestion contends that political transformation (and thus mission success) will heavily 
depend on the economic and social development of the post-conflict state.  The society 
must have its social and economic needs addressed; if not, coalition forces risk ever 
increasing hostility from the indigenous population.  For example, in the Iraq Needs 
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Assessment it is stated that the macroeconomic prospects for Iraq depend heavily on 
security, functionality of basic utilities and services, and the expansion of the oil and 
private sectors (2003: 6).  A poor, starving, sick, homeless, uneducated, and/or jobless 
populace will be much more inclined to join insurgency forces should such living 
conditions continue for an extended period of time.  Collier’s study of renewed conflict 
potential in post-conflict society also recognizes the importance of an improving 
economy.  Collier states that a lack of economic opportunity increases the risk of conflict 
and suggests four proxy measures by which to capture this effect: per capita income, 
male secondary school enrollment, per capita income growth, and population growth 
(2000: 7).   
 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of 
the United States Army (AUSA) published a task framework for post-conflict 
reconstruction.  In it the social and economic pillar is defined: 
 
Social and economic well-being addresses fundamental social and economic 
needs; in particular provision of emergency relief, restoration of essential services 
to the population, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of an 
inclusive, sustainable development program. (2002: 3) 
 
 
 In their framework CSIS/AUSA identify many key aspects of nation-building that 
should be addressed; with specific regard to the social and economic well-being of a 
society, the many areas include: assisting refugees and internally displaced persons, food 
security, public health, shelter, education, social safety net (pensions), economic 
development strategy, physical infrastructure, employment generation, financial market 
reconstitution, economic legal reform, and investment (2002: 12-16).  The SROM 
addresses food security, investment in terms of aid, public health in terms of potable 
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water, job creation, and overall economic development (with respect to rehabilitation of 
critical infrastructure and determination of GDP).  The SROM assumes a complementary 
level of progression in the areas not directly modeled.  Chapter V addresses those areas 
which should be considered in extended versions of the model. 
 A nation’s critical infrastructure refers not only to just the physical domain.  It 
encompasses many of the services, institutions, and people (like those named above) 
necessary for the functionality of the nation to carry forward.  The President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) defines an infrastructure as: 
 
a network of independent man-made systems and processes functioning 
collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of 
essential goods and services (PCCIP, 1997: 3) 
 
 
These increasingly complex infrastructure systems directly impact the security, economic 
prosperity, and social well being of the state.  Any model hoping to accurately capture the 
dynamic process of nation-building must include the nation’s infrastructure systems. 
 While much of the literature identifies and discusses the need for development of 
the infrastructure as an enabler of economic growth and prosperity (and hence political 
stability), the specifics of the discussion often ignore the interdependency of the many 
differing yet linked infrastructure systems.  When examining the rehabilitation or the 
growth of a nation’s critical infrastructure the various systems’ interdependency must be 
considered in any developmental plans. 
 Identifying, understanding, and analyzing these interdependencies can be 
problematic.  The magnitude and complexity of the infrastructure systems only increases 
this difficulty (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly, 2001: 12).  Rinaldi et al suggest six 
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dimensions for describing infrastructure interdependencies.  These dimensions are 
comprised of the various interrelated factors and system conditions that can affect 
infrastructures and include: infrastructure characteristics, state of operation, type of 
interdependencies, environment, and coupling and response behavior (Rinaldi et al, 2001: 
12).  These dimensions are formulated so as to represent all the different manners and 
degrees to which infrastructures can interrelate.  Identifying the dimensions in which the 
infrastructures interrelate allows application of the appropriate associations and links to 
the different infrastructure systems.  Rinaldi et al define dependency as “a linkage or 
connection between two infrastructures, through which the state of one infrastructure 
influences or is correlated to the state of the other” (2001: 12).  For the SROM, this 
dependency entails matching various supported infrastructure level values and their rate 
changes with the appropriate level values of supporting infrastructures.  Infrastructures 
can support multiple infrastructures and in turn be supported by many.  This interlocking 
of infrastructure systems can be thought of as a system of systems.  Rinaldi et al state that 
 
Infrastructures are frequently connected at multiple points through a wide variety 
of mechanisms, such that a bidirectional relationship exists between the states of 
any given par of infrastructures; that is, infrastructure I depends on j through some 
links, and j likewise depends on I through other links. (2001: 14) 
 
 
 When examining a system of infrastructures, it is important to realize that the 
extent of the interdependencies increases the complexity of the overall national system.  
Put another way, the overall complexity of the national level infrastructure system is 
“characterized by multiple connections among infrastructures, feedback and feedforward 
paths, and intricate, branching topologies” (Rinaldi et al, 2001: 14).  Analyzing the 
behavior of a single system in isolation will yield flawed results; thus, analysis of a 
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system of multiple infrastructures must be accomplished in a “holistic” manner (Rinaldi 
et al, 2001: 14).  It is readily seen that system dynamics lends itself naturally to the study 
of infrastructures.  As for SROM application, an excellent graphic depiction of six basic 
infrastructures and their interdependencies provides a guiding template (see Figure 2.1 
from Rinaldi et al). 
 
Figure 2.1  Example of Infrastructure Interdependencies (Rinaldi et al, 2001: 15) 
 
 Again, the importance of national infrastructure systems cannot be overstated; any 
model hoping to accurately capture the dynamic process of nation-building must include 
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these systems.  “What happens to one infrastructure can directly and indirectly affect 
other infrastructures, impact large geographic regions, and send ripples throughout the 
national and global economy” (Rinaldi et al, 2001: 16).  An excellent depiction of the 
effects of the 2001 California power disruptions are shown in Figure 2.2 from Rinaldi et 
al and illustrate many of the concepts discussed concerning the propagating effects 
disruptions in one infrastructure can have on interdependent infrastructures; the higher 
the dependency, the higher order of effect. 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Example of 2001 Electric Power Disruption (Rinaldi et al, 2001: 19) 
  
 Given projected operational capacities of different infrastructures within the 
incident AOR, the SROM can provide analysis of limiting factors and assist in 
identifying areas for improvement within the nation-building context.  This is achieved 
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by properly modeling the effects of infrastructure disruptions resulting from disparate 
growth between dependent infrastructures and/or damages suffered from insurgent 
attacks. 
Response Surface Methodology 
 With a functioning model providing results, a method for analyzing the data must 
be chosen.  In general terms, response surface methodology (RSM) is “a collection of 
statistical and mathematical techniques useful for developing, improving, and optimizing 
processes” (Myers and Montgomery, 2002: 1).  Used extensively in industry, RSM 
typically involves the investigation of the influence of several process variables on some 
performance measure or quality characteristic of a product or process (response variable).  
In graphical terms, the n process variables form an n-dimensional hyperplane with the 
experimenters, scientists, or engineers typically seeking the maximization or 
minimization of that hyperplane with respect to a single (or multiple) response variables.  
More specifically, RSM is defined as: 
 
The field of response surface methodology consists of the experimental strategy 
for exploring the space of the process or independent variables, empirical 
statistical modeling to develop an appropriate approximating relationship between 
the response and the process variables, and optimization methods for finding the 
levels or values of the process variables that produce desirable values of the 
responses. (Myers and Montgomery, 2002: 3) 
 
 In many studies, the underlying relationship between the response variable and 
the process variables is known exactly (such as chemical or engineering processes and 
physical principles).  The RSM model in such a situation would be written as 
ε+= ),,,( 21 nxxxgy K , where some function g of the n process variables plus the error ε 
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in the system together produce the response variable y.  In many other studies, such as 
this one, the exact underlying mechanism is not fully understood.  This lack of 
understanding results in the RSM model becoming ε+= ),,,( 21 nxxxfy K , where the 
function f is an approximation of the unknown function g.  The function f is typically a 
first order or second order polynomial derived from least squares regression analysis 
(Myers and Montgomery, 2002: xiii).  The second order model is widely used for a 
variety of reasons to include flexibility, ease of parameter estimation using the method of 
least squares, and real past experiences validating its use (Myers and Montgomery, 2002: 
8).  The model is expressed as ∑ ∑∑∑
=<==
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n
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jiij
n
j
jjj
n
j
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2
1
0 ββββη and reflects 
the inclusion of first order main effects, effects from interactions between the quadratic 
effects, and the main effects (Myers and Montgomery, 2002: 8). 
 Myers and Montgomery suggest that typical application of RSM is accomplished 
in three phases.  Phase zero of the RSM study involves the screening experiment.  
Generally a study begins with selection of the factors or variables most important to the 
response of interest.  Usually an experiment is conducted to filter down from many 
factors to just the important ones.  In phase one, now that the important variables are 
identified, the current settings of the process variables are tested to examine the nearness 
to the stated desired goal or optimum.  These settings are then adjusted utilizing the 
method of steepest ascent.  This method is concerned with exploring the response surface 
in the search of improved response.  Phase two begins when it is determined that phase 
one has led to a result near the goal.  A second order model is then typically used to 
obtain a more precise model of the response surface at this near optimum area (Myers 
and Montgomery, 2002: 10-11). 
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 Applying RSM to the SROM primarily involves phase zero.  This phase identifies 
the important factors within the SROM and provides general indication of priority 
selection in terms of troop deployment levels, aid disbursement, and infrastructure 
rehabilitation schedules and priorities within the nation-building context.  While not 
directly utilized in this study, many of the experimental investigations permitted by the 
SROM would be best handled using RSM. 
Summary 
 
 This chapter presented relevant background literature to the reader in order to 
provide a context for the construction of the different sub-models with the SROM.  The 
literature review focused primarily on criminal activity, insurgent activities, and critical 
infrastructure relationships.  The relevant literature provided direct numerical 
relationships based on empirical studies or when absent empirical research, much of the 
rationale for many notional relationships.  Chapter III presents the framework and direct 
application of the concepts discussed in this chapter. 
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III. Methodology 
 
The stabilization and reconstruction model (SROM) represents the complex, 
multi-faceted, and interdependent system of systems comprising the daily functionality of 
a nation.  Feedback loops, time delays, levels, and rates are the mechanisms used to 
describe each of the individual systems, which when viewed in the aggregate, describes 
the larger, national system of interest.  By investigating the interactions of the levels and 
rates associated with the individual systems in each region, a better understanding of the 
national system is achieved.  Any model constructed to simulate the nation-building 
process must be able to accurately capture the inherent dynamics of the situation. 
 This chapter outlines the structure of the general purpose SROM, providing an 
overview and discussion of the key relationships and level values applied in the model.  
Due to the large scope of the model, a hierarchical sub-national regional approach was 
taken in its construction.  The general purpose SROM consists of a national level 
functional sub-model and any number of regional sub-modules (Figure 3.1).  The number 
of regions modeled depends on the specific analytical requirements of the scenario and 
area of interests. 
 A moment should be taken to provide the reader context in regard to the size of 
the SROM.  Approximately 600 model parameters describe a single regional sub-module.  
About 50 model parameters describe the national level sub-model.  The regional 
parameters function jointly with approximately 90 random variables.  Together, the 
regional parameters and random variables represent the daily functioning of a single 
region, as expressed by a total of 87 level values and 193 rates of change.  A three region 
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implementation of the SROM would then require approximately 1850 parameters, 270 
random variables, and approximately 850 associated level values and rates of change. 
 Each region is tied to the national level sub-model, which tracks national level 
values and rates of change that affect all the regions in the model.  Each region functions 
as its own aggregate system, but does not function autonomously; a region may be tied to 
other regions based on the nature of the established interdependent relationships between 
the regions.  For economy of presentation only one specific functional sub-model, the 
insurgent and coalition military sub-model, is fully discussed within this chapter.  An 
overview of the remaining functional sub-models is presented in this chapter.  Each sub-
model is then more fully deveolped in the appendices. 
 
Figure 3.1  SROM National Level View 
 
National Level Sub-Model 
 The national level sub-model consists of those real or abstract level values that 
necessarily function at a national level.  Any system requiring management on a national 
scale and thereby directly involving multiple regions should be incorporated within the 
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national sub-model.  In addition to those level values and rates of change at the national 
level, it should also be noted that there are numerous constants (model parameters) 
affecting the model on a national scale; these constants can have a far reaching impact 
and are listed in the appendices along with their definitions.  The national level values 
and rates of change are given in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1  National Level Values and Rates of Change 
Level Value Rates of Change (RoC) Units
National Power Grid Regional Power Generation MegaWatt hours
Regional Power Consumption
National Primary Commodity GDP Commodity Export Payment Received US$
National Aid Disbursement National Aid Disbursement Rate Change millions US$
National Refined Oil Products Storage Regional Refined Products Production liters, tonnes
Regional Refined Products Consumption  
 The national power grid level value tracks the power generation capability of all 
generators connected to the national grid.  The combined power generation of the nation 
is then distributed as directed by national policy (national policy is set via constants).  
This aggregation captures the general functionality of power distribution in a nation.  A 
single region of the country may generate all the electrical power and must be allowed to 
transmit this power to other regions.  Additionally, power can be imported into the 
national grid via different regions.  The imported power is subject to the regional 
limitations of the power transmission system before being passed into the pool of 
available national power.  It is also of note that islands of power can exist; each region 
has the capability, if needed, to utilize stand alone generators that serve only regional 
demand and are not connected to the national power system. A model user could feasibly 
coordinate generator capacity rates of change within a region to represent power capacity 
being disconnected from the national grid to support only regional or local demand. 
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 The national primary commodity GDP level value can be construed as a single 
commodity or multiple commodities ranging from crude oil, diamonds, coal, natural gas, 
minerals, and so forth.  The modeling of a primary commodity may be needed to estimate 
the country’s GDP on an aggregated national level.  When it is impractical to model the 
economy of the country via its individual regions, it becomes necessary to represent the 
primary commodity’s contribution to national GDP at the national level.  This share of 
GDP is then assumed to be equally disbursed among the differing regions.  If this is not 
true, the disbursement balance could be modified. 
 As an example of this level value consider the export of crude oil.  When present, 
the petroleum sector often represents a large share of a country’s GDP; for governments 
heavily reliant on oil revenue for funding, disruption becomes quite problematic 
(UN/World Bank, 2003: v-x).  The health of the economy is driven by the operations of 
the petroleum industry; the profits of the petroleum industry are redistributed among the 
country’s regions in terms of infrastructure improvements, industry expansion, social 
programs, job creation, and other economic advancements (UN/World Bank, 2003: v-x).  
In the SROM, successful operation and growth of the primary commodity industry keeps 
the GDP of each of the regions high, translating into a higher GDP per capita and 
increased job growth in that region. 
 The rate of change of the primary commodity GDP results from the combination 
of many factors.  Successful exportation depends heavily on the condition of the 
country’s critical infrastructure and the level of violence afflicting it.  For instance, the 
extraction of crude oil in one region may be proceeding with little problem, but in the 
neighboring region the interregional pipeline transporting that crude oil to the export 
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terminal could be in poor shape due to neglect, malfunction, or sabotage.  The export 
flow would thus be heavily reduced, thereby reducing GDP revenues and harming 
national programs dependent on those revenues. 
 Aid is very important to a stabilization and reconstruction effort.  Initial aid funds 
replace the vacuum that may exist due to a war induced shut down and subsequent restart 
of the main industries within a country.  Successful aid disbursement via reconstruction 
and rehabilitation efforts will temporarily buoy the economy of the country (UN/World 
Bank, 2003: v-x).  In the SROM, aid is disbursed based on a national contribution to 
GDP.  The rate of change associated with aid is exogenous to the model, though actual 
disbursement is affected by the level of violence within a region (the impact of violence 
on GDP was mentioned in Chapter II; the exact equation associated with the reduction of 
GDP due to violence is detailed in the economic component subsystem block of 
Appendix G, the critical infrastructure sub-model appendix).   
 Refined oil products are important to citizens for their driving, cooking, and 
heating needs; they keep the transportation industry and the electrical power industry 
supplied with fuel and they are essential for the normal functioning of a modern economy 
(Rinaldi et al, 2001: 15).  After production of refined products at the regional level the 
products are first made available to regional users; the remaining balance of available 
supply is then tracked at a national level, though storage is kept local (this local storage is 
abstract; storage is not defined specifically within any region).  Keeping the supply 
management of surplus refined products at the national level allows an assumed equal 
access to the products by any region tied to the national level storage level value.  Any 
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retrieval will cause a demand on the transportation infrastructure within the demanding 
region. 
 It should be noted that at the national level, both the level values and the 
associated rates of change are affected by local regional conditions; thus, their realization 
depends on the many different prevailing conditions within the specific region of 
realization.  For instance, should heavy insurgent activity within a region extensively 
reduce the capability of the region to receive power from the national grid (reduction of 
power transmission capacity due to destruction of power substations, transformers, 
transmission lines, and so forth) then that region’s share of the national grid is unrealized 
and will be redistributed to regions with the capacity to receive the power.  The factors 
affecting these values are discussed further in the appropriate sub-models where their 
effects are realized. 
Regional Level Sub-Module 
 The SROM can theoretically consist of any number of regions which when taken 
in the aggregate functionally represents the country or area of interest.  Regions may be 
defined in a manner deemed most conducive to the analytical objectives.  Whether this is 
due to geography, population ethnicity, or economic situation the characteristics of the 
region (population, population distribution, non-primary commodity GDP, critical 
infrastructure levels, critical infrastructure growth/rehabilitation rates, and so forth) as 
defined in the model, are very important and should be carefully considered.    
 The Post Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework developed by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army 
(AUSA) provides an excellent guiding conception of the important aspects involved in 
44 
the stabilization and reconstruction of a nation (2002: 12-16).  The many level values and 
rates of change selected to collectively represent the complexities of regional behavior 
can be categorized into six different functional areas (Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3).  (Note that 
in Figure 3.3, the shaded areas indicate people susceptible to insurgent attack.)  These 
areas complement the four driving pillars of nation-building discussed in Chapter I. 
 A SROM may consist of any number of regional sub-modules.  Within each 
regional sub-module a total of six functional sub-models represent the daily functioning 
of the individual region.  As mentioned earlier, for brevity’s sake only one of the six 
functional sub-models will be reviewed in full detail in this chapter; the other sub-models 
will be briefly reviewed here and then detailed in its associated appendix.  The insurgent 
and coalition military sub-model is explained in detail in the forthcoming pages.  To 
provide the reader full context however, the general description of the demographics sub-
model is provided first. 
 
Figure 3.2 Regional Level Sub-Module 
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Figure 3.3  Conceptual Diagram of Regional Sub-Module  
 
Demographics Sub-Model 
 The demographic level values and rates of change represent the flow of 
indigenous people to and from varying life activities as prescribed by the dynamic, 
developing situation occurring throughout the regional model.  Within the SROM, the 
indigenous population of the region is divided into twenty-seven categories (level 
values).  Throughout the simulation run time of the model, individuals move back and 
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forth amongst these twenty-seven categories as determined by the conditions prevalent in 
the model.  Those individuals within the model that die are permanently removed from 
the model.  The four level values within the demographics sub-model and their associated 
rates of change are listed in Table 3.2.  The sign changes associated with the rates of 
change indicate the direction of the flow of indigenous persons to or from a particular 
level value.  A positive sign represents an increase, whereas a negative sign indicates a 
decrease. 
 The demographics sub-model manages the flow of indigenous persons amongst 
many of the twenty-seven possible level values available.  It tracks the growth of the 
general populace (expressed via the birth and death rate) and the movement of 
individuals into and out of the workforce (including criminal and insurgent lifestyles) via 
the unemployed level value.  Government employees and the private sector are also 
distinctly labeled and followed. 
 The general population level value consists of the young, the elderly, and those of 
proper age who do not work.  Most population demographic statistics include the birth 
and death rate which then reflects the population’s growth.  Additionally, a certain 
percentage of the general populace continuously reaches a level of maturity such that 
they then join the workforce.  Concurrently, a certain percentage of the population will 
retire and leave the workforce.  This (typically) results in a net positive daily flow of 
indigenous persons flowing from the general population level value into the unemployed 
level value. 
 In the SROM, it is assumed that retirees move instantaneously through 
unemployed status to the general populace with an available unemployed person  
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Table 3.2 Demographics Sub-Model Level Values and Rates of Change 
Level Value Units
General Population + Natural Birth Rate Indigenous Persons
- Natural Death Rate
- Deaths from Crime
- Deaths from Insurgency Collateral Effects
- Deaths from Direct Insurgent Attack
- Population Entering Workforce
Unemployed + Population Entering Workforce Indigenous Persons
- Deaths from Crime
- Deaths from Insurgency Collateral Effects
- Deaths from Direct Insurgent Attack
- Government Employee Hire Rate
± Private Sector Hire Rate
- Police Awaiting Training Recruit Rate
+ Police in Training Washout Rate
+ Police Attrition Rate
- CD Awaiting Training Recruit Rate
+ CD in Training Washout Rate
+ CDAttrition Rate
- IM Awaiting Training Recruit Rate
+ IM in Training Washout Rate
+ IM Attrition Rate
- BP Awaiting Training Recruit Rate
+ BP in Training Washout Rate
+ BP Attrition Rate
- FPS Awaiting Training Recruit Rate
+ FPS in Training Washout Rate
+ FPS Attrition Rate
± Criminal Recruitment Rate
+ Incarcerated Criminal Release Rate
± Insurgent Recruitment Rate
Government Employees + Government Employee Hire Rate Indigenous Persons
- Deaths from Crime
- Deaths from Insurgency Collateral Effects
- Deaths from Direct Insurgent Attack
Private Sector Employees ± Private Sector Hire Rate Indigenous Persons
- Deaths from Crime
- Deaths from Insurgency Collateral Effects
- Deaths from Direct Insurgent Attack
Rates of Change
 
   
immediately filling the opening position – this unemployed person is then immediately 
replaced by a person from the general populace thus reflecting no change in the level 
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values.  This effectively reduces the percentage of people entering the workforce on a 
daily basis and is done for simplicity’s sake.  (If a future scenario required, this 
assumption could be relaxed with a modicum of additional programming.)  
 The unemployed are monitored as legitimate jobs are obtained from the 
government, the private sector, and the various security forces; whereby they then leave 
unemployed status.  As the individuals proceed through training, they might washout or 
quit, and once again become unemployed.  If the economy worsens individuals will be 
fired and again move to the unemployed level value.  Additionally, the unemployed can 
become criminals or insurgents and pursue an illegal lifestyle. 
 In the SROM, the government only hires.  It is assumed for the sake of stability 
that civil service jobs will not be given and then removed within the timeframe of the 
model.  Government employees may be killed as the result of violence in the region, but 
the model will then hire more people until the stated manning goal is met.  As mentioned 
above, retirees are assumed to be immediately replaced by an unemployed person, who in 
turn is immediately replaced by a person from the general populace. 
 The SROM assumes the private sector hires and fires based upon the strength of 
the economy.  Richardson (2004) successfully utilized what is referred to as “Okun’s 
Law” in his model.  According to Richardson, in Okun’s paper “Potential GNP: It’s 
Measure and Significance” Okun found that: 
 
in the postwar period, on the average, each percentage point in the unemployment 
rate above four percent has been associated with about a three percentage 
decrement in the real gross national product (Okun, 1962: 2). 
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This relationship is then used as a broad macroeconomic assumption in the model 
whereby as GDP per capita increases (decreases), unemployment decreases (increases).  
Thus, as the economy grows stronger, unemployed persons flow into the private sector 
and as the economy weakens, private sector employees flow into the unemployed level 
value. 
 Besides managing the flow of people within the above four categories, the 
demographics sub-model calculates the unemployment rate, the labor force percentage, 
and the total regional population.  These three functional values are used in calculating 
rates of change for level values in other sub-models. 
 The unemployment rate, a function of all four level values in the demographics 
sub-model, appears in rate of change equations for the criminal recruit rate (law 
enforcement sub-model), the insurgent recruit rate (insurgent and coalition military sub-
model), and the popular support unemployment effect rate of change (public opinion sub-
model).  The unemployment rate is also used in the popular support limiter function 
(public opinion sub-model). 
 The labor force percentage, a function of all four level values in the demographics 
sub-model, is used in conjunction with the unemployment rate to form the popular 
support limiter function (public opinion sub-model).  This function places a ceiling on 
how high the popular support in a region can rise.  Popular support is limited by the 
number of unemployed people.  The assumption is that unemployed people are unlikely 
to directly support the coalition. 
 The regional population, again a function of all four level values in the 
demographics sub-model, is used in calculations for the insurgent recruit rate (insurgent 
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and coalition military sub-model), the level of violence effect rate of change (public 
opinion sub-model), and rates of change within multiple subsystems within the critical 
infrastructure sub-model to include: the refined products demand function, the electrical 
power demand function, the transportation food demand function, the water demand ratio 
function, and calculation of regional GDP per capita. 
Insurgent and Coalition Military Sub-Model 
 The movement and flow of indigenous persons is important because coalition 
forces are essentially concerned with stopping the flow of people into the insurgent 
category.  Indeed, a primary utilization of the SROM is to explore the different policy 
avenues by which to better achieve a slow down and subsequent stopping of indigenous 
persons flowing into the insurgent level value.  It is within the insurgent and coalition 
military sub-model that insurgent activities, recruitment, deaths, and capture are 
calculated.  The level values and rates of change for the insurgent and coalition military 
sub-model are displayed in the following table. 
 
Table 3.3  Insurgent and Coalition Military Sub-Model Level Values and Rates of Change 
Level Value Units
Insurgents + Insurgent Recruit Rate Indigenous Persons
+ International Insurgent Recruit Rate
- Insurgent KIA or Detained Rate
± Interregional Insurgent Movement
Coalition Troops + Coalition Troops Arrival Rate Coalition Troops
- Coalition Troops Departure Rate
- Coalition Troop Casualty Rate
± Coalition Troops Interregional Movement Rate
Detained Insurgents + Insurgent KIA or Detained Rate Indigenous Persons
- Detained Insurgent Release Rate
Rates of Change
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 There are three level values in the insurgent and coalition military sub-model.  
The table lists each of the rates of change that affect them.  The first of the three level 
values explained here represents the number of insurgents actively operating against 
coalition and indigenous security forces.  An insurgent is defined as a “member of a 
political party who rebels against established leadership” (JP 1-02, 2001: 260).  There are 
a total of four different rates of change that affect the number of insurgents present in a 
region.  In turn, the level of insurgents affects the rates of change of level values 
throughout the region though the functional determination of the number of insurgent  
 
 
Figure 3.4  Insurgent and Coalition Military Sub-Model Systems Dynamic Flow Chart 
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attacks.  The systems dynamic flow chart (Figure 3.4) illustrates the basic relationships 
involving the insurgent level value as well as those for the coalition troops and detained 
insurgents level values.  
 Calculation of the insurgent recruit rate is of vital importance to this model.  As a 
tool to analyze potential policy decision sets, it is imperative to properly capture the 
elements contributing to the rise and fall of insurgent personnel.  As mentioned in 
Chapter II, the aggregation of various sources, to include certain aspects of the criminal 
activity research, provides a foundation for a theoretical measure in which the insurgent 
recruitment rate within a region is determined by the many different economic, 
demographic, military, and geopolitical factors. 
 The insurgent recruit rate is a function of the perceived military success of the 
insurgency, the population diversity within the region and the country, the polarization of 
the population sub-groups (nationally and regionally), the presence of foreign troops as 
an aggravating factor, the growth of the economy in terms of GDP per capita and 
unemployment changes, an urbanization effect, the percentage of unemployed males, 
media influence, and the support of the population sub-groups for the coalition 
stabilization and reconstruction effort.  Each of these factors modifies a baseline 
recruitment rate, affecting each of the population subgroups in a different manner 
according to their level of popular support of the coalition effort. 
 The following equations specify the insurgent recruit rate: 
 7 day moving average Loss Exchange Ratio, LER(t) = ∑
= −
−
7
17
1
i it
it
IAInsurgentK
IACoalitionK
.  
Days that see insurgent military success will involve higher coalition KIAs 
relative to insurgent KIAs resulting in a higher LER and thereby a more 
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successful recruiting effort in the near term.  Note that LER(t) must have a ceiling 
to limit its impact on days when the LER could be extraordinarily large.  The 
higher the ceiling, the larger a recruiting day insurgents are allowed to have. 
 National adapted ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) score, ELFNat = 
2
1
25.05.31 ⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−⋅− ∑
=
P
i
iNatPopDist , where NatPopDist is the national population 
proportions for P sub-groups.  NatPopDist must sum to one.  ELFNat is a constant 
throughout the simulation run time.  The basic ELF index score is often used to 
measure the population diversity within a country. “It measures the probability 
that two randomly drawn individuals from a given country do not speak the same 
language” (Collier et al, 2001: 32).  For the purposes of this study it is then 
adapted based on the results of Collier et al where it was found that the risk of 
continued conflict is highest when the ELF is approximately 50 on a scale of 0-
100 (2001: 11).  Collier et al go on to note that increasing or decreasing the ELF 
to its extremes results in an eight-fold reduction in the probability of continued 
conflict.  This essentially means that a population is most at risk for internal 
conflict when it has two large, nearly equal population sub-groups.  Risk is 
lessened when a single large population group dominates the country or when 
there are many small subgroups present with no dominating ethnic group. 
 Regional adapted ethno-linguistic fractionalization score, ELFRg = 
2
1
25.05.31 ⎥
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iRgPopDist , where RgPopDist is the regional population 
distribution for P sub-groups.  This regional index score is analogous to the 
national score. 
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 National adapted polarization score, PolNat = 
   
∑
∑
∑
∑
∑
∑
∑
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⋅
⋅
⋅
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⋅
⋅
⋅
−
≠
=
≠
=
≠
=
≠
=
≠
=
≠
=
P
ij
jPi
P
ij
ji
P
ij
ji
P
ij
jPi
P
ij
ji
P
ij
ji
NatPopDistNatPopDist
NatPopDistNatPopDist
NatPopDistNatPopDist
NatPopDistNatPopDist
NatPopDistNatPopDist
NatPopDistNatPopDist
6.2
6.2
2
6.2
1
6.2
6.2
2
6.2
1
1
M
M
, 
where P is the number of sub-groups in the population. 
 The basic polarization concept seeks to further differentiate population 
sub-groups.  It is explained as follows: “Polarization is related to the alienation 
that individuals and groups feel from one another [with] such alienation fuelled by 
notions of within-group identity” (Duclos, Esteban, and Ray, 2003: 1).  The 
polarization score intends to capture the tension and hostility present in 
population sub-groups feeling marginalized by the other sub-groups. 
 Though not incorporated in the current model, a worthwhile extension to 
the polarization score would be the inclusion of an inter-group hostility matrix in 
the above equation that would modify one sub-group’s polarization score based 
on the presence of a disliked subgroup.  Currently, each sub-group’s like/dislike 
for other subgroups is equal.  The adaptation of the polarization score involves 
using the complement of the proportion of polarization held by each population 
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sub-group.  This creates a score ranging from zero to one with the more polarized 
sub-groups being near one.   
 Regional adapted polarization score, PolRg.  Analogous to the national adapted 
polarization score except using the regional population sub-group proportions. 
 Coalition troops aggravation factor, CTAF(t) = 
t
t
onRgPopulati
roopsCoalitionT
A ⋅ , where A = 
100 is the aggravation constant.  Each coalition troop present in the region at time 
t counts as 100 troops.  This modified total of troops is then divided by the 
regional population to determine a troop presence aggravation score.  Generally 
speaking, the more troops in the region, the more agitated the indigenous 
population becomes; the insurgent recruit rate thereby increases.  This factor is 
notional and should be explored further. 
 GDP per capita growth effect, GDPpcapGEff(t) = 
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For every 1% increase in the current GDP per capita (relative to the 27-day 
lagged, 7-day moving average GDP per capita) there is a corresponding 2.4% 
decrease in insurgent recruits.  This relationship is taken from the results of 
Fajnzylber et al where the increase in GDP per capita resulted in a 2.4% drop in 
violent crime (1998: 18).  This relationship fits into the economic model of crime 
whereby a portion of potential criminals/insurgents is not willing to forgo the loss 
of increased wages or the opening of a newly created, legitimate job. 
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 Unemployment effect, UnempEff(t) = 
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.  For every 1% decrease in the current 
unemployment rate (relative to the 27-day lagged, 7-day moving average 
unemployment rate) there is a corresponding 9% decrease in insurgent recruits.  
This relationship is taken from the results of Niskanen where the decrease in the 
unemployment rate resulted in a 9% drop in violent crime (1994).  This 
relationship fits into the economic model of crime whereby a portion of potential 
criminals/insurgents is not willing to forgo the loss of increased wages or the 
opening of a newly created, legitimate job. 
 Urban effect, UrbanEff = )(9.01 nUrbanEffCoeRgUrbanRat −⋅+ , where 
RgUrbanRate is the regional urbanization rate.  This value remains constant for 
the region throughout the simulation.  This relationship is also taken from 
Niskanen where his regression analysis of crime statistics determined that for 
every 1% increase in the urbanization rate over the regression mean, 0.80, the 
violent crime rate increased by 0.9%.  The urban effect constant, UrbanEffCon, is 
set to 0.80.  The more urban a society, the more crime.  This thought is then 
adapted to insurgency. 
 The male effect, MaleEff = constant.  This value reflects the expectation of the 
proportion of the workforce, region-wide, that is male.  Many regression crime 
studies, including Niskanen’s, find that more males typically indicate more crime.  
That relationship is applied here by using the number of male unemployed as part 
of the pool of potential insurgent recruits.  A related area that should be addressed 
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in future versions of the SROM is that of age.  The insurgent recruit rate could be 
modified to reflect different rates for different ages. 
 Non-supporting population vector, NonSupPop(t) = 
⎥
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sub-group’s non-supporting portion of the population is affected by the above 
mentioned factors.  The portion of each sub-group that supports coalition efforts 
is not part of the pool of potential recruits. 
 Insurgent inertial effect, InertiaEff(t) = ∑
=
−⋅
33
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i
iteff InsurgentsInert , where Inerteff 
= 1/1000 is the inertia effect constant. For every 1000 insurgents (the 27-day 
lagged, 7-day moving average number of insurgents) present on a given day an 
extra one person joins the insurgency.  Fajnzylber et al find an inertial effect for 
criminal activity (1998: 18); this is adopted for insurgent activity, intending to 
capture the momentum of an insurgency due to the absence or eradication of the 
rule of law and the rise of a criminal/lawless culture.  
 Deterrence effect, DeterEff(t) = ∑
=
−⋅
7
17
1
i
iteff dKIADetaineInsurgentsD , where Deff 
= 1/100 is the deterrence effect constant.  For every 100 insurgents killed or 
detained on average in the past 7 days, one insurgent decides to quit.  This 
relationship is adapted from the results of Levitt who found a deterrence factor for 
crime based on arrests made (1995, table 7). 
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 Media effect, MedEff(t) = 
∑⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅⋅⋅⋅ tUnempRatelineMedEffBaseNegMedMedPen365
1
]RgPopDistRgPopPopSup tt ⋅⋅− )1( ,  where MedPen is the market penetration of 
the influencing medium in terms of proportion of population, NegMed is the 
market share of the biased, insurgency reinforcing media, and MedEffBaseline = 
1/1000 is the notional annual baseline rate in which the predisposed population 
actively joins the insurgency.  The male, unemployed, non-supporting portions of 
each population subgroup combine to form the pool of potentially predisposed 
individuals already leaning toward active support of the insurgency.  This 
relationship is based on the premise of Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) Theory of 
Reasoned Action (discussed in more detail in Chapter II), which is often used in 
consumer behavior research. 
 Baseline insurgent recruit rate, BaselineIRR = constant.  This value, typically set 
at 1/10000, is the daily number of disaffected, non-supporting people actively 
joining the insurgency. 
Together, these equations form the average insurgent recruit rate, avgIRR(t) = 
( )[∑ ⋅⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+ tttRgNatRgNatt UnempEfffGDPpcapGEfCTAFPolPolELFELFLER
] tt InertiaEffNonSupPopRgPopDistRBaselineIRMaleEffUrbanEff +⋅⋅⋅⋅
tt MedEffDeterEff +−  
The functional value avgIRR(t) is then used as the expectation of the insurgent recruit 
rate, IRR(t).  A random variable distribution should be selected by the model user as 
deemed appropriate for the modeled situation. 
 The next rate of change affecting the insurgent level value is the insurgent KIA-
detained rate.  This rate is a function of the number of coalition troops performing 
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counter-insurgency operations (CIOP), as well as the number of active duty indigenous 
police, civil defense, and military personnel.  Troop type CIOP effectiveness is also a 
factor.  The insurgent KIA-detained rate of change is given by the following equation: 
⋅⋅= tt InsurgentsentensionPercCIOPApprehtIADetainedInsurgentK )(
torivenessFacCIOPEffect
EffyIndMilitarEffseCivilDefenEffPoliceEffCTroopsCIOP MiltCDtPoltCTroopt ⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅⋅%
+ InsurgentsKIADetainedFromTips(t). 
The %CIOP constant is the proportion of coalition troops actively conducting CIOP.  The 
Eff constants indicate the effectiveness of the troop type with respect to CIOP (allowing 
for variations among troops trained for a specific function versus those dragooned into a 
mission other than their primary MOS).  The CIOPEffectivenessFactor is the number of 
effective troops needed to capture on average CIOPApprehensionPercentAvg percent of 
the insurgents on a daily basis.  This average is used as the expectation of a random 
variable, with distribution chosen by the model user.  Using 
CIOPApprehensionPercentAvg as the expectation, the random variable 
CIOPApprehensionPercentt is then generated on a daily basis for use in the equation.  
AvgInsurgentsKIADetainedFromTips(t) is calculated by the following equation: 
[ ] ipKIADetPerTInsurgents
PerTipInsurgentsPopPerTip
PopPopSupRgPopDist tt ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅∑ 11
 
This equation represents those insurgents killed or apprehended as a result of pro-
coalition popular support.  As popular support grows, more of the population is willing to 
provide intelligence to coalition forces.  As would be expected, insurgents transiting into 
a coalition friendly region will find difficulties because the host population does not 
support the insurgency.  The coalition-supporting population will provide more 
intelligence to the security institutions, resulting in increased death or apprehension of the 
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insurgents.  The more insurgents present in the region, the more tips that can be 
generated.  On average, a certain number of insurgents will be caught for every tip 
provided.  The calculated expectation is then used in the generation of random variable 
InsurgentsKIADetainedFromTips(t) that is used in the calculation for the number of 
insurgents KIA or detained. 
 The InsurgentKIADetained(t) equation creates a relationship such that at time t 
for every group of CIOPEffectivenessFactor number of troops actively fighting the 
insurgency, a randomly distributed proportion of insurgents are captured or killed.  The 
insurgents killed or detained are then split again by an InsurgentKIAUncertainty random 
variable that places a certain proportion in the KIA category and the rest in detained 
status.  A random portion of those detained are released after a random length of time.  If 
theses values are known exactly, they can be entered as constants instead of parameters 
of random variables.  This is true of any relationship defined in the SROM. 
 The international insurgent recruit rate represents the influx of foreign insurgents 
into the region.  This rate is a function of the amount of active duty border patrol, number 
of coalition troops patrolling the border, their respective associated effectiveness, and the 
daily expectation of incoming foreign fighters.  The applicable equations are as follows: 
InternationalInsurgentRecruitRate(t) =  
( ) ctorBPEffectFaCTroopCTroopscingBorderCTroopPoliBPBP
ctorBPEffectFa
BorderEfftefft +⋅⋅+⋅
2%
tntInfluxnalInsurgeInternatio⋅  
InternationalInsurgentInfluxt is a random variable based on a chosen expectation 
parameter (and corresponding distribution) and represents the number of foreign 
insurgents attempting to cross into the region at time t. 
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BPEffectFactor = 
1
1
1
2
−
− centBPDeterPer
ededBPTroopsNe , BPTroopsNeeded is the number of troops 
required to stop BPDeterPercent percent of the foreign insurgents attempting to cross 
into the region. 
 The fourth rate affecting the insurgent level value represents the movement of 
insurgents to and from other regions.  This functionality exists in order to capture the 
dynamic movement of insurgents between regions.  A region with a large number of 
insurgents that is successfully executing an insurgency may export insurgents to other 
regions in the country, seeking to cause problems in those regions.  Likewise, a region 
where coalition forces are successfully eradicating insurgents may cause many of the 
remaining insurgents to flee that region to one in which the insurgency is in better shape.  
Different rule sets can be applied to what essentially is an offensive and defensive 
insurgent capability.  These conditional rule sets are applied to simulate a dynamic 
insurgency that responds to ongoing operational conditions in its environment. 
 The interregional insurgent movement rate is expressed with the following 
equations:  OffMovRate(t) = Offt IInsurgentsPercentOffMovRate ⋅⋅ , where 
OffMovRatePercent is the percentage of insurgents that leaves the region daily, 
Insurgentst is the number of insurgents at time t, and IOff is an indicator function that turns 
on/off based on the necessary conditions for movement.  IOff = 1 when 
30DayMovAvgDeathRate(t) > OffCondFactor * AcceptableDeathRate, 0 otherwise.  The 
indicator function goes high when the violence meets a certain threshold (a multiple of 
the model-terminating acceptable death rate).  Modification of this multiple affects the 
level at which insurgents will transfer out.  The higher the multiple, the smaller the 
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number of insurgents that transfer out, since more are required to stay in the region to 
meet the required level of violence.  As stated, the OffMovRatePercent value determines 
the alacrity with which insurgents transfer regions.  The equation 
DefMovRate(t) = Deft IInsurgentsPercentDefMovRate ⋅⋅ is analogous to OffMovRate(t), 
with the exception of the condition as expressed by the indicator function.  For the 
defensive movement, insurgents transfer out of the region when the current insurgent 
level drops to a certain percentage of the maximum insurgent level ever achieved.  IDef = 
1 when 
),0[),max( tiinsurgents
insurgents
i
t
=
 < DefMovThreshold, 0 otherwise. 
 Together then, the interregional insurgent movement rate, IIMR(t) = 
OffMovRate(t) + DefMoveRate(t) - ∑
≠
R
ij
ij tIIMR )( , where ∑
≠
R
ij
ij tIIMR )(  is the total number 
of insurgents flowing into the current region i via other regions’ prescribed movement 
rates. 
 Only one functional relationship is directly impacted by the insurgents level 
value, the calculation of the daily number of insurgent attacks.  The number of daily 
insurgent attacks is determined by the following equation: InsurgentAttacks(t) = 
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, where A is the number of insurgents required for a single daily attack, B is the number 
additional attacks per coalition casualty (momentum effect from successful insurgent 
operations), and C is the insurgent differential effect.  The last term is best explained in 
this manner: any 30 day period seeing a large surge in the number of insurgents will see a 
correspondingly higher surge in the number of insurgent attacks.  Likewise, any sudden 
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change in the insurgent level value will reduce the number of insurgent attacks.  Different 
interpretations of this phenomenon can be made and are not detailed here.  This equation 
was derived from a regression analysis accomplished for this study using open source 
data on the Iraq insurgency provided by the Brookings Institution (17 Dec 2004: 11-13). 
 In the model the InsurgentAttacks(t) value is partitioned into three categories: 
attacks against security forces, attacks against infrastructure, and attacks against civilians.  
These proportions are assigned by the model user to best reflect the targeting patterns 
used by the insurgents.  The attacks against security forces are further partitioned into 
attacks against coalition forces, indigenous police, civil defense, and indigenous military.  
This is subsequently discussed. 
 The second of the three level values in this sub-model is the coalition troop level 
value.  It represents the total number of coalition troops operating in the region and is 
affected by four rates of change (Table 3.3). 
 The first two rates of change are the troop arrival and departure rates.  These 
values are set by the model user to allow troops exogenous to the model to enter or depart 
at a prescribed simulation time t.  No condition inside the model interferes with the 
arrival or departure of coalition troops.  Once the exogenous troops actually flow into the 
coalition troops category they can then be affected by the prevailing conditions in that 
region.  When troops depart, they are removed from the model entirely. 
 The third rate of change affecting coalition troops is the casualty rate.  The 
equation for the casualty rate, CTroopCasualtyRate(t) = 
ttackaltiesPerACTroopCasunstCTroopsttacksAgaiInsurgentA t ⋅ , where 
InsurgentAttacksAgainstCTroopst is a proportion of the total number insurgent attacks 
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occurring at time t.  CTroopCasualtiesPerAttack is a random variable chosen by the 
model user to most accurately reflect the nature of hostilities in the region. 
 Concerning InsurgentAttacksAgainstCTroopst, this value is calculated as a 
weighted proportion of the total number of the security forces in the country, including 
the indigenous forces.  This weighted proportion is used to ensure a dynamic response by 
the insurgents.  For instance, early in a nation-building incident coalition forces will 
typically comprise the vast majority of security forces in a region and as such will be the 
targets of nearly all insurgent attacks.  However, as indigenous security forces stand up, 
they too will become targets.  The weighted proportion leaves the model user an option to 
bias attacks against coalition forces.  For example, if the force structure in the region 
were the following: 50,000 coalition troops, 10,000 police, 20,000 civil defense, and 
20,000 indigenous military, then the non-weighted proportions of insurgent attacks 
against the respective services would simply be: 0.50, 0.10, 0.20, and 0.20.  A coalition 
troop bias factor (e.g. of 1.5) would make it appear as if there were more coalition troops 
(e.g. 75,000) than are actually present; the coalition troops would then receive a higher 
proportion of the insurgent attacks with the indigenous troops receiving a reduced 
proportion.  As coalition troops are drawn down or move out of the region, and/or 
indigenous security forces become active, the insurgents will direct more attacks against 
the indigenous security forces. 
 The fourth rate of change affecting the coalition troops level value is the coalition 
troop movement rate.  This rate of change is analogous to the insurgent movement rates 
of change.  Given a certain prescribed condition, coalition troops in one region will move 
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to other regions.  The conditions required to allow movement will typically involve 
regional stability and safety considerations. 
 The equation CTroopMovRate(t) = Movt ICTroopatePercentCTroopMovR ⋅⋅  - 
∑
≠
R
ij
ij tateCTroopMovR )( describes the coalition troops movement rate of change in region 
i with the first term representing outbound flow and the second representing all coalition 
troops moving from other regions into the current region.  IMov is the indicator function 
such that IMov = 1 when the safety/stability measure is less than a predetermined threshold 
(90DayMovAvgDeathRate(t) < AcceptableDeathRate), 0 otherwise. 
 Besides just having a required violence level, another condition could involve the 
manning level of the indigenous security forces.  The CTroopMovRatePercent is the 
daily proportion of coalition troops that transfer out of the region.  The destination point 
of the transfer is a matter of policy.  The troops typically will be sent to the region with 
the highest violence level, though conceivably they could be sent home as well.  The 
model terminates when all regions have a 90 day moving average death rate below the 
acceptable violence level. 
 The third and last level value in the insurgent and coalition military sub-model is 
the detained insurgent level value.  This level value represents the number of insurgents 
currently being held by coalition forces and is obtained by splitting a proportion of the 
previously described InsurgentKIADetainedRate(t) into two flows; one for insurgents 
killed (leaves model) and one for insurgents detained.  Typically, a random variable (with 
parameters assigned as deemed appropriate by the model user) is generated for use as the 
proportion. 
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 The detained insurgent level value is affected by only one rate of change.  The 
detained insurgent release rate is determined by taking an appropriate percentage of the 
incoming detained insurgents, holding them for an appropriate process time, and then 
releasing them back into the unemployed category.  The percentage of incoming 
detainees that are to be released is a random variable with an appropriately selected 
distribution.  Likewise, the amount of time the released detainees are held is a random 
variable with an appropriately selected distribution.  The following equation describes the 
rate of change: DetainedInsurgentReleaseRate(t+wait) =  DIReleasePercent(t) 
)(teetainedRatInsurgentD⋅ , where wait is the holding time random variable.  (This 
equation involves a time delay.) 
 The insurgent and coalition military sub-model represents the activities and 
interactions of the insurgents, coalition troops, and detained insurgents level values.  
Their associated rates of change and functional applications were described in detail 
above.  The important contribution of this sub-model is the generation of the insurgent 
attacks that impact all the other sub-models within its region. 
Indigenous Security Institutions Sub-Model 
 The indigenous security institutions sub-model contains the level values of four 
indigenous security institutions.  The four security institutions set apart from each other 
by virtue of their training, manning, equipment, and ultimately in the effective execution 
of their selected security roles.  It is not necessary to limit the security institutions to a 
certain number, but their relationships to other level values and rates of change within the 
model should be considered and have some basis.  Examination of the coalition 
stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq allows some relationships to be formed 
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(Brookings Institution, 2005: 11-14).  The exact nature of recruiting rates, training rates, 
attrition rates, casualty rates, criminal interaction, and insurgent interaction between the 
various indigenous security institutions will vary from scenario to scenario.  The general 
form of the SROM therefore outlines only rudimentary relationships that are subject to 
the conditions of a particular instance of nation-building. 
 There are three level values representing the various stages of training and 
development for each of the four security institutions (Table 3.4).  The first tiers represent 
those indigenous individuals that were successfully recruited into a security service and 
await training.  These level values are increased by a recruit rate, moving those in an 
unemployed status to awaiting training status.  The factors affecting recruit rates 
currently remain exogenous to the model and are thus expressed as distributions chosen 
by the modeler to best capture the dynamic of the situation.  Future improvements of the 
model might hope to include GDP per capita, unemployment rate, level of violence, and 
popular support mechanisms among others.  
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Table 3.4  Indigenous Security Institutions Sub-Model Level Values and Rates of Change 
Level Value Units
Civil Defense (CD) + CD Training Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- CD Casualty Rate
- CD Attrition Rate
CD in Training - CDTraining Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- CD in Training Washout Rate
+ CD in Training Training Rate
CD Awaiting Training + CD Awaiting Training Recruit Rate Indigenous Persons
- CD in Training Training Rate
Indigenous Military (IM) + IM Training Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- IM Casualty Rate
- IM Attrition Rate
IM in Training - IM Training Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- IM in Training Washout Rate
+ IM in Training Training Rate
IM Awaiting Training + IM Awaiting Training Recruit Rate Indigenous Persons
- IM in Training Training Rate
Border Patrol (BP) + BP Training Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- BP Casualty Rate
- BP Attrition Rate
BP in Training - BP Training Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- BP in Training Washout Rate
+ BP in Training Training Rate
BP Awaiting Training + BP Awaiting Training Recruit Rate Indigenous Persons
- BP in Training Training Rate
Facility Protection Service (FPS) + FPS Training Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- FPS Casualty Rate
- FPS Attrition Rate
FPS in Training - FPS Training Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- FPS in Training Washout Rate
+ FPS in Training Training Rate
FPS Awaiting Training + FPS Awaiting Training Recruit Rate Indigenous Persons
- FPS in Training Training Rate
Rates of Change
 
 Once in the awaiting training status, the indigenous individuals wait until a class 
becomes open.  When classes do become available, with a frequency represented by the 
associated training rates, the individuals leave awaiting training status and move into 
training status.  These movements consist of discrete, class size blocks of trainees.  The 
class sizes, training speeds, and resultant troop effectiveness rates are all potential policy 
rule sets that the model could explore.  Once in training, the classes suffer an attrition rate 
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represented by a random variable with a distribution appropriately chosen by the model 
user to reflect the dynamic of the situation.  For instance, in Afghanistan, many trainees 
completing the government security training immediately return to their respective 
warlords.  This phenomenon effectively signifies trainee attrition since the graduating 
trainees do not enter into active duty for the government security force.  Given such a 
scenario, the attrition rate for that particular Afghanistan security institution should 
reflect the reality of the situation.  Trainees who washout are sent back into the 
unemployed category.  Trainees who graduate from their class are moved into the 
associated active duty level value of their particular indigenous security institution.  After 
a prescribed down time for the teaching cadre to reconstitute themselves, a new class can 
then begin.  
 The active duty level values tier of the various indigenous security institutions is 
where the large structural differences lie.  The civil defense could be labeled the busiest 
of the institutions.  In the general SROM, the civil defense level value functionally 
impacts the rates of change for both criminals (criminal apprehension rate) and insurgents 
(InsurgentKIADetainedRate(t)).  As currently modeled the indigenous military 
functionally impacts only the insurgents (InsurgentKIADetainedRate(t)).  The border 
patrol functionally impacts the infiltration rate of international insurgents into the region 
by reducing the number of successful foreign insurgent infiltrations.  The facility 
protection service functionally impacts the stability of the region’s critical infrastructure 
by limiting the number of successful insurgent infrastructure attacks.  Each of the security 
services suffer from an associated attrition rate.  These rates are modeled using a random 
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variable with a distribution representative of the situation.  Future versions of the SROM 
should attempt to include casualty rates and popular support as attrition mechanisms.   
 The ability and degree to which these indigenous security institutions can 
successfully execute these missions remains scenario dependent and the model 
parameters reflecting the service’s attributes should be carefully selected.  For instance, 
the capability of the civil defense to fight crime may be rated lower than its ability to 
fight the insurgents.  The effectiveness parameter could further be set with the knowledge 
in mind that inadequate training time and poor equipment further limits the security 
institution’s capability to perform its various missions. 
 Additionally, in future versions of the SROM elite commando brigades could be 
modeled as a separate indigenous security institution with longer training times and 
higher effectiveness ratings.  The brigades could also be modeled to allow a dynamic 
flow between regions as occurs with coalition troops. 
Law Enforcement Sub-Model 
 The law enforcement sub-model focuses on violent criminal activity and the 
efforts made by the coalition to reduce crime.  The law enforcement sub-model contains 
an indigenous police subsystem and a criminal subsystem.  The criminal activities section 
of Chapter II detailed many of the driving themes within this sub-model; the crime rate in 
a region is a function of the number of criminals present.  Based on empirical studies of 
crime data, certain basic relationships are surmised and then represented in this sub-
model.  The five level values and their associated rates of change are shown in the table 
below.  
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Table 3.5  Law Enforcement Sub-Model Level Values and Rates of Change 
Level Value Units
Police + Police Training Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- Police Casualty Rate
- Police Attrition Rate
Police in Training - Police Training Graduation Rate Indigenous Persons
- Police in Training Washout Rate
+ Police in Training Training Rate
Police Awaiting Training + Police Awaiting Training Recruit Rate Indigenous Persons
- Police in Training Training Rate
Criminals ± Criminal Recruitment Rate Indigenous Persons
- Criminal Apprehension Rate
- Criminal vs Criminal Death Rate
Incarcerated Criminals + Criminal Apprehension Rate Indigenous Persons
- Incarcerated Criminal Release Rate
Rates of Change
 
 The police subsystem functions in a manner analogous to any of the four 
indigenous security institutions discussed in the previous section.  Indigenous police are 
recruited from the unemployed at a random rate (appropriately chose by the model user) 
and flow from the unemployed level value into the police awaiting training level value.  
When a class becomes available and there are enough persons awaiting training, those 
individuals then flow into the indigenous police in training level value.  While in training, 
the trainees washout at a prescribed random rate.  Upon successful completion of the 
class, the remaining police in training for that class flow into the active duty indigenous 
police level value where they have an immediate impact on functions involving the 
indigenous police. 
 The indigenous police level value is reduced by an attrition rate, represented by a 
random variable appropriately chosen by the model user, and by a police casualty rate.  
The police casualty rate is a function of the number of insurgent attacks and the 
proportion of active police in the region relative to the other indigenous security forces 
and coalition troops; it represents the losses inflicted upon the police due to fighting with 
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insurgents.  The indigenous police level value functionally impacts the rates of change for 
criminals (criminal apprehension rate) and insurgents (InsurgentKIADetainedRate(t)).  Its 
impact on those rates is further modified by an associated effectiveness rate.   
 Criminals are a destabilizing force in a region.  Bourguignon (1999: 3), Tullio and 
Quarella (1998), and Bejarano (2003: 49-50) each discuss the negative costs associated 
with a high crime rate.  In the SROM, the number of criminals present in a region 
determines the region’s crime rate; the more criminals in a region, the more murders, 
violence, theft, and overall disruption to the normal functioning of society.  The criminal 
activities literature reviewed in Chapter II led to the determination of the criminal recruit 
rate and the criminal apprehension rate.  The criminal recruit rate represents the flow of 
unemployed people into the criminal lifestyle and should capture the dynamic conditions 
prevalent in the region that encourage or discourage criminal behavior.  The criminal 
apprehension rate represents the rate at which policing forces in the region successfully 
capture and imprison criminals; those apprehended flow from the criminals level value 
into the incarcerated criminals level value. 
 As mentioned in Chapter II, several basic questions need to be addressed.  How 
many police are typically appropriate for a given number of citizens?  How many police 
are required to maintain law and order given a certain amount of criminal activity?  What 
is the typical murder rate for a given crime rate? What effect does unemployment have on 
the crime rate? Does economic growth have a significant impact? What about the 
urbanization level? 
 The criminal recruit rate and criminal apprehension rate are calculated from the 
answers to the questions posed above.  Empirical relationships found in the criminal 
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literature are used to construct these rates of change.  Causes of crime are continuously 
investigated by many professional and academic sources and it should be noted that the 
relationships utilized here are based upon the general research of a few researchers that 
may or may not be specifically applicable to different model scenarios.  Model 
parameters should be adapted to best represent the nation being modeled.  The 
components used to calculate the criminal recruit rate and the criminal apprehension rate 
are shown in the table below. 
 The criminal level value is of vital concern.  Criminal activity contributes greatly 
to violence in a region.  This violence induced instability greatly reduces the economic 
prosperity of the region.  The criminal activities literature review addressed many of the 
reasons why this is so.  In the SROM, the criminal murder rate (a function of the number 
of criminals) is combined with the deaths caused from the insurgent activity to obtain the 
overall death rate in the region.  This death rate is the primary measure by which the 
model measures the progress of the coalition stabilization and reconstruction effort. 
 The fifth level value in the law enforcement sub-model is the incarcerated 
criminal level value.  It represents the criminals that have been apprehended by the 
policing forces.  Thus the apprehension rate directly feeds this level value.  A random 
number (again, the distribution of the random variable should be selected as appropriate) 
of criminals are released daily from incarceration back into the unemployed flow of 
people.  Future versions of the model should attempt to incorporate more of the criminal 
justice system to include conviction rates, holding rates, and prison capacities. 
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Table 3.6  Criminal Rates of Change Description 
Criminal Recruit Rate Description Numerical Relationship Source
Unemployment Effect                             
(Expectation Used)
For every 1% increase in unemployment rate, a 9% 
increase in crime occurs
9*(CurrentUnEmp-
LaggedUnEmp)*Criminals
Niskanen (1994)
Criminal Inertia Effect                      
(Model Parameter Constant)
Notional - on a daily basis, for every 10,000 
criminals present, an additional 1.75 new criminals 
are recruited
(1.75/10000)*Criminals Fajnzylber et al (1998)
GDP per capita Effect             
(Expectation Used)
For every 1% increase in GDP per capita, a 2.4% 
decrease in crime occurs
(lagged GDP / current GDP - 1) * 2.4 
* Criminals
Fajnzylber et al (1998) 
Table 1 Column 3
Baseline Criminal Recruit Rate        
(Model Parameter Constant)
Replenishes the assumed criminal losses due to arrest 
and deterrence (assuming full police strength)
(Daily Arrest Rate + Daily Deterrence 
Rate) * Urban Effect * Criminals per 
100k * Inititial Regional Population / 
100k
Bejarano (2003)
Assume natural crime rate of Cv violent + Cp 
property = crimes per 100k citizens annually
Cv + Cp = 2453 + 8315 = 10768 Niskanen (1994) Table 
2 maximum column
Assume Crimes per Criminal per year 15 Levitt (1995: 28)
Criminals per 100k citizens 10768 / 15 = 717.87 criminals per 
100k citizens
For every 1% increase in urbanization rate over 0.80, 
a 0.9% increase in crime occurs.
Urban Effect = 1+0.9*(regional urban 
rate - 0.8)
Niskanen (1994)
Criminal Deterrence Rate          
(Expectation Used)
The Criminal Deterrence Rate is a function of the 
Criminal Apprehension Rate. For every 1 criminal 
apprehended 1.26 criminals on average are deterred 
and return to unemployed status.
Deterence Ratio = Daily Deter Rate / 
Daily Arrest Rate = 1.2606
Levitt (1995)
Criminal Apprehension Rate Description Numerical Relationship Source
Criminal Apprehension Rate      
(Expectation Used)
Policing forces manning level of 78 Police per 100 
Criminals (from Police Demand Ratio) is required to 
achieve a daily arrest rate of 0.1846/365
Daily Arrest Rate * (Indigenous 
Police + Civil Defense + Coaltion 
Troops Policing) / Police Demand 
Ratio
Assume Required Police per 100k citizens 560 Niskanen (1994) Table 
2 double average 
column
Assume Arrest Rate of 0.1846 yearly Daily Arrest Rate = 0.1846/365 Levitt (1995) Table 1
Assume Deter Rate of 0.2327 yearly Daily Deter Rate = 0.2327/365 Levitt (1995) Table 1
Police Demand Ratio 560 / 717.87 = 0.78
Criminal Death Rate Description Numerical Relationship Source
Criminal Death Rate                    
(Random Variable)
Notional - A specified proportion of crime caused 
deaths are assumed to be criminal vs criminal death
Avg Criminal Death Rate = (1 - 
Sum(Crime Death Proportions 
Vector)) * Homicides per Criminal 
per day * Criminals
Crime Death Proportions Vector represents the 
proportion of crime induced death against the 
unemployed, government employees, private sector 
employees, and general population -> it must sum to 
less than one with any remaining proportion 
indicating crimina
[CDeathUnEmp, CDeathGovt, 
CDeathPriv, CDeathGenPop]
Criminal Homicide Rate is the pecentage of crimes 
committed that ar e murders
0.0032 Levitt (1995) table 1 
maximum column
Homicides per Criminal per day Criminal Homicide Rate * Crimes per 
Criminal per year / 365
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Public Opinion Sub-Model 
 The public opinion sub-model represents the indigenous population’s overall 
general attitude concerning the coalition stabilization and reconstruction effort.  Often 
times the feelings and behavior of the populace is difficult to predict, though not 
impossible.  The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction (PCR) project is one of many organizations attempting to develop 
measures to gauge the nation-building progress from the perspective of the indigenous 
people.  In Capturing Iraqi Voices the CSIS PCR project experts indicate how they have 
traveled to Kosovo, Iraq, Sudan, and Sri Lanka to conduct research for several influential 
reports, each of them accomplished in order to better understand the effects of ongoing 
reconstruction operations in the country (CSIS, 2004: 2).  In Progress or Peril, the 
extended follow up report to Capturing Iraqi Voices, the CSIS PCR project team details 
its full Iraqi popular perception report in five distinct areas: security, governance and 
participation, economic opportunity, services, and social well-being (2004: 1).  Not 
surprisingly, the focus of the research parallels the nation-building goals of the coalition.  
 For the purposes of this model however, a single popular support measure is used; 
the popular support level value consists of a percentage score for each population sub-
group in the nation, representing the proportion of that particular sub-group that supports 
the coalition stabilization and reconstruction effort.  This measure could be construed as a 
weighted composite of each of the important areas within the nation-building context.  
Determination of the initial popular support measures for each of the sub-groups is 
difficult, especially if no reliable polling sources are available to the model user.  It is for 
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this reason, that the initial popular support level values should be considered as a factor in 
any study conducted using this model. 
 The popular support level value and the four associated rates of change are listed 
in the table below. 
Table 3.7  Public Opinion Sub-Model Level Values and Rates of Change 
Level Value Units
Popular Support Unemployment Effect RoC Percentage Points
(vector of P length) Level of Violence Effect RoC
   P = number of population subgroups Essential Services Demand Ratio Effect RoC
   in the nation GDP per capita Effect RoC
Rates of Change (RoC)
 
 Examination of the trends revealed by various opinion methodologies (media, 
official, polls, and interviews) sheds light on what the populace views is important (CSIS, 
2004 and IRI, 2004).  The International Republican Institute (IRI) poll conducted in Iraq 
in September and October of 2004 found that the following four areas concerned ordinary 
Iraqis most: unemployment, crime, infrastructure, and national security.  Of these four, 
crime was labeled as the most important.  Not surprisingly, the important areas are 
encompassed within the four principal components of nation-building identified by the 
stabilization and reconstruction subject matter experts.  The SROM represents the 
concerns of the population through the rates of change affecting the popular support level 
value. 
 The four rates of change affecting the popular support level value are: the 
unemployment effect, level of violence effect, essential services demand ratio effect, and 
the GDP per capita effect.  The unemployment effect addresses unemployment such that 
as unemployment decreases (increases) popular support increases (decreases).  The 
specific mathematical relationship used for this rate of change is notional and requires 
further investigation. 
77 
 The level of violence effect addresses the crime and national security concerns of 
a population.  The violence within a region, as measured by the number of daily 
indigenous deaths, is an excellent barometer for stability.  The level of violence effect 
decreases popular support when the number of deaths due to crime, insurgency, direct 
insurgent attacks, and indigenous casualties is above a specified tolerable threshold.  The 
level of violence effect increases popular support when the violence is below the 
tolerable threshold.  The specific mathematical relationship used for this rate of change is 
notional and requires further investigation.  Since the model runs almost entirely in a time 
when violence is high, this effect will constantly be pushing popular support down. 
 The essential services demand ratio effect addresses the population’s 
infrastructure needs in terms of food, water, power, and availability of refined products.  
If the weighted average demand ratio is above a specified tolerable threshold there is an 
increase in popular support, otherwise there is a decrease.  Any of these demand ratios 
can be weighted according to the particular importance of the service.  A demand ratio is 
a percentage score conveying the amount of a particular product or service provided to 
the population relative to the amount demanded by the population.  For instance, if the 
power infrastructure provided 18 hours of service on a given day, the power demand ratio 
for that day would be 0.75.  If the tonnage of food demanded for delivery required 18,000 
tonnes of transport capacity daily but the transport infrastructure could only handle 9,000 
tonnes, the food demand ratio would be 0.50.  The specific mathematical relationship 
used for this rate of change is notional and requires further investigation. 
 The GDP per capita effect addresses wages, salaries, consumer prices, jobs, and 
general economic health.  As GDP per capita increases (decreases), popular support 
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increases (decreases).  The specific mathematical relationship used for this rate of change 
is notional and requires further investigation. 
Critical Infrastructure Sub-Model 
 Chapter II discussed at great length the significance of a nation’s critical 
infrastructure on stabilization and reconstruction efforts.  The critical infrastructure sub-
model represents a region’s portion of the national infrastructure.  It is the largest of the 
six sub-models, containing 58 level values and 90 associated rates of change.  The sub-
model consists of five subsystems: crude oil industry, electrical power generation and 
distribution, transportation, water, and economic.  Due to the scope and complexity of 
constructing an adequate model of a region’s critical infrastructure, a conceptual diagram 
of the SROM critical infrastructure sub-model has been provided for the reader (Figure 
3.5).  With the aid of Figure 3.5 a general description of the entire sub-model is provided 
to the reader.  Note that the shaded areas indicate component subsystems that are 
susceptible to insurgent attack. 
 It should be noted that the SROM may be adapted to different stabilization and 
reconstruction scenarios.  An industry contributing a substantial amount of money to the 
national GDP should be incorporated into the SROM.  For instance, if a country’s 
production and export of a commodity (e.g. oil, steel, coffee) accounts for 80% of its 
GDP and insurgent elements within the country are actively attempting to destroy or 
impair that industry (to hinder stabilization and reconstruction efforts), then the 
production, transport, and export of that commodity should be modeled since the 
successful operation of the industry has such a large impact on the health of the economy 
(and hence stabilization and reconstruction efforts). 
79 
 
Oil 
Extraction 
Oil 
Transport 
(Pipeline)
Interregional 
Oil 
Transport
Oil Export 
Terminal 
Direct 
Pipeline 
Export
Oil Refinery 
Processing 
Successful 
Export 
Contribution 
to National 
Level GDP
Crude Oil 
Power 
Generators
GasOil / 
Diesel Power 
Generators
FuelOil 
Power 
Generators
Natural Gas 
Power 
Generators
Natural Gas 
Extraction 
Refined Products 
GasOil/Diesel 
Kerosene 
Gasoline/Benzene 
FuelOil 
LPG 
Natural Gas 
Hydroelectric 
Power 
Generators
Regional Stand 
Alone Power 
Generation
Imported 
Refined 
Products
Oil Industry 
Power Demand 
Oil Power Demand Ratio 
 
Effects Operating Capacity 
of each component of the 
Oil Industry 
Populace Power 
Demand 
NonOil 
Industry Power 
Demand
Regional Power 
Generation 
Regional Power 
Transmission 
and Distribution
National Power 
Grid 
Oil Industry 
Power Supplied 
Populace and 
NonOil 
Industry Power
Power Demand 
Ratio 
Populace Refined 
Products Supplied 
Populace Refined 
Products Demand 
Regional 
Population 
Refined Products 
Demand Demand 
Ratio
Regional 
NonOil GDP 
National Refined 
Products Storage 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Oil & Gas Infrastructure 
Oil Power 
Demand Ratio 
Regional Power 
Grid 
Potable Water 
Demand 
Potable Water 
Supplied 
Potable Water 
Processing 
Facilities
Water Demand 
Ratio 
Road 
Transportation 
Capacity
Seaport 
Transportation 
Capacity
Rail 
Transportation 
Capacity
Air 
Transportation 
Capacity
Population 
Requiring Food 
Rations
Food Demand 
 
Commercial 
Transport 
Vehicles
Road 
Infrastructure 
Status Index
Transportation 
Infrastructure 
Capacity 
(tonnes)
Coalition 
Transportation 
Demand
Oil and Power 
Transportation 
Demand
NonOil 
Industry 
Transportation
Refined Product 
Transportation 
Demand
Transportation 
Infrastructure 
Demand 
(tonnes)
Interregional 
Excess 
Transportation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transportation Infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water Infrastructure 
Regional Power 
Transmission 
and Distribution
 
Electrical Power Infrastructure 
Transportation 
Demand Ratio 
Food Demand 
Ratio 
National Level 
GDP 
Regional GDP 
 
Regional 
Population 
GDP per 
capita 
Regional Death 
Rate 
Transportation Demand 
Ratio 
 
Effects Baseline Growth 
of Oil Infrastructure 
ACPs 
Insurgent 
Attacks 
Facility 
Protection 
Service
Insurgent Attacks 
Against Infrastructure 
 
Effected Infrastructure 
marked as illustrated 
with this box 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic 
Infrastructure 
Transportation Demand Ratio 
 
Effects Baseline Growth of 
Power Infrastructure ACPs 
 
Transportation Demand 
Ratio 
 
Effects Baseline Growth of 
Water Infrastructure ACPs 
Figure 3.5  Conceptual Diagram of Critical Infrastructure Sub-Model 
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 The crude oil infrastructure is important to many countries because it is a major 
source of fuel.  In the SROM, regional crude oil is first extracted and then moved to the 
regional oil transport (pipeline) component of the oil infrastructure subsystem.  From the 
pipeline system there are various destinations available.  The oil could be transported to 
regional oil refineries where a refining process occurs that yields different refined oil 
products.  The oil could be transported to regional oil export terminals where the oil is 
loaded into ships (or perhaps trucks) for export.  The oil could be exported directly out of 
the country via pipeline.  Successful exportation of crude oil is assumed to be sold based 
upon a model parameter constant price per barrel of oil with all revenue attributed to the 
national level GDP.  (This national level GDP is shared by all the regions in the country.)  
Finally, for refining or export purposes, oil could be transported to another region in the 
county via an interregional pipeline.  Insurgents can attack every aspect of the oil 
industry: oilfields, oil pipelines, oil refineries, and oil export terminals. 
 The natural gas extraction component is also included within the oil infrastructure 
subsystem. Much of a country’s natural gas production could come from non-associated 
gas which the Society of Petroleum Engineers defines as the “natural gas produced from 
a reservoir that does not contain significant quantities of crude oil (2005).”  The natural 
gas extraction component models the operations of the non-associated natural gas surface 
processing facilities.  The natural gas produced is transported via pipeline to join the 
regional production of refined products. 
 Associated gas, which the Society of Petroleum Engineers defines as the “natural 
gas produced with crude oil from the same reservoir, (2005)” may account for much of 
the country’s natural gas production.  Depending on the capability of the associated 
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surface processing facilities, a large amount of natural gas could be processed.  In the 
SROM, associated gas is modeled as a function of the barrels of crude oil refined.  As the 
crude oil is sent to refineries, collocated natural gas processing plants are able to siphon 
off the associated natural gas.  In the model this is accomplished by setting a natural gas 
refined yield to the appropriate amount, then converting the partial barrels of crude to 
cubic feet of natural gas.  The natural gas then joins the rest of the refined products 
produced at the refinery.  If a particular country flares all associated gas because it lacks 
the processing capabilities, the natural gas yield would be set to zero, indicating the lack 
of associated natural gas production. 
 Refinery operations consist of processing crude oil to produce differing refined 
products which are then used within different functional areas of a society and economy.  
Platt’s Guide to Petroleum Specifications provides excellent, detailed information on 
refinery processing yields.  There are many crude oil yield formulas for use with different 
crude oils, refining regions, and refining configurations.  Platt’s offers the following 
pertinent information: 
 
The normalization process involves calculation of the yield of a given refined 
product as a volume fraction of the total volume of refined products, excluding 
the refinery fuel gas produced. The amount of refinery fuel gas produced varies 
dependent upon the refinery classification (topping, cracking), the refining 
location, and the crude oil being processed. ( Platt’s, 1999: 34) 
 
 
 Yields within the model should be selected to best represent the true realization of 
the refinery yield.  The model is such that the refineries in different regions can be set to 
have different yields.  For instance, one region’s refineries could concentrate on 
production of gasoline and diesel while another concentrates on fuel oil and kerosene.  
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The chosen yields should best reflect the true potential of the refineries.  Platt’s also notes 
that the refining process consumes approximately 5% of the fuel feedstock, depending on 
the type of refining (topping, cracking) and type of crude oil (Platt’s, 1999: 35). 
 The six refined product categories modeled in the SROM are gas oil/diesel, 
kerosene, gasoline/benzene, fuel oil, liquid petroleum gas (LPG), and natural gas.  After 
the refined products are produced they are offered as fuel to many different sources: the 
generators in the electrical power infrastructure subsystem (gas oil/diesel, fuel oil, and 
natural gas), population consumption for heating, driving, and cooking (kerosene, 
gasoline/benzene, and LPG), and vehicles in the transportation infrastructure (diesel).  
Any remaining regional fuel is then forwarded for keeping in the national refined 
products storage level value.  Of note, due to the difficulty in storing large amounts of 
natural gas it is assumed in this model that excess natural gas is converted to LPG.  
Physically, no refined products storage is modeled.  The assumption is that all available 
regional surpluses are kept in storage tanks collocated with refining process facilities and 
are available for transport to other regions as demand requires.   
 The electrical power infrastructure subsystem consists of five different types of 
generators based upon the type of fuel used to spin the turbines: crude oil, gas oil/diesel, 
fuel oil, natural gas, and hydro-electric.  Each of the generator types has two categories of 
generator, those that contribute to the national grid and those considered stand alone 
(contribute power only to the region).  The amount of power generated and delivered is 
constrained not only by the operational generating capacity of the generators but also by 
the available fuel and the condition of the region’s transmission and distribution 
component.  The regional transmission and distribution component affects the amount of 
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power that can be exported from the region as well as the amount of power delivered to 
users in the region.  Insurgent attacks can be made against both the generation and the 
transmission components of the subsystem. 
 The users of power place a demand on the national power grid.  The population, 
non-oil industry, and the oil industry all are modeled as having dynamic demands on the 
regional grid and through it the national grid.  As the population grows, so too does its 
demand for power.  Based on country power consumption by sector data, a rough 
estimate of population demand in terms of megawatt-hours per capita can be calculated.  
Also of consideration, typical load characteristics (usage patterns) indicate a seasonal 
variation whereby the winter minimum load can be as low as 70% of the summer peak 
load (Sadiq and Al Taie, 2003: 9).  Thus, a seasonal demand modifier is used in the 
model to more accurately depict the seasonal changes in electricity.  Sadiq and Al Taie 
note that in Iraq the industrial base load varies the least; the largest seasonal variation in 
demand comes from residential customers operating their air conditioners in the summer 
heat.  This seasonal variation is also mention in the report issued by the US-Canada 
Power System Outage Task Force concerning the August 14th, 2003 blackout in the 
northeastern US and southeastern Canada (2003: 5). 
 The non-oil industry demand is based upon the regional non-oil GDP.  Thus, as 
the economy grows through the expansion of commerce and industry, as reflected by the 
regional non-oil GDP, so too does its demand for electricity.  Based upon a country’s 
power consumption by sector data a rough estimate of megawatt-hours per million US 
dollars of GDP can be estimated.  Thus, a growing economy must have its power needs 
met to realize full growth potential.  This concept is put forth in the Joint Iraqi Needs 
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Assessment (UN/World Bank, 2003, vi and 59).  If power requirements are not met, then 
the economy does not grow as fast and actually may decline.  The model uses the power 
demand ratio to facilitate this concept.  If the power demand ratio equals one, then the 
populace, non-oil industry, and oil industry are receiving 24 hours of service at their 
required load levels.  A ratio of 0.67 would indicate only 16 hours of service is being 
provided. 
 Moving to the transportation infrastructure, it is modeled as four distinct modes of 
transport providing capacity measured in tonnes.  The modes of transport are road, sea, 
rail, and air.  It should be noted that the coalition military transport is not modeled, 
though the coalition can place a demand on the transportation infrastructure.  The model 
only considers indigenous transport capacity.  Insurgent attacks disrupt transportation 
infrastructure.  
 Road transportation consists of a fleet of vehicles that provide the actual available 
tonnage capacity for movement of goods and supplies within the region.  Insurgent 
attacks and criminal activity can destroy commercial transport vehicles.  The actual 
condition of the system of roads and bridges that make up the physical infrastructure is 
measured using a road infrastructure index score.  This score ranges from zero to one and 
represents a penalizing factor on the available tonnage capacity provided by the fleet of 
commercial transport vehicles.  This concept is used to allow the model user to represent 
the problems arising from bridges being out or certain roads being out of service. 
 For instance, if the road infrastructure index was set at 0.80 and the region had 
100 vehicles each with an average capacity of 29.5 tonnes, then the actual available 
tonnage supplied to regional demand would be 100*29.5*0.8 = 2360.  The region has 
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effectively lost 590 tonnes (20%) of its vehicle transport capacity because of poor road 
infrastructure.  This could indicate long queues at fuel distribution stations, long queues 
at customs checkpoints, or longer routes due to bridges being down.  At any given time, 
if 20% of the region’s vehicle fleet is stuck in customs as it seeks to import food, then 
this effectively reduces the available capacity and the road infrastructure index should be 
set to approximately 0.80.  The road infrastructure index level value is notional and 
should be used to reflect improvements or problems that occur with the road 
infrastructure such as it affects the available transport capacity. 
 Any excess regional trucking capacity is offered for use by other regions that may 
be experiencing shortfalls.  The trucking industry places a demand upon and consumes 
diesel.  Regional production of diesel is used first and if demand is not met, the national 
refined products surplus of diesel, if any, is consumed.  The availability of fuel affects the 
available trucking transport capacity.  The number of liters of diesel consumed daily by 
each truck is a model parameter and can be set to appropriately reflect the fuel 
consumption in the region. 
 The seaports in a region are extremely important as much of the bulk cargo 
arriving in a country could come by sea.  Conversely, the region could have no access to 
the sea and the seaport capacity would be zero.  For a seaport, the number of functional 
berths, condition and presence of loading/unloading equipment, manning levels, power 
requirements, security, rail connections, tugboats, and basic harbor characteristics all 
impact the daily tonnage capacity of the seaport (UNJLC, 27 Aug 2004: 1-6). 
 The rail transportation capacity is determined by the number of functioning 
engines, the availability of rolling stock, and the number, condition, and location of the 
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rail lines.  The total available internal transport capacity provided by rail is added to the 
regional total. 
 The capacity of airports is determined by its size, number of inbound flights, 
cargo terminal conditions, fuel availability, and perimeter security.  Air transport 
typically will not be very large relative to trucking and sea transport and as such currently 
does not contribute a large effect to the model.  However, later versions could incorporate 
more of the positive factors associated with air cargo, such as the quick arrival of 
precious or emergency cargo. 
 The total regional transportation capacity supplied over the capacity demanded 
gives the transportation demand ratio.  The transportation demand ratio affects the 
baseline growth of availability capacity percentages (ACP) (which is subsequently 
discussed) representing the impact of slowed delivery of reconstruction supplies to 
various industries.  The transportation demand ratio also directly affects the food demand 
ratio. 
 The amount of food rationing required by the population is an unchanging model 
parameter.  (Later versions should consider making the percent of the population 
requiring food rationing a level value that could perhaps slowly be reduced as 
reconstruction progresses.)  A rough estimate of the tonnes of food per person on food 
rationing can be determined by examination of the gross food requirement estimates 
made by subject matter experts.  Used with the regional population, this estimate then 
drives the transportation demand for the delivery and distribution of food. 
 The model has a food delivery priority control whereby transportation capacity 
food demand is satisfied before any other.  Use of this control ensures a priority for food 
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delivery.  Otherwise, the food demand will be pooled with the demands of the other 
industries and be subjected to the general transportation demand ratio as an indicator of 
how much food is being delivered to the populace who needs it. 
 The industries and activities placing a demand on the transportation infrastructure 
include the movement of refined products (including imports), coalition requirements, oil 
and power industry, non-oil industry, and food rationing system. 
 The water infrastructure is represented by the total potable water accessible to the 
population.  The water demands of population typically represent essential basic needs 
such as preparation of food and personable hygiene.  These activities sustain life and 
reduce disease.  The water infrastructure subsystem measures capacity in terms of liters 
of potable water provided daily.  A per capita demand is utilized to measure the success 
of the water infrastructure in providing adequate resources.  A typical per capita demand 
is 5-15 liters per day per person though the minimum amount necessary to sustain life is 
about 2.5 liters per day (Health Disaster Management, 2002: 80).  Similar to the other 
demand ratios, the water demand ratio is the ratio of water supplied to water demand and 
is an indicator of how well the populace is doing with regard to water services.   
 The last infrastructure subsystem represents the regional economy.  The economic 
subsystem contains the regional non-oil GDP level value, its only one.  This regional 
non-oil GDP measures the strength of the non-oil economy in the region and directly 
impacts the power demand for the region based on the amount of GDP represented.  In 
the model, an assumed growth rate is set by the model user.  To achieve this growth rate, 
the average demand ratio of the five essential services must equal one. 
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 For instance, if a regional non-oil GDP was 1000 million US$ and the specified 
non-oil growth rate was 30% then the following situations might occur: should the 
demand ratios of the essential services indicate a healthy, smoothly running infrastructure 
with an average demand ratio of 0.90 then the daily equivalent non-oil GDP would be 
1000*1.30*0.90 = 1170.  The 1170 equivalent then increases the non-oil GDP to 1000.5 
for the day. The next day, assuming the same average demand ratio, the equation would 
be 1000.5*1.30*0.90 = 1170.6, increasing the non-oil GDP to 1001. 
 If the average demand ratio dropped to 0.50, indicating poor realization of 
essential services, then the non-oil GDP would be adversely affected.  Consider the 
following equation, 1000*1.30*0.50 = 650.  The 650 equivalent then decreases the non-
oil GDP to 999.04.  As mentioned previously, a society’s essential services must be 
adequately provided to meet the economic growth expectations (UN/World Bank, 2003, 
vi and 59).  The concept is realized through the use of the average demand ratio. 
 In addition to the effect that essential services have on an economy, the security 
of the region is of significant consequence as well (UN/World Bank, 2003, vi).  It is no 
surprise that increased violence harms an economy, but how much damage is done to the 
economy?  Review of the criminal activities literature revealed estimates that are used in 
the SROM.  As introduced in Chapter II, Bejarano’s implication that a natural baseline 
murder rate of 28 per 100,000 citizens results in a 2% decrease in GDP will be used to 
assess the criminal effect on the economy in a stabilization and reconstruction operational 
context (Bejarano, 2003: 49-50).  Any civilian death rate higher than the baseline will 
result in a further reduction of the GDP growth rate. 
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 Revisiting the sample non-oil GDP equations discussed above, the effect of 
violence is now considered.  With a non-oil GDP of 1000, an assumed growth rate of 
30%, and an average demand ratio of 0.90, the equation was 1000*1.30*0.90 = 1170.  
Consider that due to insurgency and extensive criminal activity, the death rate in the 
region is 100 per 100,000 citizens.  This is 3.57 times more than the baseline level of 28 
per 100,000 citizens causing a loss of 3.57*2% = 7.14% of GDP.  (This loss applies not 
only to the non-oil GDP but to the national level GDP as well.)  The resulting effect on 
non-oil GDP is illustrated with the following equation: 1000*1.30*0.90*(1-.0714) = 
1086.4.  Non-oil GDP still grows to 1000.2, but the growth was reduced due to violence.  
Of course with scenario specific data, these figures could be adjusted. 
 In addition to the regional non-oil GDP, the region receives the national level 
GDP (consisting of aid and oil money) which is then added to its own regional GDP.  
Before the realizing the national level GDP, the incoming GDP is subjected to the 
violence effect that is prevalent in that region.  Once the national level GDP is 
appropriately reduced it is then combined with the regional non-oil GDP to give the 
regional GDP.  In this way, regions with different levels of violence receive different 
disbursements of the national level GDP.  Relatively quiet regions will suffer less of a 
loss than regions with higher violence.  The higher loss reflects the problems associated 
with violence-afflicted reconstruction projects, collateral war damage due to insurgency, 
and general lack of disbursement of government monies due to ongoing hostilities and 
instability.   
 The manner in which the operational status and capacities of the numerous 
subsystem components are modeled is now discussed.  
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 The operating capacity of each of the various subsystem components is modeled 
using two level values.  The first is the available capacity percentage (ACP), a percentage 
value ranging between zero and one that indicates how much of the particular 
component’s installed capacity is available at simulation time t.  Using this value in 
conjunction with the component’s capacity gives the component’s current operating 
capacity.  For instance, if a region’s near term oil field extraction capacity is about 
500,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) and the condition of the equipment, manning level, 
electrical power, industrial water availability, transportation infrastructure’s effective 
delivery of supplies, and security is such that the ACP is 0.25, then that region’s daily 
crude oil production would be 125,000 bbl.  If at the start of a stabilization and 
reconstruction operation a particular region’s oilfields were undamaged by conflict, 
sabotage, or looting its ACP would undoubtedly be high, indicating its relatively rapid 
capability to return to normal operating conditions. 
 The ACP concept is used throughout the critical infrastructure sub-model and 
requires a more detailed discussion.  The baseline growth of an ACP represents the 
ability of infrastructure reconstruction elements to enact repairs given the local conditions 
(transportation delivery of supplies, manning levels, power availability, and so forth).  A 
typical ACP growth rate might be 1/180, indicating that it would take approximately 6 
months (180 days) to effectively repair the infrastructure component in question, given a 
starting ACP of zero.  If the component in question is more difficult to repair, such as a 
long interregional oil pipeline, than the ACP growth rate might be set to 1/730 to indicate 
an approximate estimated repair time of two years.  The ACP baseline growth rate is an 
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expectation with the model user selecting an appropriate distribution that reflects the 
variation expected in the daily rehabilitation progress. 
 It should also be noted that the ACP should be thought of as the near term 
reconstruction/repair capability of a particular component system.  Any major 
refurbishing or overhauls such as the arrival of 500 megawatts (MW) worth of electrical 
generating capacity or the opening of a new 750,000 bbl/d oilfield should be reflected in 
the appropriate capacity growth rate of change. 
 As just noted, the capacity level values found throughout the critical infrastructure 
sub-model should be construed as the attainable short term goals for a particular 
component’s reconstruction.  Any major change to the component’s capacity that a model 
user wishes to represent can be accomplished by setting the component’s capacity rate of 
change accordingly.  For example, should a region’s seaport be undergoing drudging 
operations with an expected completion time of 18 months, then use of the seaport 
capacity rate of change would be appropriate.  The ACP reflects a gradual, continuous 
growth in capacity whereas the capacity rate of change represents large discrete jumps in 
operating capacity.  Together, the versatility of the two level values and their rates of 
change allow the model to represent a wide spectrum of possible scenario developments. 
 The insurgent attack effect affects many of the sub-model’s ACP level values and 
represents a successful insurgent attack against infrastructure.  Many of the subsystems’ 
components are susceptible to attack.  Those that can be attacked are marked with stripes 
in Figure 3.4. 
 The exact distribution of the insurgent attacks against infrastructure is expressed 
as a pair of branching random variables in the model (e.g. first which subsystem, then 
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which component).  The distribution of attacks should be set to reflect the targeting 
strategies of the insurgents (e.g. 0.40 oil industry, 0.30 power industry, 0.20 transport, 
0.10 water).  Of further note, the distributions of attacks could be modified to test the 
different outcomes resulting from different enemy courses of action.  If insurgent 
elements were to repeatedly attack power transmission lines, what would occur? This is 
the type of question that could be further explored with the model. 
 In addition to the distribution of insurgent attacks against infrastructure, the 
subsequent impact of the attacks needs to be correctly specified.  Each attack causes a 
percentage loss in the ACP level value of a particular capacity (the exception being 
transport vehicles where actual vehicles are destroyed or stolen).  The attack effect is a 
random variable with a distribution chosen that best reflects the level of damage that 
could be inflicted.  The attack effect distribution should be chosen with the ACP growth 
rate and the capacity in mind.  For instance, if an ACP was currently at a value of 1.00 
and an insurgent attack with an effect of 0.05 occurred the ACP would be reduced to 
0.95.  If this ACP was operating in association with the power transmission capacity of 
100 megawatts then the current operational capacity would be 95 megawatts.  If three 
attacks had occurred, the current operational capacity would be 85 megawatts.  
 Additionally, if the ACP baseline growth rate expectation was 1/100, then on 
average it would take 15 days to bring the operational capacity back to its full potential 
(from 85 MW to 100 MW).  If the ACP baseline growth rate expectation was 1/365, then 
on average it would take approximately 55 days to bring the operational capacity back up 
to its full potential.  Thus, the attack effect for each of the components in the critical 
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infrastructure sub-model should be carefully considered in relation to the particular ACP 
growth rate and capacity. 
Interregional Interactions 
 The last section of this chapter discusses the way in which regions interact with 
each other.  There are seven relationships that tie regions together into a single national 
system. Some are of more consequence than others. 
 The two that are of most consequence are the dynamic movement of coalition 
troops and insurgents.  A particular region could be progressing forward in relative 
stability and prosperity until the arrival of large numbers of insurgents, spilling over from 
a nearby region that is experiencing severe problems due to insurgency.  Different 
insurgent movement rule sets could be investigated in an effort to understand the effects 
such movement has on the overall stabilization and reconstruction effort.  It would be 
interesting to note the effects on a region if insurgent movement rates were turned off.  
Disallowing insurgent movement between regions might reflect successful coalition 
cordon operations. 
 Similarly, a region could be in turmoil due to insurgency until a neighboring 
region is subdued, allowing the release of coalition troops from that region.  The coalition 
troops arrive in the problem region, turning the tide of the insurgency and enabling peace 
on the region.  The movement of coalition troops intends to capture the dynamic 
capability of coalition forces to respond to developing conditions within the model.  A 
stable region with a large number of troops will not stand idly by as a neighboring region 
descends into chaos.  Given a certain scenario, the movement conditions of the coalition 
troops can be investigated to find improved results. 
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 In addition to the two movement interactions, each region shares the same 
national level GDP.  Thus, the oil produced and exported in one region has an impact on 
the GDP of a non-oil producing region.  This assumes and reflects a near equal 
disbursement of revenue and associated funds.  The model user could investigate the 
effects of uneven distribution of oil wealth.  If a certain region’s stability precludes 
disbursement of oil wealth funds, its share of the national oil GDP could be adjusted.  
That region would then suffer in terms of regional GDP, job creation, and GDP per 
capita.  To the detriment of the unstable region, the other regions would benefit from the 
increased share of oil wealth.   
 Each region shares a national power infrastructure.  In this way, a region that 
generates much more electricity than it consumes, is able to export power to other 
regions, assisting in the operation and growth of their economies and the provision of 
essential services to other regions’ populations.  Analogous to the share of national level 
GDP, a region’s share of the national power plays an important role in the development 
of infrastructure.  Electricity has a wide ranging impact on a region’s stability.  Assuming 
that there is never enough generation compared to demand, proper distribution of power 
is vitally important to the overall stabilization and reconstruction effort.  Investigating 
different national power shares for the differing regions allows the model user to 
investigate the impact of poor/good resource allocation management.  This type of study 
could explain the ramifications of giving a disproportionate amount of power to one 
region, to the detriment of another. 
 The oil infrastructure is modeled such that one region may transport oil from its 
own region to a neighboring region.  This might be done for refining purposes, export 
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purposes, or generator fueling purposes.  Thus the production and transport of oil in one 
region might affect the refined products output in another region.  If the crude oil 
feedstock provided to a refinery in a stable region is cutoff due to insurgent sabotage of a 
pipeline in an unstable region, the stable region will suffer problems unless steps are 
taken to alleviate the fuel supply problem (import of fuel, more FPS, more coalition 
troops and indigenous security forces, increased oil transport ACP baseline growth rate). 
 The refined products from an oil refining region may end up being transported 
back to an oil producing region for consumption (should that region lack adequate 
refining capacity based on its requirements).  Thus, both regions’ refined products 
demand ratio may increase because of this interaction, causing an increase transportation 
capacity through provided diesel, an improved economy through the refined products 
demand ratio, and higher popular support due to the essential services demand ratio.   
 The last interaction is the shared excess road transportation capacity.  A region 
with an excess of trucks can loan out its trucking fleet to assist nearby regions in meeting 
transportation tonnage demands.  A higher transportation demand ratio facilitates full 
realization of ACP growth for the oil, power, and water industries as well helping the 
non-oil economy. 
Summary 
 
 This chapter described the general stabilization and reconstruction model 
(SROM).  General overviews, descriptions, detailed equations, and corresponding 
rationale was provided.  The model was constructed in a hierarchical manner that allows 
the investigation of a many, varying nation-building paradigms.  A “course of action” 
approach to investigation could be employed to investigate the consequences of regional 
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stabilization and reconstruction policies and strategies.  The areas of investigation can 
involve: modifying indigenous security training rates, allocation of aid disbursement, 
coalition CIOP efforts (troop allocation) given limited manning, infrastructure 
development priorities given limited funds or capability, indigenous troop effectiveness 
given training times, criminal arrest rates, criminal release rates, power generators 
scheduled maintenance cycles, and so forth as required. 
 On a broad scale, as an exploratory effort, the probability of achieving peace and 
the probability of failing the stabilization and reconstruction effort (given a set of input 
factor levels) can be calculated.  This type of macro measure can used a rough measure 
for determining the probable level of success for a nation-building effort well before such 
an effort is actually attempted. 
 A note of caution is required, however.  Systems dynamics models are difficult to 
verify, validate, and accredit.  Caution should be used when conducting an analysis with 
a model that has not been fully verified, validated, and accredited.  That said, however, if 
the purpose of the analysts is insight, the SROM does give the decision maker a tool to 
investigate stabilization and reconstruction actions.  The ultimate decision, of course, will 
remain with the appropriate decision maker. 
 Chapter IV discusses a notional test case used to illustrate the utility of the 
SROM. 
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IV. Implementation 
This chapter serves to illustrate the utility of the stabilization and reconstruction 
model (SROM).  The scope of the model prohibits the full investigation of all the 
potentially meaningful factors affecting the outcome of a nation-building scenario.  
Nonetheless, many key factors are identified and tested using the SROM.  Two measures 
are constructed that provide the probability of stabilization success and the probability of 
stabilization failure, given a certain set of factors.  The scenario used for the illustration 
of the SROM is based on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
 Operation Iraqi Freedom effected the forceful removal of the Iraqi Baathist 
regime from power.  The majority of phase III operations was considered to be complete 
on 1 May 2003 and thus for the purposes of the SROM, 1 May 2003 is the start date of 
stability and reconstruction operations (simulation start, t = 0).  As previously mentioned, 
the nation-building process often overlaps the final two phases of campaign level 
operations resulting in the concurrent execution of both phase III and phase IV operations 
within the Operation Iraqi Freedom AOR.  Based on the best available open source 
information, the model parameters are chosen to represent the state of the Iraqi AOR on 1 
May 2003. 
 For this particular implementation of the SROM the model parameters are set to 
reflect the prevailing regional conditions within Iraq, to include: population, population 
sub-group distributions, population growth rates, regional non-oil GDP, number of 
police, power infrastructure capacities, oil refinery operations, training class schedules, 
seaport tonnage capacity, importation of refined products, water requirements, food 
requirements, electricity demand, and so forth.  Factors of interest are investigated to 
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determine their relative significance to the outcome of the stabilization and reconstruction 
mission.  Explanation and discussion of the results are provided in the following sections. 
Model Implementation 
 General top level model features must first be considered before any specific 
numerical characterizations can be implemented.  An extremely important facet of the 
SROM is the definition of the regions (in terms of their module characteristics).  The 
geographical, political, religious, or ethnic based partitions chosen to make up a region 
can significantly impact the course of model development and the results.  The 
aggregation of smaller partitions into larger regions will also make a definitive impact on 
the development of the larger region due to the newly prevailing characteristics.  
Determination of the regional characteristics must be considered carefully. 
 It is worthwhile to reiterate that the SROM was constructed, in part, to investigate 
the factors that significantly affect the successful execution of stabilization and 
reconstruction operations and as discussed in Chapter I, the conditions typically 
associated with such operations will contribute towards failure of the mission.  
Determination of the regional characteristics should reflect the potential or realized level 
of violent discord occurring within the regions of the incident nation. 
 Consider the notional test case for Iraq.  In this implementation of the SROM 
there are three regions representing Iraq.  The northern region represents the five 
northernmost governorates in Iraq: Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Ninewa, and Tameem.  
Theses five regions were selected in an effort to capture the ethnic tension existing in 
Ninewa and Tameem between the Sunni Arabs and Kurds.  The selection methodology 
suggested here is to include contentious provinces where two large, distinct population 
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sub-groups coexist.  This method of selection leverages the research of Collier, Hoeffler, 
and Söderbom (2001) where it was found that societies with multiple, large population 
sub-groups were most at risk for conflict.  If the northern Iraq region was chosen to 
contain only the Kurdish governorates Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah its population 
characteristics would reflect a near homogenous block of the ethnic Kurd population sub-
group.  The regional characteristics would then most likely keep the region relatively free 
of problems (barring significant problems in other areas and assuming the Kurds are pro-
coalition), but any inter-group tension between Kurds and Sunnis in Ninewa and Tameem 
would not be adequately captured by the model if they were placed in a region that masks 
the effects.  Selection of the regional characteristics must be made with the intent of 
capturing prevailing, relevant indigenous population inter-group dynamics.  The regional 
breakdown for the OIF scenario is detailed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1  OIF Scenario Regional Breakdown by Governorate 
North Center South
Dahuk Anbar Basrah
Erbil Babylon Missan
Ninewa Baghdad Muthanna
Sulaymaniyah Diyala Najaf
Tameem Kerbala Qadissiya
Salah al-Din Thi-Qar
Wassit
Region
 
 
Of course, a different scenario could dictate a different grouping then the one used in this 
illustration. 
 Another topic concerns the selection of the population sub-groups.  This selection 
depends on the driving goals of the study being accomplished.  Generally, consideration 
should be given to population sub-groups that make up more than 5-10% of a nation’s 
population.  If a population sub-group is deemed of small consequence due to its relative 
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national size, or due to political factors not portrayed by the model, then those particular 
sub-groups are marginalized and will contribute little to the model’s outcome.  In the OIF 
scenario, there are four population sub-groups: the Shia, the Sunni, the Kurds, and others; 
in this illustration the smaller population sub-groups (Turkoman, Yezidi, and Assyrian/ 
Chaldean) are aggregated due to their limited impact. 
 Actual determination of a region’s population sub-group proportions can be 
problematic due to lack of data.  For the OIF scenario, the regional populations were 
calculated by extrapolation of the 1997 Iraq Census figures (as reported by the United 
Nation’s Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) for Iraq; HIC Map reference 027) with 
an assumed annual population growth rate of 3%.  Once the estimated 2003 population 
data was calculated, it was a simple matter of addition to determine the model’s regional 
populations.  Gross calculation of the population sub-groups proportions was then 
accomplished via examination of religious and ethnic thematic maps such as the ones in 
Figure 4.1.  The resulting estimations are shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2  OIF Scenario Regional Population Characteristics 
North Center South National Total
Population 6,755,600 12,255,000 7,313,800 26,324,000
Population Sub-Group Proportion
  Shia 0.00 0.74 0.917 0.60
  Sunni 0.645 0.24 0.073 0.19
  Kurd 0.225 0.01 0.00 0.17
  Other 0.13 0.01 .01 0.04
Region
 
 
Discussion of the regional population characteristics used in the OIF implementation 
provides a necessary overview for better understanding of the experimental results. 
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Figure 4.1  Iraqi Thematic Maps 
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Table 4.3  OIF Scenario Regional Infrastructure Model Parameters 
Infrastructure
Oil and Gas North Center South National Total
Oil Production (bbl)                [Capacity 
InitialAPC  APCGrowth ]
1.0 mbbl   0%   1/270              
Kirkuk, Bai Hassan, Jambur, 
Khabbaz, Ajil 
None 2.0 mbbl    0%    1/270  N. & S. 
Rumaila, W. Qurnah, Az Zubair, 
Misan/Buzurgan, Majnoon, Jabal 
Fauqi, Abu Ghurab, and Luhais
3.0 mbbl
Non-Associated Natural Gas Production (cubic 
feet)
50.0 mcf    0%    1/365               Al-
Anfal
None None 50.0 mcf
Oil Transport (bbl) 1.4 mbbl    0%    1/270 1.4 mbbl    0%    1/270 2.8 mbbl    0%    1/270  
Oil Refinery (bbl) None 410,000 bbl    50%    1/270 150,000 bbl    0%    1/270 560,000 bbl
Oil Export Terminal (bbl) None None 1.6 mbbl    0%    1/180 1.6 mbbl
Oil Export Pipeline (bbl) 1.4 mbbl    0%    1/270 None None 1.4 mbbl
Notes Crude Produced in the North flows 
from the Oilfields to northern crude 
oil power genrators and then to the 
Refineries in the South.  Remaining 
crude flows back from the South into 
the North and then to Export. 
Crude Produced in the North provides 
fuel for crude oil power generators 
and crude feedstock to the Baiji and 
Doura Oil Refineries.   Refined 
Products are first made available to 
regional demand then forwarded to 
national storage
The South generally operates 
independent of the other two regions 
because of the non-operational status 
of the Iraqi Strategic Oil Pipeline.  All 
crude not refined or consumed as fuel 
for power generation is exported via 
the Basra and Khor al-Amaya termin
Power
National Power Share (percentage) 25% 40% 35% 100%
Power Generation (MW) 2521 MW 2317 MW 1260 MW 6098 MW
Power Transmission (MW) 3212 MW 10438 MW 3019 MW 16,669 MW
Transportation
Road Transport (tonnes) 2200 trucks at 29.5 tonnes each = 
64900 tonnes
5000 trucks at 29.5 tonnes each 
=147500 tonnes
1100 trucks at 29.5 tonnes each 
=32450 tonnes
244,850 tonnes
Sea Transport (tonnes) None None 19,200 tonnes    75%    1/730 19,200 tonnes
Rail Transport (tonnes) 200 tonnes   100%    1/180          
Rail is unique in that ACP must = 1 
for Rail Capacity to function
200 tonnes   100%    1/180          
Rail is unique in that ACP must = 1 
for Rail Capacity to function
200 tonnes   100%    1/180          
Rail is unique in that ACP must = 1 
for Rail Capacity to function
600 tonnes
Air Transport (tonnes) 10 tonnes    100%    1/180 10 tonnes    100%    1/180 10 tonnes    100%    1/180 30 tonnes
Economic
National Population Share 0.2566 0.4655 0.2778 1.00
Regional Non-Oil GDP                         (based on 
share of national population)
770 million US$ 1397 million US$ 770 million US$ 3000 million US$
Oil GDP                                                 (based 
on share of national population)
3079 million US$ 5586 million US$ 770 million US$ 12000 million US$
A national GDP of 15000 million US$ is assumed, of which 80% is contributed by the oil sector. (Calculated from 
Region
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 Besides the regional population demographics, a region’s infrastructure heavily 
influences the successful progression towards stability.  The US Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) Iraq Country Analysis Brief (November 2004) provided general 
information concerning the operational capacities of the Iraqi oil and gas industry.  The 
Iraq Electricity Sector Report (Sadiq and Al Taie, 2003) provided general information 
concerning the operational capacities of the Iraqi power sector.  Transportation capacities 
for each of the regions were calculated from reports by the United Nations Joint Logistics 
Centre’s (UNJLC) Iraq Bulletin No. 6 of 2004.  This information is summarized in Table 
4.3. 
 Again, due to economy of presentation, the model’s hundreds of parameters are 
not detailed within this chapter.  Each of the seven appendices (one for each of the 
functional sub-models and the national sub-model) lists not only a description of the 
general functional sub-model parameters and relationships, but also the associated values 
used within the OIF scenario.  
 Once all the model parameters are appropriately set, the identified experimental 
factors are tested.  These factors include the level of popular support among the Shia, 
Sunni, and Kurds for the coalition stabilization and reconstruction effort across all 
regions, the initial number of coalition troops in each of the defined regions, the initial 
number of insurgents in each of the regions, and the rate of infrastructure development 
across all regions.  It should be noted that the focus of this experiment was of a 
geophysical intent.  That is, the factors were chosen to measure the importance of the 
allocation of resources in terms of coalition troops and reconstruction effort 
(infrastructure growth rate), amid differing levels of popular support for the coalition 
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effort (popular support and insurgent levels), given the selected regional characteristics.  
The coalition troop and insurgent factors are implemented within the different regions so 
that their importance can be measured relative to the regions in which they are realized.  
The specifics of the experiment are subsequently discussed. 
Experiment 
 The experiment conducted for this study utilized a 3102 −V one-eighth fractional 
factorial design.  The resolution of the design (V) allows the main effects and two factor 
interactions to be tested without confounding aliases with higher order interactions.  A 
single replication of the design takes 128 runs.  In addition to the 128 factorial design 
points, each replication contained two center runs to allow testing for the presence of 
curvature.  Four replications were accomplished, totaling 520 observations. 
 The design consisted of 10 factors (Table 4.4), with combinations of each factor 
being tested at a Low and High level as determined by the design matrix, X.  
Table 4.4  OIF Scenario Design Factors 
Factor Low High
X1: Shia Support 0.40 0.80
X2: Sunni Support 0.10 0.40
X3: Kurd Support 0.60 0.90
X4: Troops in North 30,000 90,000
X5: Troops in Center 30,000 90,000
X6: Troops in South 30,000 90,000
X7: Insurgents in North 2,000 14,000
X8: Insurgents in Center 2,000 14,000
X9: Insurgents in South 2,000 14,000
X10: Infrastructure Growth Rate 0.75 1.25  
 The Iraqi population sub-group’s support for coalition stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts was determined through the examination of various Iraqi polling 
studies.  The polls used were those reported in the Brookings Institution Iraq Index 
(February 2004).  Gauging the response of an indigenous people towards militarily 
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enforced regime change a priori can be problematic.  The Iraqi polls were conducted 
after completion of offensive OIF operations, but were used as rough indicators of the 
sentiment of the Iraqi people towards the coalition effort (on 1 May 2003). 
 Examination of many of the polls reported in the Brookings Institution Iraq Index 
led to the data seen in Table 4.4.  Note that Shia support is marginal to high, Sunni 
support is low, and Kurd support is high.  These ranges are meant to characterize the 
different possible initial levels of Iraqi support for the coalition stabilization and 
reconstruction effort.  Their relative ranges should be kept in mind as results are reported.  
Subsequent experiments could very easily change the factor levels to more accurately 
reflect the reality of Iraqi public opinion. 
 In each of the three regions, the initial coalition troop levels are set to 30,000 or 
90,000.  A major assumption that should be noted concerning troop levels is that for this 
experiment no reinforcements are assumed to transfer into Iraq from outside the model.  
Each region had to be stabilized with the forces in Iraq at the start of the model.  
Coalition troops were allowed to dynamically move between regions if their initial region 
became stable (regional death rate < 43 per 100,000 persons) with the additional 
constraint that only up to half of the original number of troops in the region could transfer 
to other regions.  If each of the regions contained the highest number of troops, there 
would be a total 270,000 troops in Iraq.  Conversely, at the low levels, there would be a 
total of 90,000 troops in Iraq.  These levels were chosen with the real number of coalition 
troops in mind (typically ranging from 150,000 to 175,000 troops – Brookings Institution 
Iraq Index, 25 Feb). 
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 Again, for each of the regions, an initial insurgent level value was set to a low and 
high level.  The low level was 2,000 regional insurgents (6,000 nationally when all 
regions are set at the low value) and the high level was 14,000 regional insurgents 
(42,000 nationally when all regions are set at the high value).  As with the coalition troop 
factor levels, the insurgent levels were chosen with the best real open source 
approximation in mind (typically 15,000 to 20,000 insurgents nationwide – Brookings 
Institution Iraq Index, 25 Feb). It should be noted that once the simulation begins 
insurgents have the capacity to transfer to different regions (assuming the regional death 
rate > 3*43 = 129 per 100,000 persons). 
 The infrastructure growth rate factor modifies (multiplicatively) the rate at which 
regional infrastructure is reconstructed.  Specifically, the factor modifies the baseline 
growth rate of the available capacity percentage (ACP) for every component subsystem 
in the oil, power, transportation, and water subsystems.  Thus, at the low level of 0.75 the 
infrastructure ACP growth rates for all infrastructure systems (across all regions) inhibits 
the progress of reconstruction.  At the high level of 1.25, reconstruction progresses more 
rapidly. 
 Consider the reconstruction efforts for the Basrah oil refinery, in the SROM South 
region of Iraq.  The ACP growth rate for the southern region = 
270
1 , indicating that from 
cold start-up, the refinery would take, on average, 270 days to reach full capacity 
(150,000 bbl/day).  When the infrastructure growth rate factor is low the refinery ACP 
effectively becomes 
360
1 , indicating it now takes approximately a year to reach full 
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capacity.  At the high level, the ACP becomes 
216
1 , indicating it now takes 216 days to 
reach full capacity. 
 The goal of the experiment is to investigate the factors that significantly affect the 
successful execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations (nation-building).  
Two experimental responses facilitate the construction of two different measures, a 
probability of stabilization success and a probability of stabilization failure.  Theses two 
measures are constructed using logistic regression.  Besides the two Bernoulli responses, 
the day of stabilization (or failure) and the total number of coalition casualties are 
recorded.  The summary statistics of these two responses prove insightful as well.  The 
experimental response measures are shown in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5  OIF Scenario Experimental Responses 
Response
Y1: Stabilization
Y2: Failure
Y3: Days Until Event
Y4: Coalition Casualties  
 The criteria used to judge the outcome of the model results can be set as deemed 
appropriate by the model user.  For the OIF scenario, Y1, the successful completion of the 
stabilization and reconstruction effort, occurs when the annual (unnatural, violent) death 
rate of each of the regions drops below 43 per 100,000 persons.  This rate was selected as 
the terminating threshold because it is the highest state-wide (District of Columbia) 
murder rate in the United States (Brookings Institution, 25 Feb: 10).  The failure of the 
stabilization and reconstruction effort, Y2, occurs when coalition casualties inside Iraq 
reach 50% of the total initial coalition troop strength.  Y3 represents the day when 
stabilization (Y1) or failure (Y2) occurs. 
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 If stabilization or failure does not occur within an allotted 1500 days (a little over 
4 years) then both Y1 and Y2 remain at zero.  These occurrences reflect an unresolved 
nation-building effort that if given more time may have resulted in stabilization or failure 
occurring.  However, due to practical timing considerations, a cutoff had to be 
established. 
 Before examining the results, some intuitive predictions are discussed.  Each of 
the factors was chosen because of their perceived importance to the success of the 
stabilization and reconstruction effort.  Undoubtedly, some will be more important than 
others.  Interestingly, some will be more important to establishing peace, as compared to 
mission failure.  
 Shia support should be of vital consequence to the results.  This is due to the fact 
that Shia comprise 60% of the national population.  Should Shia popular support decrease 
too low, it is assumed it will have a negative consequence on stabilization. 
 Sunni support will be important as well due the factor levels being so low.  The 
low values intend to capture the unhappiness of the Sunni population with the coalition 
effort.  This is not surprising as the minority Sunni had held power over the other 
population sub-groups through a police state.  The lower support values of the Sunni 
should prove significant to the establishment of peace. 
 The Kurdish support level values capture the high level of support the coalition 
received from the Kurds.  Ongoing support will of course depend on the dynamic 
development of situations in the SROM.  The Kurdish support factor may be of limited 
significance due to the relatively high levels of support.  The Kurd low level (0.60) is 
well above the high for the Sunnis (0.40).  As such, even when low, the Kurds are still 
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relatively pleased with the Iraqi situation.  In any future experiments, were the Kurdish 
position reevaluated, its factor levels could be altered to investigate the consequence of 
alienating the Kurds. 
 The coalition troop levels may or may not be significant.  There may be 
interactions between the troop levels and the insurgent levels.  Obviously, more troops 
should increase the odds of success; by how much and in what region is unknown. 
 High insurgent level values should negatively affect the odd of success and 
positively affect the odds of failure.  The more insurgents present in a region, the more 
casualties and damage to infrastructure they can cause. 
 The infrastructure growth factor should be extremely influential as well.  The 
quicker reconstruction occurs, the quicker essential services are restored, the happier the 
public becomes; the quicker jobs are created, the wealthier the Iraqis become, the less 
people turn to crime and insurgency, the lower the death rate, and the quicker stability 
occurs.  Conversely, slower reconstruction would decrease the odds of success and 
increase the odds of failure. 
 A last cautionary note before the discussion of the results: the experimental design 
matrix leads to combinations of factors that may not be realistic or plausible, but, are 
indeed feasible.  Furthermore, the model assumptions concerning no reinforcements must 
also be considered when interpreting the results.  (If additional troops were to be added, 
an experiment could be designed to test the effect.)  The design matrix facilitates the 
statistically valid investigation of the nation-building factor space and necessarily 
involves the realization of these doubtful design points. 
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 For instance, the situation whereby all factor levels are low except the insurgent 
factor levels amounts to an extremely unfavorable position for the coalition.  The troop 
factor levels are such that only 90,000 troops are in country.  The population sub-groups 
are as unhappy as possible, there are 42,000 insurgents operating in the country, and 
reconstruction is slow.  The deployment of only 90,000 troops in the face of such 
negative conditions is doubtful.  This recipe for disaster would typically result in failure.  
However, in order to better understand the nation-building factor space, the unfavorable 
design point just described must be examined.  Investigation of the factor space (to the 
extent possible) provides the insights this study seeks. 
Results 
 A logistic nonlinear regression model is used to analyze the Y1 and Y2 responses 
of the SROM.  A multiple logistic regression model must be used for these responses 
because of their dichotomous nature.  Special problems arise when a response variable is 
a Bernoulli (binary) variable: nonnormal error terms, nonconstant variance, and 
constrained responses (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, Wasserman, 1996: 569-570).  In such 
cases, a normal error regression model which assumes that the error terms are normally 
distributed is inappropriate.  A logistic regression model is used in this study. 
 Consider a simple linear regression model: 
ii XY εββ ++= 110   where Yi  =  0, 1 
Since { } 0=iE ε , the following is true: 
{ } 110 XYE i ββ +=  
With Yi being a Bernoulli random variable the following can be stated about the 
probability distribution (Neter et al, 1996: 568): 
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Yi Probability 
1 P(Yi = 1)  =  πi 
0 P(Yi = 0)  =  1 - πi 
Thus, the probability that a response Yi = 1 is πi and the probability that Yi = 0 is 1- πi.  By 
definition of a random variable expectation the following is obtained: 
{ } iiiiYE πππ =⋅+⋅= )(0)(1  
Equating the above equation with the expectation of the simple linear regression model: 
{ } iii XYE πββ =+= 10  
Thus, the mean response { } 110 XYE i ββ +=  as provided by the response function is the 
probability that Yi = 1 given the factor level is Xi (Neter et al, 1996: 568). 
 Due to the problems arising because of the binary nature of Yi, the above model is 
considered unreasonable.  Neter et al state “both theoretical and empirical considerations 
suggest that when the response variable is binary, the shape of the response function will 
frequently be curvilinear” (1996: 570).  Thus, a modified response function is used to 
form an appropriate model, the (sigmoidal) form: 
{ }
)exp(1
)exp(
110
110
X
X
YE
ββ
ββ
++
+
=  
The response function expectation can then be stated as: 
{ } [ ] 1110 )exp(1 −−−+= XYE ββ  
 From the method of maximum likelihood, the parameters of the logistic response 
function can be estimated (Neter et al, 1996: 574).  The simple logistic regression model 
can be stated as: 
{ } [ ] 1110 )exp(1 −−−+== XYE ii ββπ  
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Where Yi are Bernoulli random variables with expected values { } iiYE π= .  In this study, 
the Xi levels are not constant; as such, { }iYE is a conditional mean, given the values of Xi 
and is better stated as { }ii XYE | . 
 The simple logistic regression model is easily extended to the multiple logistic 
regression model.  Using the following notation: 
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the multiple logistic regression model can be stated as: 
{ } [ ] 1)exp(1| −−+== iTiii XXYE βπ  
 A numerical search procedure is required to find the maximum likelihood 
estimates for the regression coefficients (β).  The Newton-Raphson (gradient) numerical 
search method is used in this study.  Formal chi-square goodness of fit tests are used to 
test the significance of the overall model and each of the individual regression 
coefficients. 
 The results of the OIF scenario are presented in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. 
 General examination of the model parameter coefficients in terms of their signs 
and magnitudes provides some initial information.  Those factors with negative signs 
increase the probability of a successful (failed) stabilization occurring within the first 
four years (the main effects that contribute to stability (failure) are bolded).  The factors 
with low levels of significance are shaded.  Effects with a p value less than 0.10 were 
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Table 4.6  OIF Scenario Logistic Reduced Model Fit for Y1 
Nominal Logistic Fit for Y1: Stable
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error p value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -0.964 0.478 0.0436 -1.984 -0.097
X1: Shia Support -3.608 0.566 <.0001 -4.871 -2.636
X2: Sunni Support -6.427 1.071 <.0001 -8.897 -4.659
X3: Kurd Support -1.216 0.324 0.0002 -1.918 -0.629
X4: Troops in North -2.029 0.472 <.0001 -3.065 -1.184
X5: Troops in Center -1.763 0.451 <.0001 -2.768 -0.970
X6: Troops in South -0.754 0.301 0.0123 -1.400 -0.190
X7: Insurgents in North 1.994 0.495 <.0001 1.139 3.102
X8: Insurgents in Center 2.901 0.547 <.0001 1.946 4.101
X9: Insurgents in South 4.443 0.891 <.0001 2.957 6.474
X10: Infrastructure Growth Modifier -3.818 0.608 <.0001 -5.195 -2.767
X1: Shia Support*X2: Sunni Support -1.968 0.511 0.0001 -3.100 -1.066
X2: Sunni Support*X7: Insurgents in North 1.458 0.423 0.0006 0.698 2.368
X2: Sunni Support*X8: Insurgents in Center 1.618 0.388 <.0001 0.919 2.463
X2: Sunni Support*X9: Insurgents in South 2.792 0.575 <.0001 1.786 4.053
X2: Sunni Support*X10: Infrastructure Growth M -2.089 0.475 <.0001 -3.117 -1.241
X3: Kurd Support*X6: Troops in South -0.933 0.348 0.0074 -1.673 -0.299
X3: Kurd Support*X8: Insurgents in Center 0.950 0.405 0.019 0.175 1.806
X6: Troops in South*X9: Insurgents in South 0.920 0.407 0.0237 0.136 1.778  
Table 4.7  OIF Scenario Logistic Reduced Model Fit for Y2 
Nominal Logistic Fit for Y2: Failed
Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate Std Error p value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 3.628 0.473 <.0001 2.803 4.679
X1: Shia Support 2.699 0.357 <.0001 2.063 3.475
X2: Sunni Support 1.332 0.269 <.0001 0.849 1.920
X4: Troops in North 1.023 0.242 <.0001 0.579 1.541
X5: Troops in Center 0.367 0.198 0.0637 -0.014 0.767
X6: Troops in South 0.389 0.213 0.0676 -0.027 0.812
X7: Insurgents in North -1.334 0.275 <.0001 -1.923 -0.837
X8: Insurgents in Center -2.066 0.417 <.0001 -2.993 -1.331
X9: Insurgents in South -3.647 0.449 <.0001 -4.647 -2.860
X10: Infrastructure Growth Modifier 2.302 0.313 <.0001 1.745 2.990
X1: Shia Support*X7: Insurgents in North -0.804 0.226 0.0004 -1.280 -0.385
X1: Shia Support*X8: Insurgents in Center -1.198 0.318 0.0002 -1.889 -0.623
X2: Sunni Support*X8: Insurgents in Center -0.875 0.257 0.0007 -1.431 -0.409
X4: Troops in North*X9: Insurgents in South -0.599 0.234 0.0106 -1.098 -0.166
X6: Troops in South*X9: Insurgents in South 0.620 0.221 0.005 0.201 1.072
X7: Insurgents in North*X8: Insurgents in 
Center
0.758 0.254 0.0028 0.294 1.301
X8: Insurgents in Center*X9: Insurgents in 
South
1.049 0.389 0.0071 0.355 1.916
X8: Insurgents in Center*X10: Infrastructure 
Growth Modifier
-0.536 0.299 0.073 -1.186 0.012
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kept in the reduced model, though their impact is limited and ambiguous (shaded entries 
have a 95% confidence interval that includes zero).  The inclusion of many significant 
interaction terms in the stability regression model precludes direct interpretation of 
individual parameter estimates.  The two response functions derived from their respective 
logistic regression coefficients (Table 4.6 and 4.7) facilitate numerical interpretations by 
evaluating the functions at different factor levels (Table 4.8 and 4.9): 
Table 4.8  Factor Effects on P(S|X) 
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.10
X1: Shia Support -0.4224 -0.2084 -0.0375 0.0346 0.1421 0.217
X2: Sunni Support -0.689 -0.4886 -0.0932 0.0771 0.2332 0.2709
X3: Kurd Support -0.1857 -0.0878 -0.0165 0.0159 0.0734 0.1312
20,000 5,000 1,000 1,000 5,000 20,000
X4: Troops in North -0.3199 -0.0724 -0.0137 0.0133 0.0623 0.1863
X5: Troops in Center -0.2766 -0.0624 -0.0119 0.0116 0.0547 0.1708
X6: Troops in South -0.1106 -0.0258 -0.0051 0.005 0.0244 0.0886
5,000 2,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 5,000
X7: Insurgents in North 0.2086 0.1121 0.0613 -0.0711 -0.1497 -0.3916
X8: Insurgents in Center 0.2432 0.1494 0.0857 -0.1061 -0.2247 -0.5344
X9: Insurgents in South 0.2668 0.1963 0.1222 -0.1683 -0.3503 -0.6631
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.10
X10: Infrastructure Growth Modifier -0.3611 -0.174 -0.0315 0.0295 0.1252 0.1996
Decrease Increase
Increase
Decrease Increase
Decrease Increase
P(Successful Stabilization)
Popular Support
Initial Troop Strength
Initial Insurgency Strength
Infrastructure Growth
Decrease
 
P(S | X) is the probability of successfully stabilizing all regions in the Iraqi AOR within 
the first 1500 days (approximately four years).  P(F | X) is the probability of failure in the 
stabilization and reconstruction effort such that coalition forces sustain 50% casualties 
within the first 1500 days (it is assumed that coalition forces would then withdraw). 
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Table 4.9  Factor Effects on P(F|X) 
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.10
X1: Shia Support 0.067 0.0237 0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0125 -0.019
X2: Sunni Support 0.0348 0.0139 0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0091 -0.0151
X3: Kurd Support 0 0 0 0 0 0
20,000 5,000 1,000 1,000 5,000 20,000
X4: Troops in North 0.024 0.0047 0.0009 -0.0008 -0.004 -0.0126
X5: Troops in Center 0.0069 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0055
X6: Troops in South 0.0074 0.0017 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0058
5,000 2,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 5,000
X7: Insurgents in North -0.0172 -0.0091 -0.005 0.0062 0.0139 0.0488
X8: Insurgents in Center -0.0211 -0.0127 -0.0074 0.0102 0.0243 0.1034
X9: Insurgents in South -0.0246 -0.0181 -0.0116 0.0206 0.0563 0.3309
0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.10
X10: Infrastructure Growth Modifier 0.0367 0.0145 0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0094 -0.0154
Infrastructure Growth Decrease Increase
Popular Support Decrease Increase
Initial Troop Strength Decrease Increase
P(Stabilization Failure)
Initial Insurgency Strength Decrease Increase
 
 Both of the tables (Tables 4.8 and 4.9) were generated using their respective 
logistic regression response functions.  Each entry was generated by stepping the 
indicated factor level (by the indicated amount and direction) away from the baseline 
center of the factor space (Table 4.10).   
Table 4.10  OIF Scenario Baseline Factor Space Center 
Factor Center
X1: Shia Support 0.60
X2: Sunni Support 0.25
X3: Kurd Support 0.75
X4: Troops in North 60,000
X5: Troops in Center 60,000
X6: Troops in South 60,000
X7: Insurgents in North 8,000
X8: Insurgents in Center 8,000
X9: Insurgents in South 8,000
X10: Infrastructure Growth Rate 1  
 At the baseline, P(S|X) = 0.724 and P(F|X) = 0.026.  Thus, given the factor levels 
indicated in Table 4.10, the coalition has a 72.4% chance of achieving stability within the 
first 1500 days and conversely has a 2.6% chance of failure.  Generation of the entries for 
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Tables 4.8 and 4.9 assumes all other levels remain at their center levels, with the table 
entries indicating the deviations from their respective baseline probabilities, P(S|X) = 
0.724 and P(F|X) = 0.026. 
 Examination of specific factor conditions could easily be accomplished by 
evaluating the proper logistic regression response function at the factor levels of interest.  
The reader should also realize that the characteristics of the response surface could very 
easily change as different combinations of factor levels are investigated.  Of further 
interest, it should also be noted that factor effects are non-linear.  For instance, an 
increase of 5,000 troops in the North increases P(S|X) by 0.062 whereas 20,000 
additional troops increases P(S|X) by 0.186. 
 Examination of the results reinforces intuitive generalizations.  Increasing popular 
support for the coalition, increasing the initial number of troops in a region, and 
increasing the infrastructure growth modifier all increase the probability of successfully 
completing the stabilization and reconstruction mission.  Not surprisingly, increasing the 
initial number of insurgents within the regions decreases the probability of success.  
Conversely, decreasing popular support for the coalition, decreasing the initial number of 
troops in a region, decreasing the infrastructure growth modifier, and increasing the 
initial number of insurgents within the regions all increase the probability of failing the 
stabilization and reconstruction mission. 
 The degree to which the factors affect the two opposing measures provides the 
interesting insight.  The level of Shia popular support and Sunni popular support 
substantially impact the probability of success.  Increasing Shia popular support by 0.10 
increases P(S|X) by 0.217 while increasing Sunni support by the same increases P(S|X) 
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by 0.2709.  Conversely, decreasing Shia popular support by 0.10 decreases P(S|X) by 
0.4224 while decreasing Sunni support by the same decreases P(S|X) by 0.689.  It is clear 
that keeping the majority population sub-group happy increases the chance for success.  
Alternately, attempting to gain the support of the most troublesome population sub-group 
pays dividends as well.  Indeed, it is interesting to note that Sunni support is more 
important in attempting to successfully stabilize Iraq, whereas in regard to failing, it is 
important to have the support of the majority Shia; definitely an intuitive yet discerning 
result. 
 The support of the Kurds while important is not as substantial as the other 
population sub-groups.  It is important to remember however that the Kurds support was 
ranged between 0.60 and 0.90.  (Any presumed drop below 0.60 would be cause for 
concern as such an occurrence was not modeled.)  Analyzing aspects of popular support 
emphasizes the importance of focused resource allocation strategies.  For example, the 
reduction of Kurdish support from 0.75 to 0.65 is not nearly as significant as the 
reduction of Sunni support from 0.25 to 0.15 (-0.186 versus -0.689).  Additionally, the 
level of Kurdish support has negligible effect on the probability of failure.  The 
implication here is that the North will not be the key region that determines whether or 
not the overall stabilization and reconstruction mission fails.  General priorities could be 
developed from similar SROM enabling analysis. 
 Initial regional troop strength has more of an impact in the North and Center 
regions.  The specifics of why this is true remain uncertain; though the fact that the 
troublesome Sunni are concentrated mostly in the Center and North is a likely root cause.  
It is also seen that regardless of region, the absence of troops has a more substantial 
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impact than the presence of troops (for the North, -0.320 versus 0.186) emphasizing the 
utility and importance of having the right number of troops.  Given troop manning 
limitations, finding a general estimate of a troop threshold where diminishing returns 
begin would be helpful; knowing that the addition of another 20,000 soldiers in a region 
is not likely to increase the probability of success (due to a variety of causes) assists 
planning staffs with order of battle and deployment considerations. 
 The number of initial insurgents has more of an impact in the South.  This may 
speak to slower training rates or a more fragile infrastructure.  But more likely it speaks 
to the lack of a large Sunni insurgent recruiting pool in the South.  Barring an initial lack 
of Shia popular support (which would create an insurgent recruiting pool) a successful 
insurgency would require an initial cadre to cause problems and create the chaos that 
would then enable an insurgency to take root.  Thus, the number of initial insurgents in 
the South is more significant than in the other regions, suggesting the South is the key 
region in Iraq.  These results suggest that any insurgency in the South should be given 
consideration for operational priority.  A priori identification of the critical region(s) 
gives commanders and staffs more information on which to base troop manning 
priorities. 
 The infrastructure growth modifier also substantially impacts the probability of 
success and the probability of failure.  The significance and magnitude of the 
infrastructure growth modifier coefficient suggests it has the third highest impact on 
stabilization success, behind Sunni support and insurgents in the South.  With respect to 
stabilization failure, again it is third, behind insurgents in the South and Shia support.  
The significance of this factor denotes the importance of early and rapid integration of 
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phase IV with phase III operations.  Phase IV planning should not be neglected; proper 
integration saves time and lives; poor integration costs time and lives and potentially lead 
to mission failure.  
 Given the scope of the model, not all variables have been analyzed in this 
illustration.  Further studies would do well to include the national power share percentage 
for each region, the amount of national aid disbursed to the country, indigenous troop 
training rates for each region, indigenous troop effectiveness levels, dynamic 
reinforcement of coalition troops, and an extended time window (>1500).  Each of these 
factors should be of significance to the outcome of stabilization success or failure. 
 Simple summary statistics from the experiment are provided for further 
perspective.  During model execution, the event day in which stabilization or failure 
occurred was recorded (Y3).  The two histograms (Figures 4.2 and 4.3) show the results. 
 Of the 520 experimental observations, 215 resulted in stabilization success.  The 
average number of days required to achieve stabilization success was 697.  Of the 215 
successes, 75% occurred after 500 days.  (Note: the large number of observations at 100 
is due to a minimum days in country constraint; no success was allowed before 100 
days.)  Of the 520 experimental observations, failure occurred 159 times; the average 
number of days until failure was 340.  Approximately 90% of the failures occurred before 
400 days. 
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Figure 4.2  OIF Scenario Days Until Stability Histogram 
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Figure 4.3  OIF Scenario Days Until Failure Histogram 
121 
 The summary statistics suggest that the danger period for failure is within the first 
400 days, which bodes well for the current coalition effort in Iraq.  It should be noted that 
of the 520 observations, 146 resulted in a non-decision.  Stability was not achieved within 
1500 days, but neither did coalition forces suffer the heavy casualties that would lead to 
the conjectured total withdrawal of forces.  If given more time these no-win, no-loss 
observations may have ended well for the coalition.  Examination of the casualty counts 
associated with those design runs would give some indication as to the level of success 
the ongoing operations is attaining.  In future studies, given more time, the model could 
run for as many days as necessary.  Model growth parameters would have to be 
appropriately modified to reflect the longer run time, but running the SROM out to 7 or 
even 10 years is a viable option. 
 As implied above, the fact that most stabilization failures occurred before 400 
days bodes well for the ongoing coalition effort in Iraq.  In an effort to match a scenario 
design run with the current real situation, the experimental data was searched.  Data 
points with similar casualty counts (Y4) were found; one was selected, with two of the 
resulting graphs of the model level values shown as illustration for the reader.  It should 
be noted that these results are based on ongoing operations.  It is possible a turning point 
event (e.g. a Tet offensive) has not yet occurred.  The current data used would not capture 
such a turning point event.   
 For the particular design parameters selected, the coalition achieves stability in 
833 days, suffering 14,283 casualties.  The southern region started off in the best shape 
before suffering a setback around day 300.  A heavier rate of violence then afflicted the 
region before it was brought under control again by day 450.  The northern region was  
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Figure 4.4  OIF Scenario Regional Death Rates 
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Figure 4.5  OIF Scenario Total Coalition Casualties 
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the most problematic in this run, remaining the most violent region for nearly the entire 
time.  The central region, while appearing relatively less violent caused the same number 
of coalition casualties as in the north, due to its larger population.  Analysis of other 
design points can be conducted. 
Summary 
 
 This chapter served to illustrate the utility of the stabilization and reconstruction 
model (SROM).  A notional Operation Iraqi Freedom scenario provided the backdrop for 
the illustration of the model’s uses.  A number of important factors were identified and 
tested.  Two measures were constructed that give the model user an indication of the 
probability of stabilization success or failure.  These measures were then used to 
investigate the complex interactions occurring in the model.  Of course while they do 
offer insights, due to the limitation of open source data, these results should not be 
directly compared to current operations.  The notional scenario was used only to illustrate 
the utility of the SROM, not provide actual analysis of current operations. 
 The insights resulting from such SROM scenarios could be used to investigate 
different friendly and enemy courses of action.  The model can provide general solutions 
to questions plaguing commanders and support staffs.  In particular, resource allocation 
strategies involving the prioritization of one region or population sub-group over another.  
In the OIF scenario there were only three major population sub-groups.  If there had been 
fourteen sub-groups, it would have been interesting to see which held the most 
significance in determining success and/or failure and then take the appropriate actions.  
It should also be noted, that if a particular scenario has data that refines or alters the 
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relationships in the model, the relationships can be easily modified to best represent the 
reality of the situation. 
 While the SROM is good step forward in providing decision-makers a tool for 
investigating the complexities of nation-building, there remain many facets that require 
addressing.  Chapter V discusses many of the recognized areas for further study. 
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V. Conclusions 
The stabilization and reconstruction operations model (SROM) proposed in this 
study allows the user to more precisely investigate the multi-faceted process that is 
nation-building.  The complexities of nation-building involve many different but 
interrelated systems and institutions.  Understanding the significance of the dynamic 
relationships between these systems and institutions is paramount to the successful 
conclusion of stabilization and reconstruction missions.  The system dynamics model 
proposed in this research allows decision-makers and analysts to investigate different sets 
of decision approaches at a sub-national, regional level. 
 The utility of the SROM encompasses: 
• Identification of critical regions before boots hit the ground (insurgent 
effectiveness); this allows commanders and staffs to more efficiently allocate 
troop strengths for phase IV operations.  Knowing which region is most 
susceptible to insurgency allows for a more effective prioritization.  Important 
questions can be addressed: should more troops be moved to the north or to 
the south? Where would the additional troops be most effective? 
• Identification of popular support thresholds; this allows commanders and 
staffs to assess the consequences of alienating or pandering to different 
population sub-groups.  Knowing which sub-group’s support contributes most 
towards stability (or failure) allows establishment of a more effective resource 
allocation policy.  Where should the new water plant, hospital, school, power 
generator, and so forth be built? 
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• Investigation of indigenous security forces application; determining the 
rapidity of training, recruiting numbers, duty effectiveness, and stationing 
locations of indigenous security forces facilitates the development of a more 
measured and reasoned counter insurgency policy. 
• Investigation of reconstruction alacrity; this could involve investigating which 
region has priority (relating to identification of critical regions) or given 
limited resources, determining which infrastructure system should be given 
priority.  Assessing the effects of establishing power a full six months earlier 
is one application in this area.  Another could involve the opening of a seaport 
three months ahead of schedule.  Conversely, assessing the negative effects of 
failing to rehabilitate oil refineries would be of valuable information.  Other 
problem areas that could require investigation: failure of food imports arrive, a 
neighboring country closes its border, determining which regional distribution 
of the national power supply.  The relative importance of the affected 
population sub-groups should be considered as well (critical regions). 
 
 As seen, the SROM is a multi-faceted tool that permits the modeling and 
investigation of the many differing complex systems existing within the nation-building 
paradigm.  However, there are many areas requiring further research.  The SROM does 
not account for all of the important national systems.  Many of the areas requiring 
consideration have been identified for further study.  Not surprisingly, these are the same 
areas repeatedly mentioned in the post-conflict reconstruction literature.  The Post 
Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework gives a general description and rationale for 
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many of the required additional areas (2002); the four areas parallel the four overarching 
“pillars” described in Chapter I: security, law and order, critical infrastructure, and 
governance.  
 Within a security context, there are various additions that could be made to the 
SROM.  This includes modeling an indigenous commando force, a special forces group 
that moves dynamically between regions.  Tracking paramilitary foreign security 
personnel as a level value would also be of benefit.  Tying the recruitment rate of each of 
the indigenous security institutions to popular support and perhaps GDP per capita should 
be investigated.  If the population no long supports coalition efforts, recruiting the 
required number of security personnel would be problematic.  Attrition rates should 
become more dynamic.  The expectations driving the attrition rates should be influenced 
by popular support and casualty rates.  Additionally, indigenous troop effectiveness 
should be dynamic.  As indigenous troops become more experienced, receive better 
equipment, or are provided better training, their effectiveness should be affected. 
 In a law and order context, a more detailed review of the judicial process could be 
accomplished.  This would allow more accurate modeling of conviction rates and 
criminal justice processing procedures.  Not having the proper number of judges or prison 
facilities could adversely affect the rule of law in a region.  This would allow the 
development of a criminal culture which should then be reflected with a higher number of 
criminals. 
 Critical infrastructure has many areas for expansion and improvement.  Of 
potentially significant concern, and not addressed in the SROM, is the presence of 
internally displaced persons (IDP).  Refugees are a burden on a society, especially one 
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emerging from a failed or pariah state status.  At the least, IDPs place a demand on 
resources, in terms of food, water, medicine, and other aid.  At worst, IDPs could be 
exploited for insurgent recruiting purposes. 
 Food security is very important.  This version of the SROM assumes if the 
transportation capacity allows delivery, then food is delivered.  Future versions should 
consider directly modeling food storage bins, having population demand decrease food 
supplies as the agriculture sector and food imports increase supplies.   
 Public health should be modeled as well.  This would include modeling the 
numbers and effectiveness of hospitals in a region.  The presence of hospitals would have 
a positive impact on popular support while also decreasing population death rates. 
 Public housing may be a concern in a scenario AOR.  If the population does not 
have enough shelter, public health may fall, crime may rise, and popular support may 
falter as well.  Before people worry about jobs, they worry about a place to house their 
families. 
 Public education should also be addressed.  Conflict studies have found a 
relationship between the number of students enrolled in higher education and GDP per 
capita (Collier, 2000 and Collier and Hoeffler, 2001).  The implication is that increasing 
the number of enrolled students will assist in enriching a society’s economy.  Higher 
numbers of enrolled students removes individuals from the labor force (unemployed level 
value), more accurately representing the population’s occupation status.  As for youth 
education, increasing the number of grade schools should positively impact popular 
support. 
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 Modeling a region’s economy can be difficult.  Future versions of the SROM 
could focus on a more accurate depiction of a country’s economic workings.  Partitioning 
a country’s GDP into basic categories and then dynamically attaching these GDP sectors 
to a region’s electricity, industrial water, oil, refined products, and transportation 
infrastructure would be a significant step forward.  The GDP sectors would also directly 
impact job creation and the provision of certain services.  For instance, meeting public 
housing demand requires the proper functioning of construction sector.  This construction 
sector would hire workers to meet demand but may be limited by the operational capacity 
of the transportation sector to provide raw materials.  The agricultural sector should be 
significant as well; progress in this sector not only provides new jobs but helps the 
society meet its own food requirements.  However, economic effects on local agriculture 
must be carefully judged.  Well intentioned food aid can have the unintended effect of 
driving out local agricultural production.  Telecommunications should certainly be 
included in future versions of the SROM.  A final thought would be to perhaps include 
black market activities.  The development of an illegal drug trade may be of particular 
relevance to certain nation-building scenarios. 
 The impact of non-governmental organizations (NGO) should be considered as 
well.  Given a certain tolerable level of violence (and political factors exogenous to the 
model) NGOs may contribute to the coalition stabilization and reconstruction effort.  This 
contribution may come in the form of food distribution, medicine and health aid, water 
distribution, and other areas of infrastructure growth. 
 In a governance and participation context, further research should be done to 
examine indigenous popular support.  Currently, the homicide rate, unemployment, GDP 
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per capita, and essential services (electricity, water, food, refined products) all affect a 
population’s support for the coalition stabilization and reconstruction effort.  Public 
health, housing, and education could be included as well.  The weightings given to each 
area requires further research.  Additionally, the impact of elections could be modeled as 
a discrete jump in popular support (subject to necessary security conditions).  Other 
important transitional or milestone events could be modeled as popular support 
modifications.  These discrete events that can have a profound impact on scenario 
progression lead to a discussion on perturbations. 
 Many of the random variable distributions used in the OIF scenario utilized an 
exponential distribution in an attempt to capture the characteristics of a perturbation.  It is 
quite feasible for the model user to manually shut down an infrastructure component 
subsystem (e.g. power generation) in a region and examine the fallout such an action 
would cause.  Such an endeavor might be useful in examining the cascading effects such 
perturbations may cause to the collective national infrastructure system (periodic power 
outage is a current problem).  Such specific catastrophic events can naturally occur in the 
SROM.  The sequence of events causing such a perturbation would be the occurrence of a 
large of number of attacks coupled with a high damage amount per attack.  This would 
cause an available capacity percentage (ACP) to drop to zero.  The SROM models 
perturbations in this manner.  Future versions could easily provide further perturbation 
utility by inserting additional random variables that can dynamically model the total 
collapse of key nodes within a critical infrastructure. 
 Each of these enhancements might be considered.  Inputs from the appropriate 
authorities as to which are most critical at the time should assist in the solution of 
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options.  The SROM allows a wide array of scenarios and analysis to be conducted.  The 
current version can be fitted to a number of situations.  Future versions can extend the 
current version in order to more accurately represent the daily functioning of stabilization 
and reconstruction operations within a country. 
The SROM attempts to accurately represent a complex system of systems which 
when taken in the aggregate, portrays the daily functioning of newly nascent nation.  The 
sub-national regional approach to modeling the nation-building phenomenon provides 
analysts a tool for clearer examination and understanding of the dynamic forces involved 
in stabilization and reconstruction.  Such awareness then provides the basis for coalition 
actions that lead to increased probability of success.  The overarching drive is to attain 
mission success while minimizing the cost in lives, resources, and time. 
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Appendix A. Directions for Appendices 
 These appendices describe the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) scenario 
application of the stabilization and reconstruction operations model (SROM).  The 
appendices serve as a guide for any reader wishing to navigate the OIF SROM discussed 
in Chapter IV. 
The OIF SROM was created with the use of MATLAB’s Simulink software 
package.  Thousands of blocks were required for proper construction of the relationships 
in the SROM.  These blocks are organized into subsystems, sub-models, and sub-
modules.  For new users to the software, specific directions are needed. (See 
http://www.mathworks.com/support/) 
It is assumed that MATLAB and the associated Simulink toolbox have been 
installed on the user’s computer.  After opening the MATLAB software, simulink should 
be typed at the MATLAB command prompt; the Simulink library browser window will 
open.  The user should then use the File menu to Open the OIF SROM .mdl file. 
Opening the OIF SROM reveals three regional sub-modules and the national level 
sub-model.  The regional sub-modules are organized as discussed in Chapter III.  Within 
the individual sub-models and subsystems, the blocks are color coded to give the user 
immediate information about the blocks’ function.  Green indicates the block represents a 
level value.  Yellow indicates the block is a display scope that when opened, displays the 
value of the attached signal over time.  Red indicates a rate of change, e.g. the signal 
modifies or changes the value of a green block.  Magenta indicates the attached signal is 
a function of a level value.  Finally, light blue indicates a model parameter, changeable 
by the model user. 
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The light blue blocks are most numerous and show the user the manner in which 
the different model parameters impact the signals (level values or rates of change) 
attached to them.  Double-clicking on any of the light blue blocks opens a menu with an 
associated model parameter.  The parameters in the OIF SROM are listed by sub-model 
in the subsequent appendices.  The associated values are loaded into the model at the start 
of a simulation run.  Where applicable, the parameters in the following appendices are 
described, as are sources for the values used. 
Regarding Simulink, it should be noted that the user can right-click on any of the 
blocks and select help; a detailed explanation of that block is then provided. 
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Appendix B. National Sub-Model 
% Model Wide Parameters 
national_population = 26.324e6;  % from UN/World Bank Joint Iraqi Needs 
 Assessment p59 
nat_pop_dist = [0.6 0.19 0.17 0.04]';  % national population 
 distribution – multiple sources – not exact 
ELF_national = 1-3.5*((1-sum(nat_pop_dist.^2))-0.5).^2; % modified 
 national ethno-linguistic fractionalization score, Collier et al 
K = 1; % polarization constant = 1 -> magnifies polarization 
Polarization_nat_setup = (K*(sum(nat_pop_dist.^(2.6)*nat_pop_dist',2)-
diag(nat_pop_dist.^(2.6)*nat_pop_dist'))); 
Polarization_nat = 1-Polarization_nat_setup./ 
sum(Polarization_nat_setup); % proportion of polarization held by 
each population sub-grouping 
urban_effect_constant = 0.8; % Threshold where urbanization negatively 
effects crime and insurgent recruiting -> from Niskanen 
national_labor_force_percent = 0.3074; % from UN/World Bank Joint Iraqi 
 Needs Assessment 
population_entering_workforce_annually = 0.012*0.5; % percent of  
population joining unemployed from nonlabor population -> from 
CIA World Factbook: Iraq, adjusted (by 0.5) for an assumed rate 
of retirement 
population_death_rate = 5.66/1015; % percent of population leaving 
 model from general population – from CIA World Factbook: Iraq 
population_birth_rate = 33.09/1015; % percent of population entering 
 model to general population – from CIA World Factbook: Iraq 
  
init_national_refined_products_daily_populace_demand = [3e6 15e6 18e6 0 
 4e3 0]'; % assumed approx 15e6 diesel consumed by trucking 
 industry 
liters_per_bbl = 158.984; 
tons_per_bbl = 0.136; % this is actually tonnes per bbl 
cf_per_bbl = 5658.53; 
tonnes_per_liter = tons_per_bbl/liters_per_bbl; 
diesel_seasonal_demand_modifier = [1 1 1 1]'; 
kerosene_seasonal_demand_modifier = [0.51 0.67 1.2 0.67]'; 
gasoline_seasonal_demand_modifier = [1.1 1 0.9 1]'; % gasoline demand 
 spikes somewhat in the summer and drops in winter -> notional 
fueloil_seasonal_demand_modifier = [1 1 1 1]'; 
LPG_seasonal_demand_modifier = [1 1 1 1]'; 
NaturalGas_seasonal_demand_modifier = [1 1 1 1]'; 
seasonal_demand_modifier_times = [50 141 233 324].'; 
 % assumes model begins on May 1, thus 50 days after sim begins, 
 summer starts during summer, kerosene demand drops 49% to 7.7 ML 
 and goes on to spike in the winter with an increase of 20% over 
 average (15ML) to 18 ML -> from DoD working papers brief 23Feb04 
inf_baseline = Factor(10); % infrastructure baseline modifier 
 
  
% National Level Submodel 
national_init_refined_storage = 5*[18e6 15e6 18e6 10e3 4e3 eps]'; % eps  
is a very small number, very close to zero 
national_refined_storage_capacity = 30*[18e6 15e6 18e6 10e3 4e3 eps]'; 
 % total of 30 days of stock available for storage 
national_initial_oil_GDP = 12000e6; % in US$ 
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price_per_bbl_oil = 32; % $/bbl – assumed constant throughout 
 simulation run 
national_initial_aid_GDP = 0; % in millions of US$ -> aid increases  
determined from IMF Iraq Country report (2004) 
national_aid_GDP_increases = [2000 0 2200 1200]; 
national_aid_GDP_increase_times = [30 365 730 1095]; 
national_aid_GDP_decreases = [1200]; 
national_aid_GDP_decrease_times = [1460];  
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Appendix C. Indigenous Security Institution (ISI) Sub-Model 
input.ISI.CD.training_attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .25 .5]; 
 % between 0 and 50% (mode of 25%) of class will not complete 
 training 
input.ISI.CD.training_class_length = 21; % days required to complete 
 training 
input.ISI.CD.training_class_downtime_between_classes = 7; % days 
 required for school/cadre to reconstitute 
input.ISI.CD.max_training_classes = 1; % maximum number of concurrent 
 training classes allowed in this region 
input.ISI.CD.init_training = 0; % initial people in training 
input.ISI.CD.init_CD = 0; % initial active duty civil defense 
input.ISI.CD.attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .10 .20]/365; % Cordesman, 
 US Policy in Iraq p17 – active duty attrition 
input.ISI.CD.init_awaiting_training = 0; % initial recruits awaiting 
 training 
input.ISI.CD.training_class_size = 1000; % class size 
input.ISI.CD.recruit_rate_parameter = [0 50 100]; % number of 
 unemployed recruited per day 
input.ISI.CD.goal = 61904*input.national_manning_percentage; % regional 
 goal – based on region’s share of national population 
 % manning goal numbers come from Brookings Institution Iraq Index 
 % class sizes and training cycles are set to match reported 
 manning levels for the Iraqi security organizations 
 
input.ISI.IM.training_attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .25 .5]; 
input.ISI.IM.training_class_length = 60; 
input.ISI.IM.training_class_downtime_between_classes = 30; 
input.ISI.IM.max_training_classes = 1; 
input.ISI.IM.init_training = 0; 
input.ISI.IM.init_IM = 0; 
input.ISI.IM.attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .10 .20]/365; 
input.ISI.IM.init_awaiting_training = 0; 
input.ISI.IM.training_class_size =  1000; 
input.ISI.IM.recruit_rate_parameter =   [0 50 100]; 
input.ISI.IM.goal = 36462*input.national_manning_percentage; 
  
input.ISI.BP.training_attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .25 .5]; 
input.ISI.BP.training_class_length = 60; 
input.ISI.BP.training_class_downtime_between_classes = 7; 
input.ISI.BP.max_training_classes = 2; 
input.ISI.BP.init_training = 0; 
input.ISI.BP.init_BP = 0; 
input.ISI.BP.attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .10 .20]/365; 
input.ISI.BP.init_awaiting_training = 0; 
input.ISI.BP.training_class_size =  1000; 
input.ISI.BP.recruit_rate_parameter =   [0 50 150]; 
input.ISI.BP.goal = 29360*input.national_manning_percentage; 
  
input.ISI.FPS.training_attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .25 .5]; 
input.ISI.FPS.training_class_length = 3; 
input.ISI.FPS.training_class_downtime_between_classes = 7; 
input.ISI.FPS.max_training_classes = 3;  
input.ISI.FPS.init_training = 0; 
input.ISI.FPS.init_FPS = 0; 
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input.ISI.FPS.attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .10 .20]/365; 
input.ISI.FPS.init_awaiting_training = 0; 
input.ISI.FPS.training_class_size = 500; 
input.ISI.FPS.recruit_rate_parameter = [0 250 500]; 
input.ISI.FPS.goal = 73992*input.national_manning_percentage; 
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Appendix D. Law Enforcement (LE) Sub-Model 
 
% Police Subsystem 
% similar to indigenous security institutions in appendix C 
input.LE.Pol.training_attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .25 .5]; 
input.LE.Pol.training_class_length = 60; 
input.LE.Pol.training_class_downtime_between_classes = 7; 
input.LE.Pol.max_training_classes = 2; 
input.LE.Pol.init_training = 0; 
input.LE.Pol.init_Pol = 5000; 
input.LE.Pol.attrition_rate_parameter = [.00 .05 .10]/365; 
input.LE.Pol.init_awaiting_training = 0; 
input.LE.Pol.training_class_size = 1500; 
input.LE.Pol.recruit_rate_parameter =   [0 225 450]; 
input.LE.Pol.goal = 142190*input.national_manning_percentage; 
  
% Crime Subsystem 
input.LE.crime.initial_criminals = 48.5e3; % set to reflect a natural 
 crime rate of 10768 crimes per 100,000 annually, from Niskanen 
input.LE.crime.initial_incarcerated_criminals = 0; 
input.LE.crime.Pol_effectiveness = 1; % indigenous police effectiveness 
 against crime 
input.LE.crime.CD_effectiveness = 0.9; % civil defense effectiveness 
 against crime 
input.LE.crime.CTroop_policing = 0.1; % percentage of coalition troops 
 policing 
input.LE.crime.CTroop_effectiveness = 1; % coalition troop 
 effectiveness against crime 
input.LE.crime.crimes_per_criminal_per_year = 15; % from Levitt 1995 
input.LE.crime.criminals_per_100k = 
 (2453+8315)/input.LE.crime.crimes_per_criminal_per_year; % from 
 Niskanen  
input.LE.crime.required_police_per_100k = 560; % from Niskanen Table 2 
 (double average) 
input.LE.crime.police_demand_ratio = 
 input.LE.crime.required_police_per_100k/input.LE.crime.criminals_
 per_100k; % number of police required to arrest one criminal 
input.LE.crime.daily_arrest_rate = 0.1846/365; %from Levitt 1995 table1 
input.LE.crime.daily_deterrence_rate = 0.2327/365; % from Levitt 1995 
 table 1 
input.LE.crime.deterrence_ratio = 1.2606; % from Levitt 1995, for every 
 1 criminal apprehended, 1.26 criminals are deterred and return to 
 unemployment status 
input.LE.crime.urban_effect = (1+0.9*(input.demo.percent_urban-
 urban_effect_constant)); % from Niskanen, for every 1% increase 
 in urbanization, over the urban_effect_constant, crime increases 
 by 0.9% 
input.LE.crime.baseline_criminal_replenishment_rate = 
 (input.LE.crime.daily_arrest_rate + 
 input.LE.crime.daily_deterrence_rate)*input.LE.crime.urban_effect 
input.LE.crime.baseline_criminal_recruitment_rate =  
input.LE.crime.criminals_per_100k/100000*input.LE.crime.baseline_
criminal_replenishment_rate*input.demo.init_population; 
% baseline recruit rate replenishes those criminals assumed to be 
caught or deterred when police is at its full strength 
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input.LE.crime.criminal_inertia = 1/10000; % notional – criminal 
 culture – FLL and Niskanen discuss criminal inertia 
input.LE.crime.GDP_per_capita_lag_center = 4; 
input.LE.crime.GDP_per_capita_growth_effect_constant = 2.4; % from FLL 
 – for every 1% increase (decrease) in GDP per capita, there is a 
 2.4% decrease (increase) in the number of criminals 
input.LE.crime.unemp_effect_lag_center = 4; 
input.LE.crime.unemp_effect_constant = 9; % from Niskanen – for every 
 1% decrease (increase) in unemployment, there is a 9% decrease 
 (increase) in the number of criminals 
input.LE.crime.daily_criminal_release_rate = [0.5*8.2474e-4 8.2474e-4 
 1.5*8.2474e-4]; % from Travis et al -> 8.2474e-4 = 1600/1940000 – 
 based on numbers of prisoners released daily from US prisons 
input.LE.crime.criminal_homicide_rate = 0.0032; 
 % percent of crimes committed that are murders -> from Levitt 
 1995 table 1 max column 
input.LE.crime.homicides_per_criminal_per_day = 
 input.LE.crime.criminal_homicide_rate* 
 input.LE.crime.crimes_per_criminal_per_year / 365; % this value 
 times the criminal level gives the daily number of murders 
 committed  
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Appendix E. Insurgent and Coalition Military (ICM) Sub-Model 
 
input.ICM.init_CTroops = Factor(4); % initial coalition troops  
input.ICM.init_insurgents = Factor(7); % initial insurgents 
input.ICM.death_rate_mov_cond_factor = 3; % if death rate is above 3 
 times the acceptable death rate (model_termininating_death_rate) 
 then insurgents will move to neighboring region with least 
 insurgents  
input.ICM.offensive_movement_rate = 0.01; % daily, 1% of the region's 
 insurgents will transfer to neighboring region if death rate 
 condition met 
input.ICM.offensive_insurgent_move_control = 1; 
 % 1 = insurgents will transfer regions offensively 
 % 0 = insurgents will not transfer regions offensively 
input.ICM.insurgency_failing_mov_cond_factor = 0.15; 
input.ICM.defensive_movement_rate = 0.05; % daily, 5% of the region's 
 insurgents will transfer to neighboring region when current 
 insurgents number only 15% of the all time maximum number of 
 insurgents in the region 
input.ICM.defensive_mov_rate_min_cond = 500; 
input.ICM.CTroop_movement_rate = 0.05; 
 % when 90 day mov avg death rate below 43, 5% daily of coalition 
 troops in current region will transfer to the region with the 
 highest death rate 
input.ICM.stop_CTroop_movement = 0.5; 
 % CTroops will not transfer below half-strength of original 
 regional value 
input.ICM.population_per_tip = 50e3; 
input.ICM.insurgents_per_tip = 10e3; 
input.ICM.insurgents_kia_detained_per_tip = 0.3; 
  
% Coaltion Troops Deployment & Return Subsystem 
input.ICM.CTDR.CTroop_arrival_schedule_times = [0]; % arrival times 
input.ICM.CTDR.CTroop_arrival_schedule_troops = [0];  
input.ICM.CTDR.CTroop_departure_schedule_times = [0]; % departure times 
input.ICM.CTDR.CTroop_departure_schedule_troops = [0]; 
  
% Coalition Troop Casualties & Insurgent Attacks Subsystem 
input.ICM.CTCIA.init_CTroop_KIA = 0; 
input.ICM.CTCIA.CTroop_KIA_percent = [0 0.096 0.192]; 
input.ICM.CTCIA.init_CTroop_casualties = 0; 
input.ICM.CTCIA.avg_casualties_per_insurgent_attack = 4/3*[0 0.4443 
 0.8886]; 
input.ICM.CTCIA.insurgents_per_daily_attack = 400; 
input.ICM.CTCIA.daily_casualty_rate_inertia_effect = 2; 
input.ICM.CTCIA.insurgent_differential_effect = 3000; 
input.ICM.CTCIA.CTroop_casualty_inertial_center = 30; % ±3 days on 
 either side of center -> 7 day window 
input.ICM.CTCIA.insurgents_inertial_center = 30; % ±3 days on either 
 side of center -> 7 day window 
input.ICM.CTCIA.light_casualty_percentage = [0.19 0.39 0.59]; % 
 percentage of casualties returning to service 
 % after treatment for minor injuries -> from strategypage.com 
input.ICM.CTCIA.light_casualty_service_return_delay = [0 3 6]; 
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% Civilian Collateral Deaths Subsystem 
% derived from regression of Brookings Institute for Insurgent Attacks 
 and Insurgents KIA or Detained 
input.ICM.CD.civilian_collateral_insurgent_attack_effect = 10; 
 % For every ~10 Insurgent Attacks on a given day, the average 
 number of daily civilian deaths increases by 1 
input.ICM.CD.civilian_collateral_insurgent_KIA_Detained_effect = 20; 
% For every ~20 Insurgents Killed or Detained, the average number 
of daily civilian deaths increases by 1 
input.ICM.CD.civilian_collateral_deaths_uncertainty = [0.75 1 1.25]; 
input.ICM.CD.init_civilian_collateral_deaths = 0; 
input.ICM.CD.avg_deaths_per_insurgent_attack_civ = [0 10 20]; 
  
% International Insurgent Subsystem 
% Number of Troops Patrolling Border necessary to stop 50% of 
 infiltration 
input.ICM.II.BP_max_percent_deter_attack = 0.5; 
input.ICM.II.BP_effectiveness_constant = 32e3* 
 input.national_manning_percentage; 
input.ICM.II.international_insurgent_infiltration_rate = 1; 
input.ICM.II.BP_effectiveness = 1; 
input.ICM.II.CTroop_patrolling_border_percent = 0.025; 
input.ICM.II.CTroop_border_effectiveness = 1; 
  
% Insurgent Killed or Detained Subsystem (IKD) 
input.ICM.IKD.init_detained_insurgents = 0; 
input.ICM.IKD.init_killed_insurgents = 0; 
input.ICM.IKD.insurgent_KIA_uncertainty = [0 0.25 0.5]; 
input.ICM.IKD.counter_insurgency_effect_parameter = 15000; 
% Number of Troops necessary for 0.15% of insurgents to be killed or 
 % apprehended daily 
input.ICM.IKD.counter_insurgency_apprehension_avg = 0.0015; 
input.ICM.IKD.CTroop_counter_insurgency_percent = 0.4; 
input.ICM.IKD.CTroop_CIOP_effectiveness = 1; 
input.ICM.IKD.IM_CIOP_effectiveness = 0.75; 
input.ICM.IKD.CD_CIOP_effectiveness = 0.6; 
input.ICM.IKD.Pol_CIOP_effectiveness = 0.5; 
input.ICM.IKD.detained_insurgent_holding_time = [90 150 210]; 
input.ICM.IKD.detained_insurgent_release_rate = [0 0.10 0.20]; 
  
% Insurgent Attack Direction Subsystem (IAD) 
input.ICM.IAD.percent_attacks_all_troops = [0.78 0.84 0.90]; 
input.ICM.IAD.percent_attacks_civilians = [0 .02 .04]; 
input.ICM.IAD.percent_attacks_CI = [0 .02 .04]; 
input.ICM.IAD.CTroop_insurgent_attack_bias = 1.5; 
% Insurgent preference to attack coaltion troops over and above 
CTroop's relative proportion to that of indigenous security forces 
  
% Indigenous Security Forces Casualties (ISFC) Subsystem 
input.ICM.ISFC.avg_casualties_per_insurgent_attack_Pol = [0 7.1 10.6]; 
input.ICM.ISFC.avg_casualties_per_insurgent_attack_CD = [0 8.6 12.9]; 
input.ICM.ISFC.avg_casualties_per_insurgent_attack_IM = [0 8.6 12.9]; 
% from Cordesman Table 
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% Insurgent Recruit Rate 
input.ICM.IRR.LER_center = 4; % ±3 days on either side of center -> 7 
 day window 
input.ICM.IRR.baseline_recruit_rate = 1/10000; 
input.ICM.IRR.CTroop_presence_aggravation_factor = 100; % 1 troop 
 counts for 100 people for determining troop concentration 
input.ICM.IRR.ELF = 1-3.5*((1-sum(input.demo.pop_dist.^2))-0.5).^2; % 
 modified regional ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
input.ICM.IRR.polarization_setup = 
 (K*(sum(input.demo.pop_dist.^(2.6)*input.demo.pop_dist',2)-
 diag(input.demo.pop_dist.^(2.6)*input.demo.pop_dist'))); 
input.ICM.IRR.polarization = 1-input.ICM.IRR.polarization_setup./ 
 sum(input.ICM.IRR.polarization_setup); 
input.ICM.IRR.baseline_recruit_rate = 1/10000; 
input.ICM.IRR.urban_effect = 1 + 0.9*(input.demo.percent_urban-
 urban_effect_constant); % from Niskanen 
input.ICM.IRR.GDP_per_capita_growth_effect_constant = 2.4; % from FLL 
input.ICM.IRR.unemp_effect_constant = 9; % from Niskanen 
input.ICM.IRR.inertia_effect = 1/1000; % for every thousand insurgents 
1 new recruit per day 
input.ICM.IRR.insurgents_kia_detained_lag_center = 7; 
input.ICM.IRR.death_capture_effect = 1/100; % for every hundred dead or 
 captured insurgents 1 less recruit per day 
input.ICM.IRR.media_penetration = 0.577; % from 17 Feb 04 DoD brief 
 (central sat TV) 
input.ICM.IRR.negative_media_share = 0.25; % Notional 
input.ICM.IRR.media_effect = input.ICM.IRR.media_penetration* 
 input.ICM.IRR.negative_media_share*1e-3/365; 
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Appendix F. Demographics (demo) Sub-Model 
 
input.demo.init_general_population = input.demo.init_population*(1-
 national_labor_force_percent); 
input.demo.init_unemp_rate = 0.35; % Actual rate will be biased 
 slightly higher 
input.demo.init_govt_emp_rate = 0.10; % case made on p.5 of UN/World 
 Bank Joint Iraqi Needs Assessment 
input.demo.init_private_emp_rate = 0.55; 
input.demo.init_unemp_persons = 
input.demo.init_unemp_rate*input.demo.init_population* 
 national_labor_force_percent-input.ICM.init_insurgents-
 input.ICM.IKD.init_detained_insurgents-
 input.LE.crime.initial_incarcerated_criminals-
 input.LE.crime.initial_criminals; 
input.demo.init_govt_emp = 
 input.demo.init_population*input.demo.init_govt_emp_rate*national
 _labor_force_percent-input.LE.Pol.init_Pol-input.ISI.BP.init_BP-
 input.ISI.IM.init_IM-input.ISI.CD.init_CD-input.ISI.FPS.init_FPS; 
input.demo.init_private_emp = input.demo.init_population* 
 input.demo.init_private_emp_rate*national_labor_force_percent; 
input.demo.crime_deaths_percentage = [0.08 0.08 0.08 0.7]; % crime 
 deaths for Unemp, Govt, Private, & General ** Left over 
 percentage is for criminal vs criminal deaths 
input.LE.criminals_crime_deaths = 1-
 sum(input.demo.crime_deaths_percentage); % criminal deaths due to 
 criminal infighting 
input.demo.collateral_deaths_percentage = [0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7]; % 
 collateral deaths due to insurgency for General, Unemp, Govt, & 
 Private ** Sums to one 
input.demo.private_sector_GDP_job_growth_effect = -0.4; % Private 
 sector job growth/decline due to GDP 
 % +1%(+2.5%) GDP Growth = -0.4%(-1%) Unemployed Okun's Law 
input.demo.additional_govt_jobs_needed = 0.25; % additional jobs needed 
 by govt as percentage of INITIAL number of govt employees 
input.demo.govt_hiring_goal = 
 input.demo.additional_govt_jobs_needed*input.demo.init_govt_emp; 
input.demo.govt_hiring_goal_time_required = 180; 
input.demo.govt_hiring_avg = input.demo.govt_hiring_goal/ 
 input.demo.govt_hiring_goal_time_required; 
input.demo.govt_hiring_rate_parameter = [0 input.demo.govt_hiring_avg 
 2*input.demo.govt_hiring_avg]; 
input.demo.insurgent_attack_deaths_percentage = [0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7]; % 
 insurgent caused deaths for Unemp, Govt, Private, & General 
input.demo.primary_death_rate_mov_avg_length = 7; 
input.demo.death_rate_mov_avg_length = 30; 
input.demo.terminating_death_rate_mov_avg_length = 90; 
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Appendix G. Critical Infrastructure (CI) Sub-Model 
 
input.CI.insurgent_infrastructure_attack_dist = cumsum([0.5 0.20 0.20  
0.10]);  share of infrastructure attacks on oil, electrical, 
 transportation, & water 
input.CI.FPS_max_percent_deter_attack = 0.5; 
input.CI.FPS_effectiveness_constant = 88e3* 
 input.national_manning_percentage; 
 % Number of Troops Guarding Infrastructure necessary to stop 50% 
 of insurgent attacks 
input.CI.FPS_troop_effectiveness = 1; 
input.CI.foreign_security_contractors = 5e3; 
  
% *********** Oil Infrastructure Subsystem ************* 
input.CI.oil.insurgent_oil_attack_dist = cumsum([0.10 0.20 0.50 0 0 
 0.20]);  percentage of oil infrastructure attacks on extraction, 
 regional pipeline, inter-reg pipeline, refinery, export 
 terminals, refined products transport 
  
% Oil Extraction -> Regional Oilfields (Oil Wells, etc) 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_extraction_efficiency = 0; 
input.CI.oil.oil_extraction_efficiency_baseline_growth_rate = 
 inf_baseline*1/270; % 270 days until 100% when starting at 0% 
 efficiency 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_extraction_capacity = 1.0e6; % Northern Oilfields 
 % Kirkuk, Bai Hassan, Jambur, Khabbaz, Ajil 
input.CI.oil.oil_extraction_capacity_increase_times = [0 0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_extraction_capacity_increases = [0 0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_extraction_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_extraction_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_extraction_storage = 0; 
input.CI.oil.oil_extraction_storage_capacity = 1.0e6; 
input.CI.oil.insurgent_attack_extraction_effect_oil = [0 .10 .20]; 
input.CI.oil.extraction_power_demand = 0.004; % MWhrs/bbl 
 % -> from EIA Petroleum Supply Annual 2003 Vol 1, table 46,47 
 % -> assumed half as intensive as refinery operations (.008) 
input.CI.oil.extraction_trans_effect = 1; 
  
% Natural Gas Extraction -> Regional Non-Associated Gas Reservoirs 
input.CI.oil.init_NG_extraction_efficiency = 0; 
input.CI.oil.NG_extraction_efficiency_baseline_growth_rate = 
 inf_baseline*1/365; 
input.CI.oil.init_NG_extraction_capacity = 50e6; % cf/d al-Anfal 
input.CI.oil.NG_extraction_capacity_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.NG_extraction_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.NG_extraction_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.NG_extraction_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.NG_extraction_power_demand = 7.0690e-007; % MWhrs/cf  
 % Converted from Oil Extraction Requirements 
input.CI.oil.init_NG_extraction_storage = 0; 
input.CI.oil.NG_extraction_storage_capacity = 100e6; % cf/d 
input.CI.oil.insurgent_attack_extraction_effect_NG = [0 .10 .20]; 
input.CI.oil.natural_gas_extraction_trans_effect = 1; 
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% Regional Oil Pipeline(s), transports oil from any Regional Production 
 Facilities 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_transportation_efficiency = 0; 
input.CI.oil.oil_transportation_efficiency_baseline_growth_rate = 
 inf_baseline*1/270; 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_transportation_capacity = 1.4e6; 
input.CI.oil.oil_transportation_capacity_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_transportation_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_transportation_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_transportation_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.insurgent_attack_trans_effect = [0 .12 .24]; 
input.CI.oil.regional_pipeline_power_demand = 0.002; 
input.CI.oil.regional_pipeline_trans_effect = 1; 
  
% Interregional Oil Pipeline(s) 
input.CI.oil.init_interregional_oil_transportation_efficiency = 0; 
input.CI.oil.interregional_oil_trans_eff_baseline_growth_rate = 
 inf_baseline*1/270; % 270 days until 100% when starting at 0% 
 efficiency 
input.CI.oil.init_interregional_oil_transportation_capacity = 1.4e6; 
input.CI.oil.interregional_oil_transportation_capacity_increase_times = 
 [0]; 
input.CI.oil.interregional_oil_transportation_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.interregional_oil_transportation_capacity_decrease_times = 
 [0]; 
input.CI.oil.interregional_oil_transportation_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.insurgent_attack_interreg_trans_effect = [0 .12 .24]; 
input.CI.oil.interregional_pipeline_power_demand = 0.002; % Notional – 
 gross estimation from EIA  
input.CI.oil.interregional_oil_pipeline_trans_effect = 1; 
  
  
% Regional Refinery Capability 
% can be fed from interregional pipelines, regional pipelines, or both 
% [Diesel Kerosene Gas FuelOil LPG NaturalGas] 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_refined_production_yields = [0.29 0.19 0.24 
 0.17 .05 .02]; % note that Natural Gas added to reflect 
 production of associated gas 
 % from -> Platt's Description on crude oil yields -> can be 
 altered to reflect different production schemes 
 % yields should sum to 0.95 = one minus .05 for refinery 
 consumption 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_refined_production_per_bbl = 
 input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_refined_production_yields(1:3)* 
 liters_per_bbl % Diesel, Kerosene, and Gas output in terms of L 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_refined_production_per_bbl(4) = 
 input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_refined_production_yields(4); 
 % FuelOil output remains in terms of bbl 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_refined_production_per_bbl(5) = 
 input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_refined_production_yields(5)* 
 tons_per_bbl; % LPG output in terms of metric tons 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_refined_production_per_bbl(6) = 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_refined_production_yields(6)*cf_per_bbl; 
 % NaturalGas output in terms of cubic feet (cf) 
 % If all daily NG production converted to LPG -> 
 227.4e6/cf_per_bbl*tons_per_bbl = 5465.4 tons 
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input.CI.oil.init_oil_refinery_capacity = 0; % bbl of crude 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_refinery_efficiency = 0; 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_efficiency_baseline_growth_rate = 
 inf_baseline*1/365; % 365 days until 100% when starting at 0% 
 efficiency 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_capacity_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_production_time = 3; % days to produce 
 refined products (distillation process) 
input.CI.oil.refinery_production_variance = [0.90 1 1.1]; % triangular 
 distribution showing uncertainity 
input.CI.oil.insurgent_attack_refinery_effect = [0 .10 .20]; 
input.CI.oil.refinery_pipeline_power_demand = 0.008; %MWh/bbl -> from 
 EIA (2003) 
input.CI.oil.refined_oil_products_import = 0.23*[3e6 3e6 6e6 0 2e3 0]'; 
 % percentage comes from UNJLC Iraq Bulletin No.6 (23% import into 
 North) 
input.CI.oil.oil_refinery_trans_effect = 1; 
  
% Refined Producs Demand Subsystem 
input.CI.oil.NG_to_LPG_conversion_time = 1; % gas-to-liquid conversion 
 process delay, days 
input.CI.oil.refined_products_trans_effect = 1; 
  
% *** Export Terminal Subsystem *** 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_exportation_efficiency = 0; 
input.CI.oil.oil_exportation_efficiency_baseline_growth_rate = 
 inf_baseline*1/180; 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_exportation_capacity = 0; % from EIA country 
 analysis brief 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_exportation_storage = 0; 
input.CI.oil.init_oil_exportation_storage_capacity = 0; % guestimate 
input.CI.oil.oil_exportation_capacity_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_exportation_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_exportation_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_exportation_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_exportation_storage_capacity_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_exportation_storage_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_exportation_storage_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.oil_exportation_storage_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.oil.insurgent_attack_terminal_effect = [0 .10 .20]; 
input.CI.oil.export_terminal_power_demand = 0.003; 
input.CI.oil.export_terminal_trans_effect = 1; % 1st order effect 
  
% *********** Electricity Infrastructure Subsystem ************* 
input.CI.electric.insurgent_elec_attack_dist = cumsum([0.7*3/36 
 0.7*6/36 0.7*12/36 0.7*7/36 0.7*8/36 .3]); % distribution of 
 attacks against diesel, crude, fuel oil, natural gas, and hydro 
 generation, last entry concerns transmission and distribution 
 subsystem 
input.CI.electric.national_power_share = 0.25; % share of national 
 power grid (MWhrs) that region draws upon 
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% Electricity Generation 
input.CI.electric.insurgent_attack_electric_gen_effect = [0 .10 .20]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_maint_modifier = [1 1 0.80 1]'; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_maint_modifier_times = [50 141 233 324]'; 
input.CI.electric.init_imported_elec_generation = 0; % MWhrs 60 Syria 
 80 Turkey see transmission subsystem for import control 
input.CI.electric.imported_elec_generation_increases = [30*24 110*24]; 
 % Power from Syria and Turkey 
input.CI.electric.imported_elec_generation_increase_times = [150 180]; 
input.CI.electric.imported_elec_generation_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.imported_elec_generation_decrease_times = [0]; 
  
% Diesel/GasOil Fuel Generators 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_efficiency_diesel = 0.25; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_eff_baseline_growth_rate_diesel = 
 inf_baseline*1/730; 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_capacity_diesel = 130; % MW 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increase_times_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increases_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decrease_times_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decreases_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_requirement_diesel = 118.3; % L diesel/MWhr 
 generated -> from US/Canada Blackout Study Appendix p111... 
 4/128*1/42*158.984*1000 
input.CI.electric.init_fuel_storage_capacity_diesel = 400e3; 
input.CI.electric.init_fuel_storage_diesel = 200e3; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_increase_times_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_increases_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_decreases_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_decrease_times_diesel = [0]; 
 % stand alone generators are detached from national grid 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_efficiency_diesel = 1; 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_capacity_diesel = 0; 
input.CI.electric.stand_alone_gen_eff_base_growth_rate_diesel = 
 inf_baseline*1/30; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increase_times_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increases_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decrease_times_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decreases_diesel = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.transportation_gen_effect_diesel = 1;  
  
% Crude Fuel Generators 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_efficiency_crude = 0.25; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_eff_baseline_growth_rate_crude = 
 inf_baseline*1/730; 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_capacity_crude = 224; % MW 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increase_times_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increases_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decrease_times_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decreases_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_requirement_crude = 0.5883; % bbl crude oil/MWhr 
 generated conversions vary depending on the type of crude oil & 
 energy conversion -> from 
 http://www.spe.org/spe/jsp/basic/0,,1104_1732,00.html 
 % 1/(5.8e6*1055.059*1e-6/3.6*1e-3) = 0.5883 
input.CI.electric.init_fuel_storage_capacity_crude = 50e3; 
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input.CI.electric.init_fuel_storage_crude = 20e3; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_increase_times_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_increases_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_decreases_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_decrease_times_crude = [0]; 
 % stand alone generators are detached from national grid 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_efficiency_crude = 1; 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_capacity_crude = 0; 
input.CI.electric.stand_alone_gen_eff_base_growth_rate_crude = 
 inf_baseline*1/30; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increase_times_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increases_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decrease_times_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decreases_crude = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.transportation_gen_effect_crude = 1;  
  
% FuelOil Generators 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_efficiency_foil = 0.25; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_eff_baseline_growth_rate_foil = 
 inf_baseline*1/730; 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_capacity_foil = 707; % MW 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increase_times_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increases_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decrease_times_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decreases_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_requirement_foil = 0.5427; % bbl/MWhr generated 
 % from Platt's 1/(6.287e6*1055.059*1e-6/3.6*1e-3) = 0.5427 bbl 
 fuel oil/MWhr 
input.CI.electric.init_fuel_storage_capacity_foil = 50e3; % bbl of 
 fuel oil 
input.CI.electric.init_fuel_storage_foil = 0; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_increase_times_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_increases_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_decreases_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_decrease_times_foil = [0]; 
 % stand alone generators are detached from national grid 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_efficiency_foil = 1; 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_capacity_foil = 0; 
input.CI.electric.stand_alone_gen_eff_base_growth_rate_foil = 
 inf_baseline*1/30; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increase_times_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increases_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decrease_times_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decreases_foil = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.transportation_gen_effect_foil = 1;  
  
 
% Natural Gas Generators 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_efficiency_NG = 0; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_eff_baseline_growth_rate_NG = 
 inf_baseline*1/730; 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_capacity_NG = 800; % MW 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increase_times_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increases_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decrease_times_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decreases_NG = [0]; 
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input.CI.electric.fuel_requirement_NG = 3000; % cf/MWhr generated 
 % -> from US/Canada Blackout Study Appendix p.111... 3*1000  
input.CI.electric.init_fuel_storage_NG = 0; 
input.CI.electric.init_fuel_storage_capacity_NG = 46e6; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_increase_times_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_increases_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_decreases_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.fuel_storage_capacity_decrease_times_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_efficiency_NG = 1; 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_capacity_NG = 0; 
input.CI.electric.stand_alone_gen_eff_base_growth_rate_NG = 1/30; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increase_times_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increases_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decrease_times_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decreases_NG = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.transportation_gen_effect_NG = 1; 
  
% Hydroelectric Generators 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_efficiency_hydro = 0.5; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_eff_baseline_growth_rate_hydro = 
 inf_baseline*1/365; 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_gen_capacity_hydro = 660; % MW only river 
 flow  restricts generating capacity (water supply exogenous to 
 model) 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increase_times_hydro = 0; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_increases_hydro = 0; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decrease_times_hydro = 0; 
input.CI.electric.elec_gen_capacity_decreases_hydro = 0; 
 % stand alone generators are detached from national grid 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_efficiency_hydro = 1; 
input.CI.electric.init_stand_alone_gen_capacity_hydro = 0; 
input.CI.electric.stand_alone_gen_eff_base_growth_rate_hydro = 
 inf_baseline*1/30; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increase_times_hydro = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_increases_hydro = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decrease_times_hydro = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_sa_capacity_decreases_hydro = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.transportation_gen_effect_hydro = 1;  
  
% Electricity Transmission Subsystem 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_trans_eff = 0.75; 
input.CI.electric.elec_trans_eff_baseline_growth_rate = 
 inf_baseline*1/270; 
input.CI.electric.init_elec_trans_capacity = 3112*24; % MWhrs 
input.CI.electric.elec_trans_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_trans_capacity_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_trans_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.elec_trans_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.electric.trans_line_power_loss_percent = [.05 .07]; 
input.CI.electric.insurgent_attack_electric_trans_effect = [0 .12 .24]; 
input.CI.electric.transportation_trans_effect = 1; 
input.CI.electric.power_import_grid_control = 1; 
 % 1 => imported power joins national grid 
 % 0 => imported power only available for regional consumption 
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% Electricity Demand Subsystem 
input.CI.electric.population_demand = 0.0027; % MWhr per capita per day 
input.CI.electric.non_oil_industrial_demand = 18.5; % MWhr per non-oil 
 GDP million dollars 
input.CI.electric.oil_industrial_demand_priority = 1; 
 % 1 = oil industry receives full priority 
 % 0 = even distribution among populace, industry, and oil 
input.CI.electric.pop_demand_uncertainty = [.9 1 1.1]; 
input.CI.electric.industrial_demand_uncertainty = [.9 1 1.1]; 
input.CI.electric.pop_demand_seasonal_modifier = [0.25 0.75 41]; 
input.CI.electric.non_oil_demand_seasonal_modifier = [0.05 0.95 41]; 
 % sine wave depicting seasonal demand -> amplitude = 0.25, center 
 bias = 0.75 and initial phase bias = 41 days => time begins May 
 1, (t = 0) and since day 50 is summer we need to subtract 41 from 
 the period of 91.25. Wave begins with an upslope toward 1 for 
 summer (day 50), dropping to 0.75 in fall (day 141), then dips to 
 0.5 (day 233) in winter before rising again 
  
% *********** Water Infrastructure Subsystem ************* 
input.CI.water.baseline_growth_rate = inf_baseline*1/365; 
input.CI.water.init_percent_capacity_available = 0.25; 
input.CI.water.insurgent_attack_effect = [0 .10 .20]; 
input.CI.water.init_potable_water_capacity = 150e6; % Mliters/day 
input.CI.water.demand_per_capita = 15; 
input.CI.water.potable_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.water.potable_capacity_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.water.potable_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.water.potable_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.water.trans_effect = 1; 
  
% *********** Transportation Infrastructure Subsystem ************* 
input.CI.transport.insurgent_attack_dist = cumsum([0.75 0 0.2 0.05]); 
 % attack distribution on road, seaport, rail system, and airports 
  
input.CI.transport.road_init_tractor_trucks = 2200; 
input.CI.transport.vehicle_capacity_increases = [200 200 200 200 200]; 
input.CI.transport.vehicle_capacity_increase_times = [180 365 545 730 
 1095]; 
input.CI.transport.vehicle_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.vehicle_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.road_trailer_tonnage = 0.5*15+0.5*44; 
 % This assumes 50% of the trucking fleet is 15 tons and the other 
 50% is of the 44 ton variety (50 tonne trailer - max allowable 
 load = 44 tonnes)  
input.CI.transport.road_init_infrastructure_index = 0.75; % notional 
 % congestion delay idleness factors resulting from a variety of 
 factors including transport route closed, bridge out, poor road 
 quality, customs delay 
input.CI.transport.road_infra_index_increases = [0.05 0.1]; 
input.CI.transport.road_infra_index_increase_times = [365 730]; 
input.CI.transport.road_infra_index_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.road_infra_index_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.road_insurgent_attack_effect = [0 1 2]; % each 
 insurgent attack against trucking takes down 0 to 2 trucks 
input.CI.transport.road_criminal_effect_uncert = [0.5 1 1.5]; 
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input.CI.transport.road_crime_effect_factor = 1/40000; % 1 truck-
 jackings per 40000 criminals daily 
input.CI.transport.diesel_required_per_vehicle = 1800; % liters per 
 truck per day -> assumes 15e6 of 18e6 (80%) diesel demand per day 
 used by trucking industry % 15e6/8300 = 1800 
  
input.CI.transport.seaport_init_availability = 0; 
input.CI.transport.seaport_availability_growth = inf_baseline*1/730; 
input.CI.transport.seaport_init_capacity = 0; % tonnes 
input.CI.transport.seaport_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.seaport_capacity_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.seaport_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.seaport_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.seaport_insurgent_attack_effect = [0 .10 .20]; 
  
input.CI.transport.rail_init_availability = 1; 
input.CI.transport.rail_availability_repair = inf_baseline*1/180; 
input.CI.transport.rail_insurgent_attack_effect = [0 0.12 0.24]; 
input.CI.transport.rail_init_capacity = 200; % tonnes per day 
input.CI.transport.rail_capacity_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.rail_capacity_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.rail_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.rail_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
  
input.CI.transport.air_init_availability = 1; 
input.CI.transport.air_availability_repair = inf_baseline*1/180; 
input.CI.transport.air_insurgent_attack_effect = [0 0.10 0.2]; 
input.CI.transport.air_init_capacity = 10; % tonnes per day 
input.CI.transport.air_capacity_increases = [50 50]; 
input.CI.transport.air_capacity_increase_times = [365 540]; 
input.CI.transport.air_capacity_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.air_capacity_decrease_times = [0]; 
  
input.CI.transport.refined_oil_products_import = 
input.CI.oil.refined_oil_products_import; 
input.CI.transport.init_oil_power_demand = 4e3; % tonnes per day 
input.CI.transport.oil_power_demand_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.oil_power_demand_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.oil_power_demand_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.oil_power_demand_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.init_coalition_demand = 2e3; % tonnes per day 
 % note: this is coalition demand on non-military transport 
 services only 
input.CI.transport.coalition_demand_increases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.coalition_demand_increase_times = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.coalition_demand_decreases = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.coalition_demand_decrease_times = [0]; 
input.CI.transport.refined_oil_products_import(1:3) = 
input.CI.oil.refined_oil_products_import(1:3)*tonnes_per_liter; 
 % daily regional import, rough estimate of weight for diesel, 
 kerosene, and gasoline/benzene 
input.CI.transport.food_demand_per_capita = .0011; % tonnes per day per 
 person on Food Rations -> from 530e3 tonnes of food per month 
 needed for 60% of national population -> from 23 Feb 04 Iraq 
 Update Brief 
input.CI.transport.percent_population_on_food_ration = 0.60; 
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input.CI.transport.commercial_demand_per_NonOilGDP = 10.83; % 10.83 
 daily tonnes per NonOil GDP million dollars % calculated from 
 UNJLC bulletin 6 figures on import tonnage 
input.CI.transport.food_delivery_priority_control = 0; 
 % 1 = food tonnage demand satisfied before any commercial and 
 fuel shipping 
% 0 = food demand treated equally 
  
% ********************************************************************* 
% Economic Subsystem 
input.CI.econ.init_NonOil_GDP = 770; % in millions of US$  
input.CI.econ.NonOil_GDP_growth = 0.35; % expected annual growth if 
 essential services demands are met -> from IMF Iraq report 
input.CI.econ.violence_GDP_reduction_factor = [28 .02]; 
 % from Bejarano -> a murder rate of 28 per 100k corresponds to a 
 loss of 2% GDP annually 
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Appendix H. Public Opinion (PO) Sub-Model 
 
All parameters affecting popular support are notional. 
 
% ********************************************************************* 
% Public Opionion Sub-Model 
input.PO.init_population_support= [Factor(1) Factor(2) Factor(3) .75]'; 
 % popular support percentages for the three major population sub-
 groups, Shia, Sunni, Kurd – the “Others” sub-group always starts 
 at 0.75 
input.PO.baseline_acceptable_civilian_death_rate_annually = 43/100e3;   
input.PO.civilian_death_effect_constant = 150; % for every 1 person 
 killed over the acceptable level of violence, 100 supporters lost 
input.PO.GDP_per_capita_factor = 0.1; % one percent rise in GDP per 
 capita corresponds to a 0.1 increase in popular support relative 
 to the current popular support 
input.PO.demand_ratio_weights = [1 1 1 1]; 
 % importance weighting factor for demand ratios 
 % Power, Water, Food, Refined Products Demand 
input.PO.baseline_demand_ratio = 0.75; % for essential services demand 
 ratios - above baseline, popular support increases – below 
 baseline, popular support decreases 
input.PO.unemp_eff_constant = 4; % Notional - for every person removed 
 from (put on) unemployment 4 people support (don't support) 
 coalition efforts 
 
Note that region2 and region3 are not shown in these appendices. 
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